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Preface: 
Perceptions of Hungary and Hungarians 
Throughout the Centuries 
Nandor Dreisziger 
2006 is a special year in the evolution of the Hungarian communities of 
North America, and especially, Canada. It marks the fiftieth anniversary 
of the coming of the refugees of the 1956 anti-Soviet revolution in 
Hungary. With the arrival of those refugees, the writer of these lines 
included, the life of Canada's Magyar colonies was revitalized. With over 
38,000 additional Hungarians settling in Canada, a new era began in the 
Magyar neighbourhoods of metropolitan centres such as Toronto, Mont-
real, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton, as well as smaller settle-
ments. With this event commenced what has been called the "golden age" 
of the Hungarian ethnic group in this country.1 
To celebrate this anniversary we plan to publish two volumes of 
our journal, both of them bulkier than has been our tradition in the past. 
For the first of our "1956" commemorative issues we present a volume of 
essays that, on first impression, contains a selection of articles on an 
assortment of subjects with no manifest correlation to each other. Never-
theless, the papers have one over-riding theme, since to a greater or lesser 
degree all of them deal with the image Hungary and/or Hungarians at 
home or abroad projected to the outside world. For this reason we feel 
entitled to call the volume "The Image of Hungary and Hungarians." 
The very first essay in the collection, by George Bisztray, our 
journal's former co-editor, treats the subject of what impression Hungary 
made on foreign visitors from late medieval times to the middle of the 
nineteenth century. The following paper, that of Zoltan Fejos, the C.E.O. 
of Hungary's Museum of Ethnography, examines the evolution of "mother 
tongue" education in early Hungarian-American communities and con-
cludes that, among other things, the ethnic schools Magyar immigrants 
established at the turn of the last century, bolstered above all their self-
image — and by doing so contributed to the preservation of their ethnic 
consciousness. 
The next study, by Canadian literary historian Kenneth McRobbie, 
tells the story that post-1914 Hungary's most prominent female revolutio-
nary figure, Ilona Duczynska never managed to narrate in a comprehen-
sive auto-biography. The article explains how this rebellious young 
woman of noble background managed to form an image of Hungary's 
Prime Minister Istvan Tisza as war-mongering anti-democrat, insensitive 
to the sufferings of his people — an image that many inside and outside 
of Hungary shared at the time. She convinced herself that only the 
elimination of Tisza would free her nation from its torments and tormen-
tors. She was ready to sacrifice herself for her cause, but fate intervened 
at the last moment and the planned assassination became unnecessary. 
The next paper, by University of Sherbrooke political scientist 
Dany Deschenes, deals directly with the evolving image of Austria-
Hungary — and within it, the historic Kingdom of Hungary — in the 
decades before (and also during) the First World War. He explains how 
the erosion of the largely positive image that Hungary had in France from 
1848 to the 1870s contributed to the rise of a political atmosphere in 
which Hungary's dismemberment in the post-World War I peace settle-
ment became possible and, in fact, a probable development. 
The following essay, by the Canadian-trained historian Bela Bodo, 
explains how the maraudings of the "White" officers' detachments during 
the chaos after a lost war, two unsuccessful revolutions, and foreign occu-
pation, were perceived by Hungary's rulers as impacting negatively on the 
country's image, and — after many delays and some difficulties — reined 
them in. The next two papers, by American scholars Thomas Sakmyster 
and Marguerite DeHuszar Allen respectively, also touch on the issue of 
the image Hungarian right-wing leaders projected, for Hungary and for 
her politics, during the interwar and the World War II years. Finally, in 
her essay, Emese Ivan of the University of Western Ontario deals with the 
image people in charge of Hungary's sports policies project for their 
country and its sports establishment in the post-communist era. 
* * * 
We hope to mark the 50th anniversary of 1956 further by publishing in a 
supplemental 2006 volume a collection of essays pertaining directly to 
some of the antecedents as well as the aftermath of that important event 
in Hungarian history. We also plan to include papers as well as docu-
ments in this anthology that deal with the coming of the 1956 refugees to 
Canada, their reception here and their adjustment to Canadian life. 
Our 2006 output represents a departure from our traditions not 
only in the publication of two bulky volumes in a single year but also in 
the authorship of their contents. Unlike other volumes over the years 
whose articles were produced by a combination of American, Hungarian, 
and Canadian authors, these volumes, in particular the first one, have been 
written mainly by Canadian academics. The fact that several scholars in 
Canada are active in the field of Hungarian studies is to some extent an 
indication of the continued vitality of Hungarian culture in Canada, a 
vitality that had been reinvigorated as a result of the coming of the 
refugees of 1956 to this country in that year and in 1957 — and to a 
lesser degree even thereafter in the case of refugees whose first destina-
tion had been a country other than Canada. 
Our present volume, the 2006 "official" double-issue, represents a 
departure from our traditions in one other way as well. Some academic 
journals occasionally publish essays by graduate students. Our journal has 
resisted this idea. This time we made an exception and we included a 
paper by Dany Deschenes in our collection. Although Dr. Deschenes is a 
full-time academic now, at the time he wrote his paper and presented it at 
the annual meeting of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada that 
was held at Laval University in Quebec City in 2001, he was a graduate 
student. His paper, explaining some of the background to the dismember-
ment of the historic Kingdom of Hungary in the wake of World War I, 
will no doubt interest Hungarians and Hungarian specialists in Canada 
and elsewhere.2 Furthermore, we have not published an article dealing 
with French attitudes to Hungary for decades, and we have never pub-
lished a work by a French-Canadian author. Because of problems and 
delays with the translation of this work from French into English, it sat 
on my editorial desk for several years. I apologize for this and also for 
the fact that by now the paper is missing references to some pertinent 
new research.3 
In 2007 we'll return to our time-honoured practice of publishing 
"only" about 150 pages per year, usually in one combined volume. We 
already have a volume waiting to be finalized on a subject of art history, 
and another one on the planning board, on the theme of Transylvania in 
the 20th century. Of course, we also hope to produce at least one "regular" 
issue or volume of our journal during the last few years of this decade. 
NOTES 
1
 N. F. Dreisziger et ai, Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian 
Experience (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1982), see the Chapter entitled 
"Towards a Golden Age: The 1950s" especially pp. 203-219, as well as the 
book's conclusions, pp. 220-31 in passim. 
2
 About the decline of Hungary's reputation in the years before 1914 in 
Great Britain see Geza Jeszenszky, Az elvesztett preszti'zs: Magyarorszag megite-
lesenek megvaltozasa Nagy-Britanniaban (1894-1918) [The lost prestige: the 
transformation of Hungary's image in Great Britain] (Budapest: Magveto, 1986); 
as well as Tibor Frank's recent book, Picturing Austria-Hungary: The British 
Perception of the Habsburg Monarchy (Wayne, N.J.: Center for Hungarian 
Studies and Publications, 2005; distributed by Columbia University Press, New 
York). 
3
 Such as the article of Lajos Kover, "A 18. szazadi Franciaorszag 
magyarsagkepenek gyokerei" [The origins of the image of Hungary in 18lh 
century France], A ETAS, 20, 3 (fall, 2005): 69-86. (Incidentally, this study also 
comments on the image Hungary presented to French travellers in the country 
[pp. 77-81]). Another work that Professor Deschenes might have mentioned had 
his paper been written more recently is the biography of Leopold I of Austria by 
the noted French student of Habsburg history Jean Berenger: Leopold ler (1640-
1705): fondateur de la puissance autrichienne (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 2004). 
The World Visits Hungary: 
Reflections of Foreign Travellers, 
1433-1842 
George Bisztray 
In the Hungarian language, slightly more than in English, there is a 
difference between the words tourist and traveller. Traditionally, tourists 
were people who liked to take long excursions in nature. Nowadays, 
recreational mass travel is so-called tourism. A traveller is a different 
person: an educated lady or gentleman who savours the foreign places 
that she or he visits, compares experiences and learns from them. 
Considering those travellers who visited Hungary, first of all we 
find intellectuals and scholars among the visitors (Quad, Brown, Town-
son, and Ackersdijck). Besides, or through, their professional interest, 
they also formed a general view of Hungary. Then there were the offi-
cials, emissaries, and escorts of dignitaries. Next came those who actu-
ally never planned to see Hungary, but the country was on their way to 
some destination. An interesting group, particularly familiar in England, 
were the globetrotters who made sport of visiting as many countries as 
they could in their lifetime (like Tafur or Pinxner). Finally, emotional 
considerations also motivated certain people, notably John Paget (and 
many others since...). 
It should be understood that there is no such thing as an objective 
travel report. There can be a lot of reasons why somebody learns to dis-
like a country: a dishonest inn-keeper, an infested bed, indigestion caused 
by the local food, or other complaints. On the other hand, good weather 
and friendly hosts make the traveller happy. Therefore, reports are never 
conclusive. Lady Wortley Montagu was satisfied with Hungarian hotels, 
while a hundred years later the Dutch traveller Ackersdijck was not. 
External influence in the form of socio-political biases can form an 
opinion in advance (nowadays we would call it brainwashing). We shall 
see how eagerly the Austrians tried to dissuade Western European travel-
lers in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries to continue their trip to 
Hungary. "Truth" is, to a great degree, in the eye of the beholder. It is 
easy to criticize. We can assume that there were more irresponsible or 
tendentiously negative reports about Hungary than critically sympathetic 
ones. It is true everywhere. In his pioneering book The Italians (1964), 
Luigi Barzini devoted pages to quoting the most outrageously biased 
opinions of eighteenth-century travellers (almost all Englishmen) about 
Italy. Such opinionated travel literature is counterproductive, possibly 
comical, and it may have been Barzini's aim to demonstrate this. 
Another matter that should be understood is that some travel 
reports on Hungary are quite voluminous: Paget's consists of two, Miss 
Pardoe's of three, volumes. Also in shorter works, there is much informa-
tion conveyed about a wide variety of experiences. The selection of our 
references has to be limited to observations that are comparable to those 
of several travellers. The discourse will be organized thematically, which 
may seem like a positivistic approach, yet the comparison of various 
observations will eventually point to certain shared dominant views. My 
thematic survey will, hopefully, complement the thus far only comprehen-
sive survey of the subject: Gyula Antalffy's A Thousand Years of Travel 
in Old Hungarywhich offers a chronological presentation. As so many 
cultural histories written by Hungarians, Antalffy's book also provides a 
wide ramification of the subject, describing not only impressions of 
travellers but also the means of transportation, road conditions, and the 
like. At the same time, it is a useful guide for readers unfamiliar with 
Hungarian history, inasmuch as it discusses major turns of events before 
dealing with their impact on travel. 
Other than Antalffy's survey, only publications on travellers from 
one country, in one period, are available. Arguably, there are exceptions, 
such as J. E. Horvath's selective, short summary: Hungary Through West-
ern Eyes? Two volumes (Regi utazasok Magyarorszagon es a Balkan-
felszigeten, edited by Istvan Szamota,3 and Regi hiriink a vilagban, edited 
by Lajos Tardi),4 provide indispensable source materials: excerpts from 
travel reports by foreign travellers in Hungarian translation. 
* * * 
Until recently, Hungary was regarded as a primarily agricultural country, 
yet the cities and towns were among the first attractions that travellers 
commented on. (In parentheses: is this not a cue to re-evaluate the still 
standing judgment of historians about the supposedly underdeveloped 
Hungarian urban civilization?) Understandably, the royal capital of Buda 
attracted the most attention throughout the centuries, both in its glorious 
years and in sad times. In 1433, Bertrandon de la Brocquiere travelled 
home to France from the Holy Land through the Balkan and Hungary. 
Impressed by king Sigismund's Buda, he mentioned the town and palace 
briefly but appreciatively in his travel report.5 In 1502 Pierre Choque, 
member of a royal escort, still witnessed king Matthias' fabulous Renais-
sance castle, characterizing it thus: "The palace is magnificently situated 
and is the most beautiful royal residence that I ever saw."6 This remark 
comes from a Frenchman, at a time when some of the castles of the Loire 
Valley (e.g. Amboise and Chaumont) were standing already. Even during 
the Turkish occupation, Buda impressed Edward Brown, an English 
physician who studied the mines of Northern Hungary, sufficiently to call 
it "a large city, and of a pleasant situation," although he qualified this 
statement by adding: "but much abating of its ancient glory."7 Unfortu-
nately, the ravages of the 1686 siege were visible even decades later, as 
the distinguished Lady Montagu's regretful reference from 1717 shows: 
"[the] Palace was reckon'd one of the most beautiful Buildings of the 
Age, now wholly destroy'd."8 (Those of us who remember the state of 
Buda after the 1945 siege cannot help but reminisce upon reading this 
description.) 
While the Habsburg empire did its best to keep Hungary and its 
royal capital a godforsaken place, the gradually rebuilt capital of Buda 
still had its fans during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
among them numerous Germans, formally subjects of the same Habs-
burgs. With the slow but steady development of the urban middle class, 
however, also Pest, the ugly duckling hardly ever mentioned in travel 
reports before the nineteenth century, started to attract visitors. In 1835 
John Paget (who will be repeatedly mentioned later), and in 1839 the 
English writer and traveller Julia Pardoe, may have been the first travel-
lers to appreciate the shops and the commercial spirit of Pest. The general 
set-up of the city also pleased Miss Pardoe: "Many of the streets are as 
handsome as in Vienna, and most of them considerably wider; the blocks 
of building are solid and regular, and the shops handsome and well-fitted-
up."9 A year later, the Italian traveller Tullio Dandolo praised Pest thus: 
"[it] seems to have developed its line of mansions along the Danube 
embankment only to offer the visitors a pleasant experience on their arri-
val. [...] Its streets have been broadened, and it has developed into a huge 
trade centre and the heart of Hungarian culture."10 The most exuberant 
and detailed description came from the great storyteller and traveller Hans 
Christian Andersen. On a Danubian boat trip that started at the Bosporus 
and ended in Vienna, he visited Pest-Buda (as the twin cities were usually 
called before their 1873 unification) in 1841 at the time of the famous 
Whitsun fair. "It is a remarkable view — but how does one paint it — 
and the sunlight in which it appeared — in words? The buildings along 
the river in Pest looked like a series of palaces. What life and traffic 
there was! Hungarian dandies, merchants — both Jews and Greeks — 
soldiers and peasants all mingle together."11 Two decades earlier the 
Dutch traveller (later professor) Jan Ackersdijck also witnessed a seasonal 
fair in Pest, and was amazed at the variety of objects on sale, calling the 
sight colourful.12 Buda also impressed Andersen, and he wouldn't have 
been the world's greatest tale-teller if he had not referred to a superstitious 
tale that he heard there about the ghost of a huge Turkish warrior who 
haunted the slopes of the castle hill shortly before midnight.13 
Another, almost unconditional, admirer of Hungary was the Eng-
lish physician John Paget who met a young Hungarian aristocrat, the 
baroness Polixena Wesselenyi, in Rome in 1835. Determined to marry 
her, Paget travelled to Hungary in the same year to meet her family and 
get acquainted with her country. After the baroness, he also fell in love 
with the country. Among others, he, too, loved Pest-Buda. Beyond the 
pleasant sights that affected most travellers, however, Paget was also a 
keen observer (and later participant) of Hungarian civilization. It is inte-
resting to consider his comparison of local transportation in Pest-Buda 
with the same in other European capitals: 
Please notice the fiacre: none of the dirty, heavy, shabby, slow 
coaches, found on the stands in London; but a very clean, 
smart, open caleche, with two high-bred little horses which 
whisk along at a famous rate; and the driver as far superior in 
sharpness and wit to his wooden-shod confrere of Paris as the 
equipage is to that of London. In winter, instead of the open 
caleche, a neat close chariot takes its place, for he is a very 
poor fiacre in Pest who has not a winter and a summer car-
14 
riage. 
Pest and Buda were not the only cities that pleased foreign 
visitors. Towns that had been taken from Hungary by the 1920 peace 
treaty of Versailles-Trianon were mentioned more or less in the same 
proportion as towns that still belong to Hungary. Most travellers entered 
the country from the west (coming from Vienna), and their fist stop was 
Pozsony or Pressburg (now Bratislava, Slovakia), site of the Hungarian 
parliament between 1531 and 1848. Brown calls Pozsony "pleasant, [its] 
castle is stately,"15 Ackersdijck calls it "beautiful."16 The other charming 
historical towns of the Upland (Felvidek, now coinciding with the Slovak 
Republic) also received enthusiastic reviews. According to Pierre Les-
calopier, a French lawyer who visited Transylvania in 1574 to strike up 
an engagement between the ruling prince and a French princess, Kassa 
was "one of the most beautiful cities of Hungary "17 The same traveller 
had kind words about Eperjes and Locse as well.18 
Beautiful and romantic Transylvania (now part of Romania) was 
also regarded with admiration. The same Lescalopier called Kolozsvar a 
"beautiful, fortified city,"19 and the respected high-ranking Austrian 
official and scholar, Transylvanian-born Ignaz von Born was not alone 
with his opinion that Kolozsvar was one of Transylvania's most illustrious 
cities.20 One cannot help but be moved by the enthusiastic references to 
other Northern towns such as Besztercebanya, Trencsen, or Munkacs 
(whose "majestic fort" the Swedish diplomat Pal Strassburg mentions),21 
or, among the Transylvanian ones, Brasso, Nagyszeben, or Nagyvarad 
(which Robert Townson called "one of Hungary's most beautiful cities."22 
Towns and areas that remained within the present Hungarian 
borders were equally appreciated. The route along the Danube was a 
popular and scenic one between Vienna and Pest-Buda, whether travelled 
by ship or stagecoach. After Pozsony, the travellers could visit Gyor, 
Komarom, Esztergom, Visegrad and Vac. Elsewhere in the country 
Godollo, Szekesfehervar and Pecs were mentioned with praise, as well as 
Mosonmagyarovar, the lovely town that most foreign and Hungarian 
tourists ignore now as they rush on to Vienna or Budapest. 
From the travel reports on Hungarian cities and towns we can 
learn two lessons so far. One: the travellers quoted came from some of 
the culturally richest countries of Europe — England, France, Germany 
— yet, they found a lot to praise in Hungarian urban culture. Two: while 
many Hungarians cannot forget the injustice done to their country in 
1920, when they lost two-thirds of their historical territories, references to 
beautiful places within the present borders testify that Hungary is still a 
rewarding destination for modern travellers (as we shall see from statistics 
quoted later). 
Our travellers paid little attention to rural Hungary: the villages 
and their dwellers. Only Ackersdijck named a number of villages he had 
passed through — most of them he called "neat." The landscape of 
different parts of the country received much more attention, and some 
were lavishly praised. Considering once again the direction of the travel-
lers' arrival, the Danube-bend was the first majestic natural sight. Town-
son described Visegrad in superlatives: "I crossed the Danube[...]. Seen 
from hence, I hardly know a more beautiful landscape than what these 
ruins and rocks, with the addition of some hills covered with wood which 
now rise behind them, form.[...] This castle, now in ruins, was once the 
Windsor of several kings of Hungary[...]."23 Buda's location and the 
surrounding mountains were also a great experience. Johan von Hoffman-
segg, a German scientist who sojourned in Hungary in 1793-1794, spent 
a whole week in the Buda hills, notably in the Inn of the Pretty Shepherd-
ess (Szepjuhaszne fogado), whose memory has been preserved by a 
mountain road. He wrote that every Sunday the mountains were swarm-
ing with tourists24 — just like nowadays. More mixed were the opinions 
about Lake Balaton, which was at that time largely undeveloped, and 
even Hungarians did not appreciate it as a recreational area. Richard 
Bright, an English physician who was the guest of count Gyorgy Festetics 
in Keszthely in the 1810s, at least called it a "fine lake,"25 while the Hun-
garophile Paget praised it with reservations: "It is difficult for an English-
man to imagine a fine inland lake of this kind, totally useless for the 
purposes of commerce or pleasure. I believe there is not a single trading 
barge, and certainly not one sailing-boat on the whole lake!"26 It was 
tamed and civilized nature that Paget, in line with his age, expected. Is 
the conflict between undisturbed preservation and recreational use not 
with us still? 
Even more divided were the opinions about one area that modern 
Hungary has been promoting as a major tourist attraction. It was the 
Great Plain (Nagyalfold), including the famous Hortobagy. For Townson, 
the Plain was "an immense and boundless waste."27 Writing about 
Debrecen, the largest town of the Plain, he could not understand why its 
dwellers selected "a country destitute of springs, rivers, building materials, 
fuel, and the heart-cheering wine, for their residence.28 Townson was not 
alone with his view. A dissenting voice was John Paget's, who liked even 
the "Pusta" already in 1835. He felt "a real delight in traversing it, and 
never for a moment experienced the weariness of monotony."29 He also 
loved the sunsets and mirages.30 
In the past, as much as now, voyagers liked to travel comfortably. 
While Hungary's roads left much to be desired, the hospitality of the 
people and the excellent opportunities to eat well and sample delicious 
wines were as much appreciated by our travellers as they are by modern 
tourists. Almost everybody mentioned the abundance of the country's 
agriculture, although their reference sometimes had a critical edge — or a 
covetous one? According to Pierre Choque, "all that the Hungarians 
know is to till the land and produce wine; they enjoy living well."31 The 
result of the good life was visible on the consumers. As the Spanish 
traveller Pedro Tafur who travelled in Hungary between 1435-39 charac-
terized Buda's dwellers, they are "slightly overweight, which they attribute 
to their richness."32 Perhaps the most detailed summary of Hungary's 
consumable goods comes from Edward Brown.33 Almost everybody 
praised the wines, except those served in taverns. Townson detected the 
reason: in the cities the aldermen, in the country the landlords paid a set 
amount (a kind of salary) to the innkeeper, and kept the balance of the 
income. Thus, innkeepers were not interested in providing quality goods, 
nor service, as the inadequate comfort and cleanness of country inns 
proved.34 The travellers soon found out that it was smarter to appeal to 
the hospitality of people. Not only well-off gentlefolk but even people 
from more humble ranks were found to be exceedingly hearty. Lady 
Montagu describes how her husband surprised village people when he 
paid them for their generous hospitality. While they accepted the money, 
at departure they presented the distinguished British travelling company 
with gifts: on one occasion with "a dozen of fat pheasants."35 Once 
Paget's companion and friend, the British artist Hering, found lodging 
with a carpenter in Tihany who refused the payment he offered next 
morning.36 
There were numerous inns in Pest-Buda that served food, and 
most of them also offered lodging. In 1720, there were only twenty-four, 
by 1830 some eight-hundred. However, few of them impressed the 
travellers. Especially the finicky Ackersdijck's judgment of the establish-
ments was devastating. "We found each of them pretty bad, especially 
the dining rooms, which were dirty and full of tobacco smoke. We were 
wondering why a capital city did not offer better dining facilities. The 
probable reason is that higher civilization and refined taste have not 
conquered Hungary yet."37 So much for ethnocentrism. 
One social gathering place where also food and drinks were 
consumed was the coffee house, of which travellers were pleased to find 
a good number in the twin cities. H. C. Andersen described a famous one 
with the attractive exaltation characteristic of him: "[The sign on a coffee 
house] has in gilded letters Kave Haz and underneath is a picture showing 
'The heavenly coffee-spring.' Angels are sitting at a table drinking coffee: 
one of the prettiest angels is taking coffee from a spring where, dark 
brown, it gushes out among the flowers."38 
Historians of Pest-Buda recognized from this description the 
renowned Legrand's Coffee Source. Andersen probably didn't know that 
"the loveliest angel" in the picture was the owner Erno Kammer's wife, 
bom Katica Kerner, whose stunning beauty certainly contributed to the 
brisk business of the cafe. (Had Andersen known this, the whole world 
would know it now.) 
Decades before Andersen, in 1793, Townson already characterized 
another cafe as one unmatched anywhere in Europe. Differently from the 
apolitical Andersen, however, Townson made a brief but significant 
observation about the social function of the coffee houses: "... here, 
according to the continental custom, all ranks and both sexes may come; 
hair-dressers in their powdered coats, and old market-women come here 
and take their coffee [...] as well as counts and barons."39 In other words, 
coffee houses were democratic institutions — at a time when democracy 
in its modern meaning was nowhere to be found in the world. 
Country inns got better reviews than those of the twin cities. It 
appears that western European travellers heard a lot of discouraging tales, 
if not horror stories, in Austria about conditions in Hungary. The more 
pleasantly they were surprised to find a civilized and hospitable country 
where Lady Montagu "found [such] tolerable accommodation everywhere 
that I can hardly forbear laughing when I recollect all the frightful ideas 
that were given me of this journey."40 Paget, perhaps the greatest fan of 
Hungary, ridiculed the (tendentious rather than uninformed) Austrian 
rumours: 
The reader would certainly laugh, as I have often done since, 
did I tell him one half the foolish tales the good Viennese told 
us of the country we were about to visit. No roads! no inns! 
no police! we must sleep on the ground, eat where we could, 
and be ready to defend our purses and our lives at every 
moment!41 
Paget found that "travelling in Hungary was just as safe as 
travelling in England."42 He also described country inns favourably. The 
guestrooms "have boarded floors, thickly strewn over with sand; and are 
furnished each with two beds, a table, and three or four wooden chairs."43 
On the other hand, we can surmise whether Ackersdijck had the 
misfortune of eating and sleeping in the country's worst inns; or, whether 
the problem was with him. We have learned his opinion about the inns 
of Pest, and he was just as dissatisfied with the country inns, which he 
found unpleasant: cold, unwelcoming, dirty rooms, uncomfortable beds 
and bad food awaited the demanding traveller like him.44 The saying that 
one cannot please everybody was as true in those days as it is now: 
conditions that suited the wife of the British ambassador in Turkey did 
not please the Dutch professor. 
Not as if travel had been easy in Hungary. Many travellers 
complained about the abysmal condition of the roads, the uncomfortable 
carriages, the mud covering not only highways but also village streets. 
Ackersdijck was surprised that Hungarian women wore boots but, seeing 
the muddy streets, he thought he understood why.45 Medical care must 
have been unsatisfactory. Even Robert Townson, who praised many 
things in Hungary, warned travellers not to get sick in Pest-Buda, where 
conditions in the city hospital were, in his opinion, probably the worst in 
Europe. "The building, the equipment, the personnel were equally un-
friendly, stinky and dirty."46 
Yet, there was something rewarding in the spirit of the country. 
The learned young Aleksander Ivanovich Turgenev, later respected histo-
rian and diplomat (who was not related to the writer I. S. Turgenev), 
thought it was the spirit of freedom granted to foreigners. Based on his 
travel experience in Germany, he appreciated that various Hungarian 
officials did not pester the travellers, checking their identity and the 
contents of their luggage again and again. "It is not for nothing that 
Hungarians call their country the land of freedom," he concluded.47 In 
the same vein, Paget described his crossing of the Hungarian border thus: 
I proffered my passport, as usual, to the guard who opened the 
barrier; but it was declined with a polite bow, and an assurance 
that I was in Hungary and had no longer need of it. I appeal to 
those who have travelled in Italy and Germany for sympathy 
with my delight at being once more free from the annoyance of 
passports. [...] I blessed the land where some trace of personal 
liberty still existed.4* 
Aside from this, several travellers (even Turgenev!) made dis-
approving remarks about the Hungarian social class hierarchy and the 
lowly place of the serfs, something that they must have known from 
second-hand information, hardly from personal experience. 
Recreational activities are a part of travel. Hungary was always 
famous for its horses and baths. From de la Brocquiere's report it seems 
that in his time (1433) Szeged was the centre of horse breeding. He was 
told that in that town he could buy thousands of horses any time.49 As 
for the famous hot springs of Buda, they were developed mainly by the 
Turks, and Edward Brown was the first one to provide a detailed report 
about them.50 (In pre-Turkish times, de la Brocquiere also mentioned the 
hot springs.) The maintenance of the baths had to be a costly job. It 
almost sounds like a complaint of today how the health commissioner of 
Buda lamented to Dandolo about the expenses.51 Some travellers also 
visited the Northern Hungarian and Transylvanian baths. 
The appearance, social life and customs of the Hungarians drew 
slightly more attention than their culture. It must have fascinated Ackers-
dijck that Hungarian men wore moustaches, as he mentioned this repeat-
edly in his short travel report, adding that it lent them a warrior-like 
national character.52 According to Brown, Hungarian clothing was 
designed for riding and fighting, and was so practical for these purposes 
that both the peoples of the Balkan and the Turks adopted their design. 
He also added that Hungarians liked colourful clothing.53 
The social events of the upper classes were described as dignified 
and measured (by Pal Strassburg54 and A.I. Turgenev, among others). 
More mixed was the company, and more lively the mood, of the Anna-
day Ball of Balatonfiired that Paget attended on his first trip.55 
Rich Hungarian folklore always interested the travellers. Brown 
witnessed and briefly described the hajdu (heyduk) dance, a provocative 
dance the steps of which imitated a man-to-man fight. He called it "a 
pyrrhic [dance]," comparing it by this term to a soldierly dance of the 
ancient Greeks.56 As for Townson, he wrote with delight about the games 
of a group of teenage country girls on a Transdanubian Sunday.57 
Since most travellers were men, and all lived before political 
correctness hit our planet, reflections on Hungarian women are parts of 
numerous travel reports. Especially the two Russian travellers, Turgenev 
and Glinka, praised their beauty. The former attended the Palatine's ball 
and concluded that aside from Vienna, no other city could show up as 
many beauties as Pest-Buda. The latter, a great Romantic composer, 
wrote about Hungarian women in superlatives: "One should think one 
sees the nymphs of the hills! Imagine: a perfect and proportioned posture, 
long black curls covering the shoulders casually, a charming face and 
deep red lips, like a rose in May."58 We should add: the Slavophile (that 
is, populist) romantic Glinka described the idealized beauty of peasant 
girls, suspecting that those who lived in the cities did not preserve their 
virtue, which enhanced the beauty of country girls. 
Relatively few travellers were seriously interested in Hungarian 
education and scholarship. Ackersdijck found much pleasure in visiting 
the National Museum59 and the university library.60 Especially the numis-
matic collection impressed him. "One cannot praise such initiatives 
enough," he wrote. Indeed! Almost two centuries earlier Edward Brown 
wrote that the most valuable coins had been found in many parts of the 
country, but since no systematic collection and depository existed, the 
local peasants usually picked up these treasures.61 Ackersdijck also visited 
the new observatory on the Gellert Hill62 and the university that moved 
from Buda to Pest in 1784.63 He described his meetings with some 
professors and his attendance of their lectures without qualifying these, 
but emphasized the large number and enthusiastic attention of the stu-
dents. Not indicating his source, he gave an unflattering report on 
elementary education, characterizing it as scholastic and of low quality, 
and attributing the problem to censorship and the many checks on educa-
tion. 
Briefer than Ackersdijck, Townson also wrote about the university 
and its library collections. In addition, he dealt with the situation of 
theatre life in Hungary. At the time of his visit, there was one theatre in 
each of the twin cities, both performing usually in German, but exception-
ally also in Hungarian.64 (The theatre in Buda was the Palace Theatre 
[Varszinhaz], founded in 1790, closing in 1796; the one in Pest was the 
so-called Rondella.) In 1841 H.C. Andersen could already visit the still 
young National Theatre, which was also used as a concert hall, and he 
heard Mendelssohn's Saint Paul oratorio performed there.65 While he 
noted that the German-language City Theatre was larger than the National 
Theatre, he didn't like the performance he saw there; it was one of the 
many obscure German plays. He thought it was ranting. 
Our survey of the travellers' impressions would not be complete 
without their reflections on the Hungarian language. Its unusual character 
fascinated them, which just proves that they considered the country an 
organic part of Europe. Before the modern historical interest in the native 
tongue had started in Hungary, in the late sixteenth century, the Dutch 
geographer and traveller Matthias Quad let the world know that Hungari-
ans spoke the Scythian language (whatever that was), but had borrowed 
many words from their neighbours.66 Two seventeenth-century voyagers, 
the Scottish William Lithgow67 and Edward Brown,68 no longer speculated 
about the Hungarian language but simply reported that it was unlike any 
other. Brown presented a sample: the beginning of the Lord's Prayer in 
Hungarian. Almost two centuries later, Glinka had more information on 
hand. He proudly reported that the Hungarians had once lived in Siberia, 
but in the ninth century they had started moving westward. However, 
"even now" (in Glinka's time) in the land of the Ostyaks, people in 
several settlements spoke an "almost Hungarian" language.69 Almost on 
the mark. And there seems to be an implication hinted, whether naive, 
unintentional or early pan-Slavic, that maybe-maybe Hungarians were also 
the natives of Mother Russia. 
* * * 
The author of this paper regards positivism: the collection of facts, as the 
basis of knowledge. However, one should ask: facts to what avail? Why 
do we pursue lengthy, meticulous studies if we don't compare facts, can't 
achieve a synthesis, and don't ask how our acquired knowledge has 
enriched us? 
The first thing we have learned is that practically all travellers 
gave signs of sympathy toward, and at least some appreciation of, 
Hungary. Maybe the sources that I worked with did not want to print 
blatantly hostile travel reports, which would be understandable. The fatal 
turn of the world's sympathy for Hungary from positive to negative 
happened decades after our time frame. In a sense, we can call the 
voyagers discussed "friends of Hungary." 
Secondly, we can find an interesting analogy between what 
travellers of past centuries and modern day tourists appreciate most about 
Hungary: beautiful towns, lovely landscape, tasty (although rich) cuisine, 
excellent wines, inspiring coffee houses, colourful (now waning) folklore, 
and a lively mood, a joi de vivre. Beautiful girls and women too. Let us 
leave aside the shadier aspects of the modern entertainment industry. 
(There is nothing new about that either: in 1822 a Russian traveller, Pyotr 
Ivanovich Keppen, gave a fairly detailed account of prostitution in Pest-
Buda.70 Just like in any other big city of the world, we may add.) Let us 
not forget the ancient recreational activities: spas and horseback riding. 
Can we feel safe to add hospitality to the list of living traditions? Even 
this situation has been improving though, after decades of the "winter of 
our discontent" when sales-people in the shops were often grumpy, bus 
drivers rude, waiters indifferent. 
It would be interesting to compare similar experiences of other 
countries past and present, whether what they had to offer to travellers 
has been similarly unchanging. Whatever the findings would be, it 
appears that Hungary itself, with the relics of its past and the continuity 
of its best features, is a large treasure-chest. In 1995 it was the fifth, in 
1996 the eights most frequented tourist destination world-wide. And it is 
up to its ten million inhabitants to keep it that way. Tourism is less 
elegant than travelling, yet it is a multi-billion dollar business. All three 
dimensions of time are needed to shape a positive image of the country. 
We read the two or three century-old travel reports through the eyes of an 
entirely different age: ours. It is easy to point out inconsistencies and 
critical fallacies retrospectively. However, without the appreciation of 
what the world said about Hungary between 1433 and 1842, our image of 
ourselves would be less complete. 
NOTES 
This paper is an enhanced and documented version of the one that 
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Education in the Mother Tongue: 
The Perpetuation of Ethnic Consciousness 
among Hungarian-Americans, 
1890-1920 
Zoltan Fejos 
A century ago, Hungarian immigrants to the United States could send 
their children to Catholic elementary schools in Cleveland and Toledo, 
Ohio, and South Bend, Indiana, where they were taught for a part of the 
school-day in Hungarian. The schools established in these cities by Hun-
garian communities prove the parents' ambition, but they primarily ful-
filled the requirements of Church authorities. The American Catholic 
Church laid stress on the founding of Catholic parochial schools by its 
parishes — especially after the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore in 
1884.1 The parishioners were strictly ordered by their bishops to open 
schools soon after the establishment of a church. The intent was to fortify 
the institutions of the Catholic Church, which was in a minority in the 
United States, and to spread the education based on Catholic values in 
opposition to the predominantly Protestant public schools. 
The Church could not deal consistently with the question of the 
"new immigrants" and their place in the education system. The "liberal" 
bishops wished to save the Catholic faith and morals through Americaniz-
ing the immigrants, while the "conservatives" believed that accelerating 
the natural speed of the immigrants' assimilation process could be danger-
ous, and were more tolerant toward the idea of education in native lan-
guages. The German Catholics viewed the parish schools as a channel for 
transmitting the language and the culture in addition to being the means 
of furthering religious education. Czech and Polish immigrants also built 
their school network in a similar spirit.2 The small groups which joined 
the immigration wave later intended to do the same but lacked the finan-
cial resources. In any case by the time of their arrival in large numbers, 
both American society and the whole immigration process had changed 
totally. 
The First Hungarian Schools in America 
This was especially true in the case of Hungarian (Magyar) immigrants 
who, amongst other peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, came in 
large numbers only in the first decade of the 20th century.3 The short 
period of time at their disposal, about two decades before World War I, 
was just one explanation for the underdeveloped state of their educational 
structure. Similarly, the relatively small number of Hungarian immigrants 
is only one of the arguments in explaining their relatively feeble efforts to 
keep the native language alive. 
The three parish schools mentioned above represent a very early 
stage of the Hungarian-American educational system. The first was 
opened in Cleveland (1893) in a single-story building with wooden walls 
with a single class and a teacher. It would be expanded during the next 
couple of years, and in 1900 more than 350 students were taught in a 
two-story brick building. In Toledo and South Bend the schools were 
consecrated together with the churches in 1899 and 1900 respectively. 
The language of instruction was English in all the three schools, with 
Hungarian reading, writing, and history being taught, usually an hour a 
day, by the parish priests.4 In addition to the slow structural develop-
ment, the Hungarian immigrants' schools also suffered from a lack of 
support from the congregations. In South Bend a debate started three 
years after the opening of the schools mainly because of the extra costs 
that the language instruction for immigrant children entailed.5 
In Bridgeport, Connecticut, another kind of school was tried out. 
A day school was opened during the summer vacation of 1897. In it, 
Hungarian geography, history, writing, reading, and religious courses were 
taught in Hungarian for a couple of weeks. At the end of the session, the 
examinations were open to the public. The experiment was so successful 
that the congregation started to collect money to establish a permanent 
Hungarian school. The school was started and the Hungarian Government 
sent the textbooks for the first four grades. Yet the experiment failed, and 
the school was closed in 1899. From that time on only summer schools 
provided an opportunity for learning in Hungarian. Such schools were 
then organized by the Reformed congregations of Cleveland and South 
Norwalk, Connecticut. During the school year just the religious education 
was offered in Hungarian, in the Sunday schools.6 
The development progressed in one of two ways: 1) establishing 
parochial schools that always intended to teach subjects in Hungarian, or 
2) organizing regular Saturday or Sunday and summer courses. Hungarian 
(Hungarian-English) day schools paralleling the public schools could not 
be maintained permanently even though they were deemed to be feasible 
both by immigrant community leaders and the government back in Hun-
gary. The Szabadsag (Liberty), a daily Hungarian-language newspaper in 
Cleveland, pressed the Hungarian Government to support the estab-
lishment of Hungarian schools independent of the Church because, as the 
editor put it, "the Hungarians [here] are not and will not be able to estab-
lish and maintain such schools."7 
The Attitude of the Hungarian Government 
In the beginning the Hungarian Government supported the establishment 
of Hungarian day schools (though religious ones only) after the program 
known as "American Action" started in 1903 to support the emigrants. 
What the Hungarian authorities wanted to achieve through their "Action" 
was to help the migrants to return to their homeland.8 In order to do this 
— as the plan, presented to His Majesty the Emperor-King Francis-
Joseph, stipulated — "we need to keep the national consciousness awake 
which most surely can be done by ecclesiastical organization, the setting 
up of schools, and the supporting of the patriotic newspapers."9 A lack of 
schools teaching in Hungarian would keep many of the parents from 
coming home because of the children's questionable future, the plan 
stated. As the support was understood in the plan, the Hungarian commu-
nities that were willing to provide the salary of the English teacher 
prescribed by American legislation would be provided with a Hungarian 
teacher sent to America and paid by the Hungarian Government. The 
already established practice of the Hungarian state-financed elementary 
schools in Bukovina, Rumania, and in Croatia was to be transplanted into 
the totally different American environment. Thus, theoretically, the 
Hungarian authorities stood for the concept of the nationality schools 
teaching in the mother tongue. They were ready to accept the idea that 
half the subjects, mainly those "indifferent... from the national viewpoint," 
should be taught in English.10 In short, the Hungarian Government 
intended to set up Hungarian schools in the United States similar to the 
ones existing in Hungary at that time. 
The Schools of the Protestant Congregations 
As a first step of the "American Action" program, in 1904 the Reformed 
Church of Hungary sent one of its officials, Count Degenfeld, to the 
United States to survey the Hungarian Protestant congregations there.11 
Degenfeld found hardly anything encouraging about the education of the 
children of Hungarian immigrants. He visited twenty congregations. Most 
of these had religious instruction for the members of the second genera-
tion, but only one of them had a modest-sized Hungarian day school — 
this was in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.12 
Degenfeld's suggestion that congregations should sponsor Magyar 
day schools in the United States, was received with little enthusiasm. 
While ten of the congregations he visited decided to join the Reformed 
Church of Hungary, only those in Cleveland, Bridgeport, and New York 
seemed to be willing to establish regular Magyar day schools. Further-
more, only the one in Bridgeport offered to pay the minimal teachers' 
allowance ($250 a year) to a Hungarian-speaking teacher, but promised 
nothing to the English teachers at all who would had to be hired by the 
school also. 
What was behind this indifferent attitude? In his report Degenfeld 
listed most of the reasons, though he did not analyze them. He considered 
the question of the schools to be one of the most important, and he was 
convinced that "ordinary Hungarian ecclesiastical schools should be set up 
even at major financial cost."13 The relative weakness and poverty of the 
churches was a great problem. Seven congregations had no church 
buildings of their own, thus these could not have schools either — classes 
were often held in church basements in those days. In many cases the 
members of the congregation did not live near the church, but were 
spread out over a large area. Furthermore, the size of many immigrant 
congregations fluctuated greatly as their members kept relocating to 
distant places in search of employment. All these factors contributed to 
these churches' financial troubles, in Degenfeld's opinion. 
The issue of the schools was also complicated in some places by 
the presence of bilingual Slovak members in the otherwise Hungarian 
Protestant congregations. (This problem was even more true of the 
Catholic parishes.) And, in some cases, not even the Hungarian members 
of the congregations believed that Magyar instruction was all that impor-
tant. "Unfortunately," reported Degenfeld, "I also heard such opinion 
even in the Pittsburgh presbytery, that Hungarian teaching was unneces-
sary and that English was the only useful language in America."14 
Parents had some interest in the question of the teaching of their 
children in the mother tongue in school. Those parents who came to 
America to work temporarily and then to return to Hungary wanted their 
children to have a Hungarian education lest they would feel as strangers 
once they returned home. At the same time the intention to return was 
coupled with the urge to save money. As a result these parents preferred 
to send their children to the public schools that were free than to the 
church-operated schools which charged tuition fees. These parents were 
satisfied with a limited amount of Hungarian instruction for their off-
spring during the vacation periods. Those parents who did not want to 
return to Hungary saw quite clearly that their children had to learn 
English in order to be successful in American society. The easiest way to 
leam English was certainly by attending the public schools. 
At that time, the General Synod of the Reformed Church of 
Hungary did not see how serious these problems were. The preparations 
to open "Hungarian" schools in America's Magyar settlements were con-
tinued even though the next delegate sent from Hungary to the United 
States, Laszlo Bede, clearly pointed out that the lack knowledge of En-
glish posed a danger for the children's future.15 One of the main tasks of 
Bede was to find a solution for Hungarian-America's "school problem." In 
his report on his mission Bede claimed that "the result of setting up 
schools and the conditions of setting up more, do not meet our require-
ments partly because of the financial conditions of the Church and partly 
because of certain restrictive State laws on education."16 
According to Bede's information, only English-language schools 
were legal in Connecticut. Schools teaching in a foreign language were 
legal in Pennsylvania if half of the subjects were taught in English. Such 
schools were also legal in the states of New York and New Jersey, but 
English teaching was also compulsory there as well. Based on similar 
legislation and the circumstances of the Hungarian congregations, Bede 
thought the establishment of schools with daily instruction in Hungarian 
to be possible in the New York City, Passaic, and Phoenixville parishes. 
In his opinion the earlier plans had to be changed, and Hungarian reading, 
writing, history, and geography should be taught parallel with the com-
pulsory subjects, but only after regular school hours or during holidays. 
He believed that one reason to do so was that children "preferred to be in 
public schools to learn ordinary subjects." With half the children's inst-
ruction accomplished in the public schools, the cost of their overall educa-
tion would be lower.17 
In spite of all this, in September, 1907 the Hungarian authorities 
opened the Magyar day schools they had been planning in New York City 
and in Passaic. In Bridgeport they chose the evening and holiday version, 
because of Connecticut's laws. The Hungarian Government specified that 
instruction in these schools should be in Hungarian only, that all children 
should be accepted regardless of their religious affiliation, that no tuition 
fee should be charged, and that books and school supplies had to be 
provided to them free as well. The teachers' salary was conditional on 
there being at least fifty students and the teacher had to double as the 
cantor of the parish as well.18 
Unfortunately for the advocates of these schools, the results were 
disappointing. In New York City the school functioned only for one year 
because of the limited interest shown in it by parents. In Passaic, the 
teacher had a quarrel with the congregation at the end of the first school-
year and teaching ended.19 The representative of the Synod had to report: 
"minority schools do not have a future in the United States, we can only 
try schools on Saturdays, Sundays, and on holidays."20 Within these 
schools and under appropriate leadership "we can teach Hungarian child-
ren to write, read, and count and we can also bring a vague picture of 
their homeland to their minds and hearts but there can be no doubt about 
the fact that the emigrants' children born in the United States, and their 
grandchildren even more, will be totally Americans who will not return to 
Hungary for good."21 Hungarian-American clergymen were also aware 
that parents who knew no English preferred to send their children to 
schools where they could learn English in order to help their parents in 
their quest to learn basic English.22 
At about this time the Hungarian Government received informa-
tion about negative experiences of two Hungarian Greek-Rite Catholic 
elementary schools. A parochial school teaching in English and Hungarian 
had been started in Cleveland even before the launching of the "American 
Action" in 1903. Similar education had started in South Lorain, Ohio in 
the fall of 1906. Members of the parishes of these places, "day labourers 
in factories," had applied many times for a teacher for the school they had 
built "without any support, amidst very hard working conditions."23 The 
Government in Budapest sent a qualified Hungarian teacher, the necessary 
books, and school equipment to each place. The Hungarian authorities 
made it clear that they expected children of other religions to be admitted 
to these schools as well. Unfortunately they soon learned that the priests 
of the local Roman Catholic parishes and the pastors of the Reformed 
Church congregations did not allow the children under their supervision to 
go to the Greek Catholic schools. 
In times of economic hardship, most Hungarian-American parents 
did not want and often could not pay the tuition required by the church 
schools. Others preferred to send their children to public schools because 
they were not taught proper English in the Hungarian school. (A father 
took his daughter out of school because she could not understand the 
butcher's bill that was written in English.) Counsellor Lajos Ambrozy, 
who visited Hungarian settlements on behalf of the Hungarian Govern-
ment, wrote: "Children become Americans in their feelings and emotions 
in spite of their perfectly spoken Hungarian."24 On the basis of Ambro-
zy's and other similar experiences, the Hungarian Government closed the 
Greek Catholic schools of Cleveland and South Lorain and recalled their 
teachers. 
The Hungarian newspapers in the United States protested this 
action. They accused "official Hungary" of not caring about the Hungar-
ian emigrants.25 Ambrozy's astute observations show clearly that the 
expectations of the Hungarian Government could not be attained by the 
Magyar day schools in the United States. The Budapest authorities wanted 
to establish institutions that served their interests and would have pre-
vented the assimilation of Hungarian immigrants in the United States. 
When these aims could not be realized, they lowered their requirements 
and came up with new guidelines. The new scheme matched better the 
modest aims of Bede, and it also tried to use the meagre financial re-
sources more efficiently. 
Mother Tongue Education Outside Regular Schooldays 
The real solution lay in organizing weekend and summer schools. After 
the failure of the experiments with day schools, the Hungarian Govern-
ment urged the Hungarian-American churches to introduce this form of 
education. The congregations were advised to include appropriate class-
room space in their plans for church buildings. Teaching became the 
ministers' task and the money for the teachers' salary was stopped, except 
in Cleveland.26 Even though this form of education was not developed at 
all at that time, the Hungarian official decision accepted the local Hungar-
ian-American practice and made it compulsory. In 1907 only five of the 
sixteen congregations affiliated with the Reformed Church of Hungary 
had Sunday schools and only six of them organized courses during school 
holidays (Saturdays or during the summer) with almost 300 students.27 By 
1911, when the Synod's decree was introduced, the situation had im-
proved. In that year there were 20 affiliated congregations and 12 had 
vacation schools — with a total of 677 students. By 1915 the number of 
students had increased to 2300.28 
We should also mention congregations affiliated with the Ameri-
can Churches. Some of these also had schools where classes were taught 
in Hungarian. In Lorain, Ohio, for example, there had been a Hungarian 
school for more than a hundred children every summer since 1905. The 
small Presbyterian community in Wharton, Ohio introduced summer 
school in 1907. Some wealthy "non-joiner" congregations could afford 
qualified teachers from Hungary. One of them was the Bridgeport cong-
regation that was affiliated with the Reformed Church of the United 
States. Here Lajos Ambrozy found 250 students, while there were only 
25-30 students in a school of the congregation affiliated with the mother 
Church in Hungary. Both schools held classes three times a week, in the 
evenings and on Saturday, and they used books from Hungary.29 
The Hungarian Government developed a uniform program for the 
summer schools. It prescribed the curriculum and provided pedagogical 
guidelines. Subjects of the summer schools were to be: Hungarian lan-
guage (speaking and listening practice, reading, writing, grammar), 
History of the Hungarian Nation, The Constitution, Geography of 
Hungary, Singing (folk songs, patriotic songs, and religious songs). The 
program was based on textbooks for elementary schools that were used in 
Hungary. These books were supplied to the Hungarian-American summer 
schools by the Hungarian Government through the Synod. In addition, the 
local deans were required to supervise the summer schools regularly. The 
purpose of this program was similar to the earlier program of Hungarian 
day-schools: to make sure that the children of Hungarian immigrants 
became familiar with the Magyar language and the country of their 
parents, so that their ignorance of these would not to keep the parents 
from going home.30 
Teaching was a big burden for the pastors, especially in the big-
ger congregations where they often had more than 100 children to deal 
with. They were not paid for the teaching but those who achieved signifi-
cant results were given some small bonus. Many of the ministers had their 
wives and children help them with the teaching. Many of the congrega-
tions had to pay a local teacher as well, who usually did not have the 
proper qualifications. The largest school of the Reformed congregations 
was in Cleveland, with around 300 students in attendance. As an unusual 
exception, this school and its a nursery-school had two teachers paid by 
the Government of Hungary.31 
Seeing the difficulties experienced by some congregations, the 
Hungarian authorities sent assistant pastors to the larger communities, for 
example to Detroit, where a day nursery-school was opened in 1911. The 
Government supplied all the equipment for the nursery-school (just as in 
Cleveland).32 Besides the summer school and the nursery-school, the 
local church in Detroit opened a regular day school in Magyar and En-
glish in 1914 without any homeland assistance. But financial troubles split 
the congregation, and the pastor, who had been keen on the school, had to 
resign his position. However, the school was maintained even by his 
successor, though with reduced ambitions. The Reformed congregation in 
Detroit had daily Hungarian instruction even in the 1930s, held after the 
regular school day.33 
The Hungarian program, the requirements, and the books of the 
Hungarian elementary schools, established very high standards for the 
Hungarian-American students and teachers. Not everyone was pleased by 
the situation. Sandor Kalassay, the dean of the Western Classis of the 
Hungarian Reformed Church in America, claimed that a program should 
have been set up which better fit the local circumstances. In his opinion 
the Hungarian schools in the United States needed special textbooks.34 
On the whole, however, financial help from the mother Church in 
Hungary affected very positively the education of the second generation 
in America. If the First World War had not intervened, the help from 
Hungary could have continued. Local efforts and aid from the mother 
country could have been coordinated more effectively and the quest for 
the preservation of the Hungarian-American communities' ethnic heritage 
could have continued with better results throughout the interwar decades. 
The rivalry between the congregations belonging to the Reformed 
Church of Hungary and those affiliated with the Reformed and Presbyte-
rian Churches of the United States, the so-called "affiliation war", had 
some beneficial impact on the development of the schools belonging to 
the Protestant churches. On the whole, however, denominational divisions 
within Hungarian-American communities were a source of weakness for 
the Magyar ethnic group in America. The rivalry among the various 
denominations extended to the issue of the establishment of schools. The 
Reformed Church and the Presbyterian Church in the United States also 
financed their Hungarian congregations' schools. Except for the teachers' 
salary, the Presbyterians maintained a Hungarian day school in New York 
City, in Harlem, and a nursery-school in Cleveland and in Detroit for a 
couple of years.35 These congregations could not count on Hungarian 
support because of their affiliation with the American Churches rather 
than the Hungarian. Once the bishop of Debrecen, Hungary, sent a large 
number of textbooks (1,300 pounds) to these "non-joiners," which made 
the members of the congregations affiliated with the Hungarian Church 
protest profusely. They hardly had grounds to complain, since each 
affiliated congregation had received a library of 100-150 volumes of 
textbooks as well as great many Protestant religious publications from 
Hungary.36 
Mother Tongue Education in the Catholic Parishes 
Most of the emigrants from Hungary to the United States (about 60%) 
were Catholic. Despite this numerical strength, Magyar Catholic parishes 
were organized more slowly than the Protestant congregations. The Hun-
garian establishment and Hungary's R.C. church authorities began paying 
real attention to the emigrant Catholics' problems only after 1910. Before 
then they proceeded with much caution. Starting with the "American Ac-
tion", only priests reliable from the "patriotic viewpoint" were slated to be 
sent to serve Hungarian immigrants in the United States. This cautious 
approach came from the desire of not getting involved in any conflicts 
with the American Catholic Church, and from a respect for the hierar-
chical structure of the Church. Another problem was a shortage of priests 
in Hungary.37 
Catholic Hungarians in the United States repeatedly appealed to 
church authorities in Hungary for help with the education of their chil-
dren. The parish priest in Trenton, New Jersey, applied for financial 
support for a Hungarian parochial school as early as 1904. "There are not 
going to be Hungarian speaking people here in 20 years," he wrote, 
"because socialism and English schools will turn our people away from 
their homeland."38 The first convention of Hungarian Catholics in the 
United States suggested to the Hungarian Government that schools should 
be set up in every parish where more than 60 Catholic students could be 
found. The parish priest in McKeesport wanted to "import" nuns from 
Hungary as early as 1903, but he could only realize this plan in 1912. In 
the meanwhile he started a summer school which then functioned every 
year and managed to get free textbooks from Hungary. The parishioners 
themselves paid the cantor-teacher's allowance.39 
We can also learn from the sources that Hungarian instruction was 
not considered very important everywhere. According to a report, Karoly 
Bohm, the most respected Hungarian Catholic priest in the United States, 
was himself a "great opponent" of it. In his parochial school ten English-
speaking nuns taught 650 students in 1906 but "no one teaches the 
children to read in Hungarian." Only a few parents dared to send their 
children in secret to the Greek Catholic Hungarian parochial school which 
also existed in the same community.40 
In most cases, Hungarian-American Catholics had to establish 
their schools themselves. Their chances for success greatly depended on 
the local bishops' attitudes, the financial state of the local churches and 
the ethnic composition of the parishes. The situation was illustrated by the 
experiences of two parishes. The already mentioned Catholic school in 
South Bend would have liked to employ a teacher sent and paid from 
Hungary. According to the Hungarian authorities the teacher's salary 
could be paid from Hungary only if at least half of the courses were 
taught in Hungarian. The parish priest, lacking the permission of his 
bishop, could not meet this condition, and he could not employ the teach-
er. Characteristically the parish intended to invite a teacher who spoke 
Hungarian, Slovak, and German.41 In contrast, the Szent Laszlo (St. Ladis-
laus) Roman Catholic congregation in New Brunswick could maintain a 
four-grade Hungarian day school with episcopal permission and without 
any assistance from the homeland, between 1907 and 1914. Teaching took 
place in the basement of the church, in very modest circumstances. The 
morning courses were held in Hungarian and matched the education in 
Hungary. In the afternoon a qualified American teacher taught in the En-
glish language. This arrangement lasted for seven years. It clearly bene-
fitted the community from the religious, ethnic, and national points of 
view. 
Unfortunately, the social problems that caused the failure of the 
day schools of the Protestant congregations were not absent in the case of 
the Catholic parishes either. One of the priests who served the Szent 
Laszlo parish later explained: "The all-Hungarian school became a 
disadvantage for the future of our young people. They were left behind in 
the field of American education, the necessary elite were not reared and if 
they were, we lost them." It is also a fact that many of the children in the 
parish attended the public schools. On the basis of these experiences a 
six-room school was built where education went according to the standard 
of the American public schools. Teaching was not in Hungarian. Further-
more, only the Magyar language was taught during certain hours to the 
students. The ethnic-national education of the second generation was car-
ried out only in the totally Hungarian nursery-school, in the supple-
mentary courses of the elementary school, in religious classes, and in the 
cultural activities outside of school hours. The nuns that came from 
Hungary played an important role in the later type of activities.42 
Two significant developments took place in connection with the 
Catholic schools before World War I: 1) the Hungarian Government 
donated a of lots of books to almost all of the Hungarian parishes; 2) two 
of the Hungarian orders of nuns started to work in the United States. Both 
were inspired by the intention to extend the "American Action" program 
to Catholics as well. The Government could not ignore the Catholics' 
demands any more. The paucity of priests became more and more serious 
as time passed. As a result of the Hungarian Government's support for the 
Reformed (and even certain Slovak and Ruthenian) congregations, dis-
content arose amongst the Catholics. Not surprisingly new appeals for 
help were addressed to the Government. Expanding the Catholic branch of 
the "American Action" program was made easier by the discovery that a 
Catholic organization in Hungary independent of the Government, the St. 
Ladislaus Society, was willing to assume a role in helping America's 
Hungarian parishes. The Society's involvement also had the advantage of 
not giving the American Catholic hierarchy an excuse to protest official 
Hungarian "intervention" in the affairs of the Catholic Church in the 
United States.43 
In time the Government in Budapest extended the program de-
signed for the schools of the Reformed congregations to the Catholics as 
well. The original syllabus of the summer schools was not to be changed 
except at points where it was required according to the Roman and Greek 
Catholic canons, in the religious and singing courses. The Government 
also promised to send textbooks to the parishes participating in the 
program and to reward the parish priests involved.44 
The delegate of the St. Ladislaus Society who toured the schools 
found thirty-seven active Hungarian Catholic parishes. Nine of them had 
day schools but the Hungarian language did not play an important role in 
any of them — except in the above-mentioned New Brunswick parish. 
Eleven parishes had schools where some courses were taught in Hungar-
ian in addition to the religious instruction. In five parishes only the 
religious education was conducted in Hungarian. The rest did not have 
any kind of Hungarian teaching. In the summer of 1913, vacation-time 
day schools existed only in Perth Amboy and South Norwalk. That year 
there were only two other Hungarian summer schools — and neither 
lasted for more than three of four days.45 
The homeland authorities just managed to respond to the first re-
quests of the Catholic parishes for textbooks when World War I broke 
out. The 17 boxes of textbooks provided by the Hungarian Government 
(in the value of 10,000 Crowns) arrived at their destination on August 27, 
1914. The shipment consisted of textbooks for religious education, for the 
six-year elementary school, and handbooks for methodology. The ship-
ment was distributed among thirty-two congregations, including those that 
did not have a Hungarian parish priest. This significant donation of books 
was meant to form the basis of the Hungarian Catholic summer schools. 
The program could not be continued the next year because of the war.46 
Education in the Mother Tongue in the Era of World War I 
Just as aid from the mother country became cut off by the war, teaching 
in the mother tongue became more popular among Hungarian Americans. 
This is indicated by the fact that in 1918 two Hungarian textbooks were 
published in America. They were the first of their kind. Sandor Kalassay, 
the dean of the Western Classis, edited a textbook for summer schools 
under the authority of the Hungarian Reformed Church of America. The 
Magyar Bdnyaszlap (Hungarian Miners' Journal) published its spelling-
book at the same time; it was intended to meet the educational needs of 
the Hungarian immigrants who lived out of the reach of the major Hun-
garian centres.47 
One of the serious problems of the parochial schools — and also 
of the whole program of passing on the knowledge of Hungarian language 
and culture to the children of immigrants — was the paucity of teachers. 
Because the Hungarian "school-network" was organized very late in 
America, just before World War I broke out, Hungarian teaching orders 
could not establish chapters in the United States. The applications of 
South Bend and South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, for members of one or 
another of such orders were rejected. In the fall of 1912, however, 
Kalman Kovats, the parish priest of McKeesport, Pennsylvania, did suc-
ceed in bringing to America four sisters of the religious order the Daugh-
ters of the Divine Redeemer. Their travel expenses were covered by the 
St. Ladislaus Society, in agreement with the Hungarian Government. 
The McKeesport parish did not have a parochial school at that 
time so the Hungarian sisters started to teach religion, reading, and 
writing in eighteen different places, visiting one after another the parishio-
ners who lived scattered around this industrial town. The children usually 
studied two hours a week for ten months in this peripatetic school. 
Sometimes the classes were held in a rented room, sometime at private 
houses "in a kitchen." The sisters also travelled far away to teach else-
where as well. There was no Catholic church in Daisytown, Pennsylvania, 
at all, but the congregation had a brass band to greet their first Hungarian 
teacher. The McKeesport parish's weekly publication reported annually on 
the exams that were taken usually by as many as 400-500 students. These 
reports considered the aim of teaching Hungarian (which was "opposed 
by everyone here" as the priest wrote in 1915) to be the strengthening the 
students' national consciousness. The weekly's editors hoped that, as a 
result of the parish's educational efforts, Hungarians of the next generation 
would no longer by called "Hunkys" and that it would become evident 
that the "future of our nation is not yet lost in America."48 
The president of the St. Ladislaus Society informed the Govern-
ment in December 1912 that another order of sisters in Budapest, the 
Daughters of Divine Charity was also willing to send nuns to teach in the 
United States. The sisters who were sent had a very hard start. Some of 
the parishes could not provide support for their work, and the local 
ecclesiastical authorities also hindered them from realizing their plans. 
According to one of the sources, "The bishop who invited them [later] 
sent a message without any explanation that there was no need for them." 
The essence of the controversy can not be detected from the contempo-
rary reports, but it is a fact that in the beginning these nuns could not 
work in the Hungarian parochial schools. Nor could the church authorities 
find accommodation for them. There was only a home for young women 
— opened with the permission of the archbishop of New York. The idea 
of placing the nuns in a home for destitute people was naturally not ap-
plauded by officials in Hungary. The Hungarians shared the blame for this 
situation since their Government had failed to provide for the expenses of 
the nuns for the first few years of their stay in the United States.49 
The sisters started to teach Hungarian independently of the parish 
schools. They opened a Hungarian weekend school in New York City. In 
Perth Amboy, New Jersey, and vicinity they tried the peripatetic teaching 
method that had been introduced around McKeesport. Thanks to the 
bishop of Trenton, New Jersey, they were finally allowed to teach in three 
of the Hungarian parish schools, in Trenton, New Brunswick, and Perth 
Amboy. By they years had been lost. In the meantime other Hungarian 
parishes began showing an increasing interest in their work. Ten more 
sisters managed go to get the United States before the outbreak of World 
War I. They even established a convent of their own — for which they 
received modest financial support from the Hungarian Government. The 
order opened a "mother house" on Staten Island, at Arrocher, New York. 
They accepted local, Hungarian-American applicants. The house's "gradu-
ates" managed to receive the necessary American teachers' qualifications 
so they could gradually take over teaching in Hungarian-America's 
Catholic schools in the 1920s. Fifteen Catholic elementary schools func-
tioned in the Hungarian centres of the United States in 1924. The nuns of 
the two Hungarian orders established in the new homeland just before and 
during the war were teaching in ten of them. They were also helping in 
the cultural and social activities of six other parishes.50 
World War I severed the connection between America's Hungari-
an immigrants and their homeland. Catholic Hungarian education was to 
be dismantled during the war. Many of the parishes, lacking any kind of 
support from the home authorities, could not maintain their schools, 
religious and social organizations. And the conditions for running the 
schools that survived the war changed sharply after the conflict was over. 
The 1920s started a new chapter in the immigrants' lives in which 
the state of their Hungarian schools was rather disappointing — at least at 
the beginning of the decade. The Czech, Lithuanian, and Slovak Catho-
lics, not to mention the Poles, maintained parochial schools in larger 
numbers. Usually the subjects which were to impart the non-English 
native culture to the children of their immigrants played a proportionally 
larger role in the syllabi of their schools.51 The situation in respect to the 
Hungarians was somewhat happier if we include the Hungarian-American 
Protestant congregations and the large network of their summer schools. 
In the post-1920 years, just as in the preceding decades, the chance to 
establish financially strong Hungarian parishes, which could also maintain 
more significant educational institutions, continued to be lessened by the 
religious division of the Hungarians and the conflicts about affiliation 
within the congregations of the Hungarian Reformed Church. 
Conclusions 
From that 1890s to the First World War, Hungarian immigrants to the 
United States made real sacrifices to save their language and culture, and 
to pass them on to the next generation. In this struggle for culture 
maintenance the help they received from the mother country was a plus 
rather than a detrimental factor. 
The historical evidence reveals that the Hungarians could not 
copy the "German model" of education that had exited in the German 
communities of America before World War I. Under the "German model" 
we understand those schools for immigrant children which taught in the 
newcomers' mother tongue. After World War I the new situation, the end 
of free immigration and the increase of "Americanizing" pressure, did not 
favour such ambitions. Starting with the early 1920s, the restrictive Amer-
ican Acts of Education ultimately made it impossible that courses for 
passing on the ethnic languages and cultural traditions should play a 
significant role within the official curriculum.52 
From the turn of the century on, as we have seen, both the 
Hungarians in the United States and the Hungarian Government would 
have liked to realize the "German model" for Hungarian-Americans 
because of practical reasons. They thought that the educational system 
transplanted to the New World from the mother country could ensure that 
the emigrants could return home at any time without experiencing diffi-
culties of adjustment to life and society there. The attempts to establish 
schools on the "German model" failed. 
Next came the efforts to achieve the more modest aim of establi-
shing weekend and summer schools in which some attempt would be 
made to pass on the immigrant heritage to the second generation. The 
motive for introducing this type of education was the same: to facilitate 
the emigrants' return to the mother country and their adjustment there. 
The reason why the home authorities had high expectations in 
regard to the return of emigrants was the fact that most of the Hungarian 
"immigrants" to America were really sojourners who planned to return to 
their native lands after making some money in the United States. The 
school's existence probably did little to encourage Hungarian immigrants 
to return to the old country. Some Hungarian-Americans did go back to 
Hungary but many of those who did, did not stay long. After a while they 
decided to re-emigrate to the United States, this time with the intention of 
staying there. 
While the schools did not fulfil the expectations of Hungary's 
authorities, they also created some problems for Hungarian Americans. 
They sapped their very meagre financial resources. They also tended in 
some cases to hinder the immigrants' adjustment to American society, es-
pecially if they interfered with their students' acquisition of the English 
language. The fact was that, for both the immigrants and especially the 
second generation, the English language was essential, especially for 
climbing the social ladder. 
For some parents, however, the learning of the mother tongue 
gained a great deal of emotional significance. The more the knowledge 
the mother tongue was threatened by the practical value of the "rival" 
language (i.e. English), the greater importance was assigned to it by some 
parents.53 This fact motivated the Hungarian-American leaders to make 
more and more strenuous efforts to maintain their native culture and 
language. They did not even try to prove the practical usefulness of 
learning the parents' language to the second generation. In their view, the 
emotional, symbolic meaning of education in the mother tongue was 
enough to justify their efforts to maintain their Hungarian school prog-
rams. 
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Ilona Duczynska meets Ervin Szabo: 
The making of a revolutionary personality — 
from theory to terrorism, 
April-May 1917 
Kenneth McRobbie 
"I'm not against bombs. 
Not all bombs are bad..." 
Ilona Duczynska (1969)1 
The Unknown City 
Ilona Duczynska (1897-1978),2 born near Vienna and a resident of Cana-
da after 1950, has been called one of Hungary's outstanding revolutionary 
personalities.3 In the first part of what was to have been an auto-
biography,4 she describes, with no little satisfaction, how her "rebellious" 
nature developed in opposition to her mother's Hungarian gentry family, 
and then outlines how it became truly revolutionary under the impact of 
the momentous events of March 1917. Duczynska was just twenty in the 
late spring of 1917 when she was privileged to spend several weeks in the 
company of Ervin Szabo (1877-1918). Through Hungary's leading social-
ist theoretician, she became exposed, as never before or since, to ques-
tions of ideology, and the variety of the conflicting currents of socialist 
theory. These made little impression, however. What did leave a perma-
nent mark were two things that spoke most directly to her nature: Szabo's 
emphasis upon the importance of the critically thinking individual, and 
the imperative of action. Duczynska considered herself a socialist, on the 
basis of her reading, since the age of fifteen. Certainly, she was not uncri-
tical5 of the early betrayals of the principles of peace and proletarian 
internationalism after 1914 by social democratic parties, nor later of the 
infinitely greater betrayals of Marx's moral injunctions by national com-
munist parties and the degenerate Soviet system. But her criticism, which 
resulted in her being expelled from two communist parties, owed as much 
to her psychological predisposition to challenge authority as to her early 
exposure through Szabo to anarchism. However, such criticism paled in 
comparison to her life-long opposition to the liberal capitalist order. Her 
hatred (a word Duczynska never hesitated to apply) was visceral, being 
based on moral, indeed quasi-religious condemnation. This was the world 
view current among Hungarian intellectuals such as Gyorgy Lukacs and 
Karl Polanyi (Duczynska's second husband) who remained convinced that 
theirs was "the age of absolute sinfulness."6 Like them, Duczynska always 
held to the conviction that the mission of socialism was to redeem 
humanity from this condition. 
The magnitude of World War One's human and material destruc-
tion on a scale previously inconceivable would have a lasting effect on 
Duczynska. By May 1917 she had internalized the legitimacy of violence 
as a weapon, and attempted to employ it in an assassination attempt on a 
leading Hungarian political figure. This she revealed only late in life, in 
an article published in a leading Hungarian journal. Her startling revela-
tion — in effect, of intending to commit an act that "existing socialist" 
Hungary would have regarded as a crime and, even more, a dangerous 
provocation — was successfully insinuated into, and insulated by, the 
wider context of an insightful and engaging discussion of the work and 
personality of one of Europe's most sympathetic socialist thinkers who 
had the misfortune to die tragically young. Duczynska's experiences in 
1917-22 hardened her in preparation for the new era of violence that 
characterized European politics during the ensuing decades. Finally, in the 
1970s following a life of active political involvement in several countries, 
she seems to have felt compelled to feel her way towards yet again 
justifying the use of violence, in its new manifestation of random terror-
ism, against the western capitalist order. 
Like many of her generation, in 1914 Duczynska was profoundly 
disillusioned by the support given to the war by social democratic parties, 
particularly the German party which was the largest and a model for 
others. She was eighteen in the autumn of 1915 when she enrolled in 
engineering at Zurich's prestigious Eidgendssischer Technische Hoch-
schule (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology). Her determination to 
devote herself wholly to her studies — "young, wounded, one whose faith 
had been betrayed" (UL) — was as much an indication of political 
disillusionment as it was of a disposition to commit herself totally to 
whatever she might at a given time decide upon. Then, at the electrifying 
news of the Russian Revolution of March 12 (February 27), with the 
formation in Petrograd of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers deputies, 
Duczynska threw herself into neutral Zurich's hectic political life. For 
there the 1915 Zimmerwald anti-war movement had put down roots, and 
among the vibrant emigre communities Lenin and his followers argued 
that the war could only be halted by a social revolution. During the 
ensuing five weeks Duczynska was introduced to Marxism by the Polish 
communist Henryk Lauer, one of her instructors, and to the energetic 
Angelika Balabanov, secretary of the International Socialist Committee, 
the executive body of the 1915 Zimmerwald and 1916 Kienthal Conferen-
ces.7 By then a woman given to headstrong reaction, Duczynska declared 
her eagerness to publicize "at home" (as she called it) the revolutionary 
March 20th Manifesto of the International Socialist Committee. Accord-
ingly, with the help of her newly acquired comrades she prepared a 
microphoto of the front page of the Berner Tagwacht where the document 
had appeared on March 26th, secreted it in the empty rubber ink-sac of a 
fountain pen, and purchased a rail ticket for Vienna. 
Duczynska was convinced that to her had fallen the responsibility 
of bringing the Manifesto, as she put it, to the attention of the proletariat 
of the Central Powers, or rather to such left-wing groups among the social 
democrats who would accept it in theory and as a basis for action. She 
knew that censorship was stringent, and that all travellers crossing fron-
tiers were subjected to a strict search. Thus, just in case the microphoto 
were to be discovered, she committed the document to memory. "I 
remember some of it to this day," she wrote half a century later: 
The revolution lives. The red flag of the workers flies over the 
Tauride Palace.... Now is the historic moment when the prole-
tariat of every country has to choose between revolution and 
war... because either the war will kill the revolution, or revolu-
tion will overcome the war... if the workers in Germany and 
Austria-Hungary do not rise up. 
Accordingly, she formally withdrew from her programme of study 
at the "Poly" and took the train to Vienna, the city of her birth. There to 
her disgust the small group of left social democrats, to whom she had 
been given an introduction by Balabanov, proved to be too cautious and 
even downright pessimistic as to the prospects of printing and circulating 
the Manifesto. Thereupon, Duczynska cut short her stay and proceeded on 
her way further east to Budapest. There at least, she trusted, she would 
find a more promising reception, if only from the one person with whom 
she was personally acquainted — the director of the Budapest Municipal 
Library, leading socialist theorist, the editor and translator of the first 
Hungarian edition of the works of Marx, Ervin Szabo. 
The train carrying Duczynska to Budapest left Vienna's Ostbahn-
hof on April 20, 1917.5 It reached the frontier in less than an hour, and 
after the usual delay continued on across the wide plain of Burgenland. "I 
must.. . return home, to the revolution," she repeated to herself to the 
rhythm of the wheels; the thought was still in her mind three hours later 
as the train entered the industrial outer districts of Pest. She was only 
twenty, she reflected, also consumptive, and — though she never consid-
ered this a handicap — but little acquainted with Marxism. Yet she was 
clear that her objective should be to spread the message of the Manifesto, 
clear too that the time was ripe and Budapest was the place, though just 
how this action would be realized was "shrouded in obscurity." Still, the 
first step, she thought, was clear: she had to join the workers movement. 
For this, she trusted absolutely that Ervin Szabo would "show the way." 
Soon Duczynska was walking down the platform with its massive brick 
pillars supporting the narrow curved glass roof of the Hungarian capital's 
Keleti palyudvar (East Station). Beyond the swing doors, she was con-
fronted with a main thoroughfare teeming with uniforms and the obliga-
tory working-class threadbare dark suits. Her only item of luggage — 
winter clothes, books and notes presumably having been sent on ahead, 
care of her family, to their country home of Zsennye — was a small, flat 
suitcase, divided into separate compartments (which in a few months 
would hold contraband printers' type). 
In Zurich, Duczynska had spoken of going home; but to her this 
raw newly dynamic city of Budapest was anything but that. "It was much 
stranger to me than Vienna," she comments, "it was an unknown city..." 
Come to which, she knew relatively little of Hungary, beyond what she 
had read in the country house libraries of her gentry relatives. At that 
time, she wished to remain unnoticed in the city. Thus it was "potentially 
disturbing" that her gentry relatives owned a house in Budapest on the 
very upper middle-class street where she expected to be accommodated 
by friends of Ervin Szabo. "I was afraid of them; they were a great 
danger; one could not trust them," she says, "they would give you away 
knowingly or unknowingly, so I had to avoid them." The family usually 
spent the winter months there, while her aunt Gizella attended eurythmic 
classes given by the very woman to whose apartment Duczynska was then 
heading. Still, she had no other option for the time being. In later years. 
Duczynska would become very interested in the history of early 
twentieth-century Budapest, particularly as it was the scene of Karl 
Polanyi's activities as well as her own. Her early hope that Budapest 
would become an arena of the class struggle was shared by elements of 
the burgeoning intelligentsia that was being recruited not as traditionally 
from the gentry and aristocracy, but from the urban business and profes-
sional classes. Painfully aware of new elements of western culture, 
conscious of living within a non-western social entity, they were fiercely 
committed to change.10 Furthermore, a rapidly emerging working class, 
among whom literacy was close to 80% among males (over seven) that 
promised to be available for political mobilization.11 
For this socio-political aspect of the Budapest cultural phenome-
non Duczynska was reasonably well-prepared by her precocious early 
acquaintance with the works of the avant garde radical lyric poet Endre 
Ady (1877-1919). Hungary's oppressively chauvinistic conservative 
official culture provided the social basis of artistic revolt, such as in 
Zurich, say, the international avant-garde lacked. "Socially we live in pre-
historical times," Ady wrote in the "Wasteland."12 It was this shared 
perception that inspired the Hungarian intellectual elite to proclaim 
"Liberty for the people!" in contrast to their Viennese counterparts' 
"Liberty for Art!" Ady reassessed the social components of the nation: 
devaluing the nobility and historical middle class, he looked to the 
workers, peasants, and professionals as alone capable of rejuvenating the 
country.13 
This ideologically oppositional counter-culture was represented by 
the sociological journal Huzsadik Szazad (Twentieth Century), the literary 
periodical significantly named Nyugat (The West) founded in 1908, and 
the work of Endre Ady whose volume Uj Versek (New Poems) appeared 
in 1906.14 The impact of the latter was immense, above all, as in Du-
czynska's case — she says she "grew up with him from the age of 12 or 
13 15 — on Hungary's youth in whom his words seemed to conjure up 
new powers.16 Similarly, Gyorgy Lukacs confessed that at the age of nine 
(!) he rejected novels about Hungarian heroes who reminded him too 
much "of the social condescension of the real-life ladies and gentlemen" 
who visited his parents.17 Duczynska's tastes were similar. She claims to 
have read all the great Russian writers in her teens, while reading "practi-
cally nothing" of Hungarian literature apart from Ady ("everything") and 
the poet Mihaly Babits (1883-1941) "to some extent."18 At the end of her 
life, when asked what her generation had to thank Ady for, she replied, in 
what the interviewer called "that spirited girl student's voice of hers:" 
"For everything."19 
The revolutionary significance of Ady's poetry and journalism 
generated paroxysms of verbal insult that contrasts with the at times 
heated artist-public debates in other countries. In response to the poet's 
castigation of his country as "the hunting ground of gentlemen nomads," 
and inferior even to Korea and Macedonia,20 prime minister Istvan Tisza 
(1861-1918) retorted "Ady and Nyugat are plant-lice on the palm tree of 
Magyar culture."21 In addition to helping to prepare the ground for the 
political revolutions of 1918-1919, Ady's writings are credited with 
initiating a spiritual revolution through self-realization. His "I shall not let 
myself be ordered around,"22 together with the "No!" implicit in his 
poetry, echoed Duczynska's early passion for her favourite fictional 
character — Bazarov (in Turgenev's Fathers and Sons) with his, to her 
ear, equally definitive "No! flung in the face of humanity!" (EM) But 
there was also Ady's "Yes" in his "Vision in the Fens" (1903) that shows 
how, just as individual salvation comes through love, the salvation of all 
may come through revolution.18 Basically, it was his rejection of compro-
mise with existing reality — widely shared by many intellectuals at the 
time — that accounts for Duczynska's attraction towards his verse, and for 
why Gyorgy Lukacs could declare that Ady had been more important to 
him than Marx.24 The effect of poetry upon certain personalities invites 
discussion. It is significant that Ady's verse resists translation, partly 
because of its being rooted in the psycho-social context of the times. 
Certainly, it mobilized consciousness in a particular direction to which 
some readers, though not by rational processes, were already predisposed. 
Early exposure in her youth (indeed, before she commenced her formal 
education) to the vatic, condemnatory poetry of Ady — like her late inte-
rest in Holderlin (a new edition of whose works lay open on her table, at 
the end) — represent Duczynska's absorption of, and reliance upon, 
poetry as a repository of values, feelings and modes of expression from 
which she would select in order to confirm the "irrational momentum" of 
her absolute faith which determined her political outlook. She seems to 
have lacked the ability and inclination, for it would have invalidated her 
life's commitment, to test or revise this faith — which she sought to 
confirm even in the oppositional poetry of 1956 — against the testimony 
presented by the sea-changes in the real world about her.25 
The initial impression of Budapest's strangeness that greeted 
Duczynska as she descended the steps from the broad stone platform 
outside the East Station's main exit — with its huge round window's "eye 
blinded with dust"26 — would for her never change. The soot sifting 
down from the smoke cloud hanging over the city would have reassured 
Duczynska that she had come to the right place. Her intended action 
would be directed towards Hungary's one-million strong industrial work 
force whose unionized numbers were increasing dramatically27 in an 
economy that grew before the war at 8.5% per year, with patterns of 
ownership concentrated in large production units.28 
In comparison with Vienna's ample parks and gardens, the 
booming city of Pest was a network of crowded housing developments, 
warehouses, and factories.29 There were tenements where one third of the 
population could but rent a bed, or, as Duczynska would later see for 
herself, merely a mattress for the night. The novelist Gyula Krudy wrote 
of how by day there rose new palaces "topped by towers rising towards 
the sun," while by night processions of carts hauled away corpses along 
with old ways of life.30 Yet cutting through it all was the pseudo Champs-
Elysees of Andrassy ut with its neo-classical villas where the young 
Gyorgy Lukacs lived, as well as some years earlier the family of Duczyn-
ska's second husband Karl Polanyi. But she had little inclination to 
register the progress of new stucco facades. "Budapest was very alive, but 
I had no time to notice." 
The few features of the urban environment that Duczynska does 
mention reflect mainly her immediate concerns. Thus she notes that there 
was bread rationing and she became "very hungry." Of the city's down-
town, she admitted, she had "no memories." "I once asked Ervin Szabo 
where the Vaci utca [the most elegant shopping street] was. He looked at 
me, and burst out laughing, which was very rare for him; he exclaimed 
that I knew where the Vaci ut [the workers' quarter] is, but not the Vaci 
utca." Even then Duczynska may have sensed she was embarking upon a 
life-time of self-denial. "Budapest was full of coffee houses," she grants, 
"but I never went in one; we did not meet in such places"; instead, she 
would meet with Szabo — by then, her "Master" — in side streets, and 
most memorably in a cemetery. Only once did the city impress her with 
its beauty — though this took the form of a vision of the coming power 
of the proletariat. It was the dark bulk that loomed behind her when 
crossing the Chain Bridge to Pest. 
I remember how the Castle Hill looked on those days when it 
was turning pink in the morning fog. And I recall the peculiar 
feeling that the centre of power conveyed, and with it a special 
appreciation of the holiness of power that was over there — 
and that we were going to conquer it. (K) 
Budapest would always remain for her a castle shrouded in fog. 
Seeking direction 
On leaving the East Station, Duczynska somehow found her way "as if 
sleepwalking" to the address she had been given almost two years earlier 
by Alice Madzsar (sister of Oszkar Jaszi), then visiting Barok with Ervin 
Szabo (two emissaries from "the other Hungary") who invited her to visit 
her in Budapest. Now Duczynska made her way down Rakoczi ut, 
crossed the Danube by the Elizabeth Bridge to Buda, skirted the Gellert 
Hill, laboriously ascended one of the steeply sloping side streets to 
Menesi ut, and presented herself at number 8. Jozsef and Alice Madzsar 
were at home. They asked no questions, took her in, said she could stay, 
and allotted her a sofa. Of Jozsef Madzsar, her host after all, Duczynska 
has nothing to say, other than that he played his part uncomplainingly in 
a menage a trois together with his wife and close friend Ervin Szabo. 
Surprisingly, for she almost never praised the appearance of women she 
encountered, Duczynska recalled Alice as being "in her own way, very 
beautiful; very small and very typical, very; she taught Dalcroze dancing, 
and lived for it, to develop the body.""" She was at once encouraged to 
find herself where Ervin Szabo's was a daily visitor. His mother, who 
was "still very beautiful," had a small flat in the same villa as the 
Madzsars, while Szabo himself lived further along the street at number 
19. On his way home from the library, it was his custom as a diabetic to 
stop in to have the special meal his mother (aunt Lujza, to Duczynska) 
prepared for him. Afterwards he called in on the Madzsars for up to half 
an hour. Jozsef Madzsar (1876-1940) remained on terms of warm friend-
ship with Szabo. In addition to being a physician and sociologist, he was 
an honourary lecturer at the University, and vice-director at Szabo's 
Municipal Library. In politics, he moved steadily to the left: from the 
Bourgeois Radical Party to the HSDP, and subsequently to the Commu-
nist Party. Like many other Hungarians, shortly after emigrating to the 
Soviet Union in 1936, he was liquidated during Stalin's purges. 
The day after her arrival at the Madzsars, Duczynska got down to 
work: "The good life of a 'postman' was already a thing of the past!" 
Noticing a microscope on Jozsef's desk, she used it to transcribe the text 
of the microphoto32 which she then translated into Hungarian. This took 
little more than a day. Then problems arose. Discussions ensued as to 
what might be done with the document, with a variety of visiting left-
oriented social democrats. "We talked about everything, we discussed 
everything, exactly as in Zurich," Duczynska granted. But it was all talk. 
There was no organization, she noted, nothing to equal even that of the 
hitherto despised Viennese left: "I saw, for better or for worse, that there 
was nothing to be done with these people." The complaint is familiar. Of 
course, she expected that things would go differently with him who was 
destined to become her "Master." 
In all, Duczynska met Ervin Szabo during three distinct periods: 
for a few hours at a relative's country house in the summer of 1915, 
almost daily from late April till near the end of May 1917, then finally on 
a few occasions between September and November. The aggressively 
expectant young woman who now presented herself to Ervin Szabo in the 
Madzsars' living room was very different from the diffident girl who in 
1915 had hung on his every word and barely managed a whispered 
response in her aunt's garden at Barok. The tone of Duczynska's tape-
recorded voice suggests she was barely able to suppress a smile, recalling 
their second meeting: "I simply said to him: 'Well, here I am!'" She had 
always believed in him: "For a long time the one thing I trusted in was 
that Ervin Szabo would instruct me when the moment came." Now it had 
come. But she admits that she was not in a mood to be instructed — that 
would only come much later, from her reading. Nevertheless, during their 
conversations Duczynska would form an unforgettably favourable impres-
sion of Ervin Szabo, as man and thinker, though her powers of reception 
and absorption were limited by her narrow fixation on two predetermined 
objectives. Consequently her image of Szabo would undergo considerable 
enhancement half a century later — including, as was characteristic of her 
at the time, over-enthusiastic use of the term 'revolution'. 
He was a very strange personality, an intellectual bordering on 
being a bookworm; by day a civil servant, by night a conspira-
tor unlike any other. I think I can honestly say that in Hungary 
there was no revolutionary action that was not initiated or 
influenced by him -- but this I would discover only later. As a 
person, he was very mild of manner, and had about him an air 
of sadness, perhaps due to his illness, diabetes, you know. 
(Beg) 
It must have been difficult to know what to make of the young 
Duczynska. Her Zurich political mentor Henryk Lauer had shown caution, 
as had Balabanov. Now here she was blurting out to Szabo the first of her 
reasons for coming to Budapest: namely, to establish contact with factory 
workers. But he studiously refrained from offering advice during their 
otherwise "long and thorough" conversations in the Madzsars' living 
room, "sincere and profound" though they may have been. They always 
concluded with Szabo putting her off, with his typical sad smile: '"It isn't 
so easy to join the workers' movement'." That was hard to take. She 
remembered: "I had all kinds of illusions...." Szabo's caution bordered on 
scepticism: "I believe that he was doubtful as to just how serious I was," 
she recalled. In later years, Szabo's biographer attempted to gauge the 
impression made on him by Duczynska's sudden irruption into his circle: 
There appeared suddenly in his midst — and in his life — a 
disciple, almost the only one who took him literally at his 
word, and called into question the ethical substance and mes-
sage of his whole teaching: namely, responsibility for revolu-
tionary activity. Ilona Duczynska was hewn from a different 
sort of wood than [previous followers]....33 
Szabo resorted to delaying tactics, to test Duczynska's motives, commit-
ment — and good sense. Later, she would appreciate that out of natural 
caution and understandable prudence, as well as the need to preserve what 
free time he had for his own writing, Szabo was not prepared to take it 
upon himself to tell "such a half-baked little girl what she should read 
and study, and what questions she should ask." Above all, he was not 
prepared — not until the third phase of their association in September — 
to disclose to this impetuous young stranger the nature of the links with 
selected union shop stewards that he had carefully built up over the years. 
Nevertheless, something of Duczynska's obvious sincerity spoke 
to him, and he tried to be helpful — "going, I think, against his better 
judgment," she observes wryly. First, he put her in touch with one of his 
friends Zoltan Ronai29 who also visited the Madzsars, though predictably 
he did not measure up to the intense expectation against which she now 
tested everyone and everything. Accordingly he was dismissed as no more 
than "a sort of critic," one of the intellectual leaders (though at least 
"mildly left-wing") of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (Magyar-
orszagi Szocialdemokrata Part, hereafter HSDP). Next, Szabo suggested 
she visit the editorial offices of the periodical Nomunkds (The Working 
Woman). But whomever it was he referred her to there, "the contact was 
stone cold" probably — bearing in mind Duczynska's aversion to femi-
nism and 'the womens' movement' — because it was a woman. "I went 
from one dead end to the next; there was no way 'leading to the masses,' 
no opportunity for 'joining the movement'. The task which had seemed to 
be so clear at the beginning was becoming more and more distant and 
unreal." (OM) Was there no step anyone could recommend that would 
lead her closer to her goal? she asked herself, though with no clear idea 
of what exactly she was asking. "Is there no ray of light? One that will 
reveal all?" 
When Duczynska looked back in old age to the seeming tri-
umphs and undoubted tragedies of the revolutionary century, she ac-
knowledged that "the ethics of Ervin Szabo's heroic socialist man" — 
which she had been far from understanding or appreciating in those early 
days — was more relevant than ever. (UL) In the evening of her life, she 
sought the key to him who "was the spiritual father of us all," who died 
in 1918 when she was twenty-one, and whose works had been consigned 
by communist ideologists to a dusty niche over the course of four de-
cades. She played a part in restoring his image, but not in a manner that 
conformed to the dictates of Hungary's then 'existing socialism.' In 
perhaps her most inspired passage, she wrote: "For some he stands like an 
honoured statue, one of stone. But not as a stone statue should he stand 
among us, he who was a flame, a self-consuming flame. Let his memory 
be a statue of flame." 
In the creator of that memorable image a new sort of person had 
entered Szabo's life. Indeed, Duczynska had appeared at a time when his 
attention was directed towards a cause very different from the one she 
represented. For in discussions with Oszkar Jaszi and other liberals, Szabo 
was attempting to formulate some sort of organization of a spiritual and 
ethical elite. Nothing could have been more remote from Duczynska's 
mind. Belonging to no party or grouping, not particularly well-read, 
indeed "ignorant" as she many times admitted, she could think of nothing 
but her action plan. Thus, she impressed Szabo's biographer as being 
possessed of some predetermining "disposition of spirit", rendering her a 
self-effacing, solitary and "silent conspirator". Indeed, in Litvan's view, 
by the middle of May, her resolution "could have caused the master 
unpleasant and sometimes perhaps serious conflicts of conscience."35 Her 
psychological inclination predisposed her to see in Szabo what she needed 
him to be — and what perhaps he too wanted to be — a revolutionary 
activist. Consequently, despite their long discussions, she was probably 
not in a state of mind fully to appreciate what Ervin Szabo had to say. 
Against party bureaucratism 
Within a few days of their first meeting, Duczynska found in Szabo's 
openly expressed detestation of bureaucratism support for her own instinc-
tive dislike of organizations (not excluding that of the family). At that 
time, it had the effect of heightening her sense of alienation from social 
democracy. At the outbreak of war, she had been made brutally aware of 
the limitations of the HSDP when her aunt Gizella one morning tri-
umphantly tossed onto her bed the issue of the social democratic Nep-
szava (The People's Voice) for August 3, 1914.36 Under the banner 
headline "The Nation's Holy Cause," the party's leadership was reported 
as announcing the suspension of the class struggle and that the trade 
unions would henceforth be at the service of the war economy.37 
The 1917 May Day festival of supposed working-class fraternal 
solidarity turned out to be anything but solidarity as far as Szabo — and 
Duczynska, following his lead — were concerned. Presumably, he had not 
encouraged her to attend the party's colourful downtown march, with all 
or most of whose slogans she would surely have agreed. At least, though, 
the two of them did make an afternoon excursion to the Buda Hills, 
together with Alice Madzsar and Lili Magyar. "We sat on the grass.... 
violets were everywhere; it was a very beautiful day; May clouds were in 
the sky, and the sun was shining," she remembered vividly. However, for 
Szabo the experience was spoiled by the spectacle of a group — whom 
Duczynska would term "the dark company" (of "portly" individuals!) — 
sitting nearby on blankets, noisily tucking into a picnic lunch, and 
drinking beer. Szabo glanced across at them, then turning his back 
remarked: "It's the Jakabs, the lot of them," meaning the associates of the 
HSDP secretary Jakab Weltner.38 "He hated them," Duczynska explains, 
"he became physically ill when he saw one of them."39 Towards the 
leadership, Duczynska realized, Szabo's bitterness knew no bounds, "and 
his contempt was boundless too." He disapproved of them, apparently, 
because he considered that they had betrayed their class, as workers who 
had advanced themselves in the movement and thus now counted as 
"bourgeois plebeians." That was enough for her: "I had no dealings with 
them, and wanted to know as little about them as possible." Duczynska 
remained anxious to interpret Szabo's criticism as blanket condemnation 
of the party. It was at this time that Duczynska conceived such a detesta-
tion for social democracy — comparing them unfavourably to the police40 
— which inclined her, at least in the short run, towards communism. 
Later though, Zsigmond Kunfi, a leading left social democrat, suggested 
that Szabo had a more balanced view: "If he criticized, it was with the 
troubled, jealous criticism of the lover, who did not regard the one he 
loved as perfect enough."41 
Founded in December 1890 and modeled on the German and 
Austrian parties, within a decade the HSDP was numerically a significant 
force with 72,790 members. Due to its origins, its leaders, mainly trade 
union bureaucrats with little ideological training, cautiously followed the 
revisionists of the international movement in making parliamentary 
representation their main objective.42 Inevitably, a split occurred early on 
between the leadership and younger radicals. In 1902 Ervin Szabo 
organized a group known as the Revolutionary Socialist Students of 
Budapest. Two years later his activities earned a severe reprimand, and by 
1909 he and other "dissident" intellectuals effectively broke with the 
party, and resigned from it in 1918.43 
It was in order to achieve financial independence that Szabo had 
accepted a post that would lead to his becoming Director of Budapest's 
Municipal Library (which today bears his name). Being free to write what 
he liked, he contributed to many leading socialist and sociological jour-
nals in several countries as well as at home, besides acting as leader of 
the loosely-defined left opposition. What impressed Duczynska as much 
as anything was Szabo's harsh critique of the HSDP's German-style 
bureaucratic structure. In his article entitled "Marx" Szabo accused the 
party of having moved away from Marxism's view of the individual in 
terms of his class relations, and conceiving of "democracy" not in the 
socialist but the bourgeois democracy sense of rule of the majority. 
Against this, he argued that parliamentarianism would "change nothing," 
which Duczynska soon came to appreciate. (A) It is reasonable to sup-
pose, though, as Kunfi again argued, that Szabo meant only that among 
the means available to socialism he did not consider the struggle in 
parliament "the most important." But Duczynska was probably correct in 
saying that it was Szabo's conviction that only through direct action, on 
the part of trade unions — at least those imbued with the spirit of revo-
lutionary socialism expressed in syndicalism — could an economic strug-
gle be waged against capitalism. (UL) 
Hence the uncompromising stand he took as early as 1904: 
The most successful tactic of the socialist parties is to develop 
the consciousness of the working class... it remains the only 
party principle which is unquestionably in agreement with the 
higher laws of social development. Whichever party deviates 
from this road either has a defective organization, or a false 
spirit, or both. In any case, it only deserves to be burned! 
("Party Discipline and the Freedom of the Individual.")44 
In denouncing social democracy's other failing, namely its 
bureaucratism, Szabo was in good company: Rosa Luxemburg castigated 
the German Party's leaders as "Judases" and "traitors;"45 the liberal Oszkar 
Jaszi declared that it was "virtually a cultural insult whenever I happen to 
make contact with them,"46 and Count Michael Karolyi (though he 
personally had a 'very good war') was loud in his contempt for socialists 
who had "no faith, and are therefore incapable of dying for their 
beliefs."47 For her part, Duczynska regretted that the Hungarian leadership 
included no one of the stature of the Austrian party's Victor Adler, not to 
mention his son Friedrich, her hero. Many years later though, with the 
hindsight of experience, she would grant that among the party leadership 
there were some "fantastic speakers," even some "honest people," some 
of whom she admitted to knowing personally: Dezso Bokanyi48 (even 
though "he counted as one of the Jakabs"), Vilmos Bohm (to her an 
intellectual, with whom she had differences),49 and Zsigmond Kunfi.50 
In accounting for what made Szabo so different, Duczynska 
points to the Russian tradition which, she claims, also influenced both 
herself and her husband Karl Polanyi. In his youth Szabo declined a trade 
union position in the party apparently on the advice of his old mentor the 
Russian revolutionary Samuel Klatschko: "You are too good to become 
cannon-fodder; rather you should become the sort of leader and advocate 
who stands in the vanguard and conjures up fertile soil from the swamp." 
At the 1905 Party Congress Szabo spoke out in defense of intra-party 
democracy, criticizing the party's "principles of military organization," in 
terms that spoke later to Duczynska's instinctive suspicion of organi-
zations.51 Later it may have crossed her mind how unprepared Szabo 
would have been had he been confronted by bureaucratic developments in 
the Russian party that went beyond what he could ever have imagined 
possible in a self-styled Marxist party. So it would be for her too. As 
early as 1920, even amid the excitement of working for the Comintern in 
Russia, Duczynska found "life within the bureaucracy very hard to 
tolerate." (A) Later that year, she was faced in Vienna with the challenge 
of having to conform to the dictates of the emigre Hungarian Communist 
Party — which she had joined in late 191852 — as spelled out in lectures 
and debates: "It was really the first time in my life that I was in a proper 
party school." Slowly, views that she had developed "internally" began to 
surface and found expression in what she called "my search to introduce 
more and more democracy within the party... to give greater voice to the 
rank and file of the movement." (A) Finally, she realized that the party's 
main problems of corruption and talking down to the masses were inevita-
ble products of its being an apparatus that was centralized on a "military 
basis." In a devastating passage in her 1922 article, she describes the 
results. 
In many comrades there developed an inability to think, to such 
an extent that they became unable to evaluate the crucial 
situations encountered, in fact even to see the bare facts. It's 
not only that they were no longer revolutionaries, but already 
they were not even conscious and responsible human beings. 
Such a devaluation of the human [to the material level] has 
prevented all attempts directed towards the renewal of the 
party. 
Duczynska's article represented her conversion to Szabo's way 
of thinking regarding the dangers of bureaucratization.53 After declining to 
retract her published views, she was expelled — in the party's usual 
meeting place, the Cafe Liechtenstein — in front of the assembled 
membership. The charge: violation of party discipline.54 Half a century 
later, in her book on the anti-fascist Austrian Workers Militia (Schutz-
bund) in 1934, Duczynska accused the hidebound Austrian Communist 
Party of being less effective in offering resistance than the existing 
autonomous worker organizations.55 She concluded, in a passage remar-
kable for its optimism, by expressing satisfaction that there was no longer 
just one model for communism, because within the worker movement 
there was a process of renewal in terms of "the dichotomy of power and 
respect for humanity."56 
Individualism 
Both master and disciple were as instinctively opposed to bureaucratism 
as they were in favour of individualism. Duczynska claimed to locate the 
well-spring of this attitude explicitly in Szabo's — and to some extent her 
own, if more indirect — experience of Russian turn-of-the-century radi-
calism. This she viewed in extravagant terms as the "the life-giving, 
passionate scene of every shade of [Russian] socialist thought and revolu-
tionary practice" that she imagined shaped Szabo during his student days 
in Vienna. While studying philosophy and history at university (1899-
1903), he read Proudhon, Lavrov and Kropotkin. But more importantly he 
came under the influence (as did his younger cousin Karl Polanyi) of the 
Russian emigre Samuel Klatschko while boarding in his modest 3-room 
apartment at Belvederegasse 3 ("his real home") an experience of which 
Duczynska writes in some detail.57 (Indeed, similar "magic circles" that 
supposedly emanated from Klatschko's surviving family would make a 
deep impression on her too in Vienna after 1923.) The Belvederegasse 
apartment was "a hot-bed of the Russian revolution and the 'red' Red 
Cross" where for thirty-four years until his death in 1914 Klatschko, the 
former narodnik and "a non-party man," gave assistance to revolutionary 
fugitives of all parties from Russia; for some, the bedrooms of Adolf and 
Karl, in the much spacious Polanyi residence at Andrassy ut 2 in Buda-
pest also "served as a temporary lodging place." (UL) As Duczynska 
came to see it, the cousins were influenced in different ways. 
The wind of the Russian revolutionary student movement blew 
upon Karl Polanyi, the gymnasium school boy; in it he recog-
nized the practice of devotion on the model of 'he who is 
committed to the movement'. Later, in the first initiatives of his 
youth — in the Galileo Circle — the ethic of the 'Russian 
Student' movement was unmistakable. 
Of the two, Ervin Szabo was the more profoundly affected by 
Klatschko, "his spiritual father," and by such famous guests passing 
through the household as Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Leo Deutsch. In 
consciously becoming a socialist, Szabo would combine the tradition of 
objective Marxian social and historical truth with what Duczynska terms 
"the well-spring of Russian populism's subjective element." (UL) Oszkar 
Jaszi said much the same thing of Szabo in his Funeral Address in 1918: 
"For his very being was the blood relation of Russian propagandists and 
revolutionaries, in spite of all his Marxism."58 After returning to Hungary, 
Szabo undertook to link the Russian revolutionary movement with the 
West, particularly through transmitting printed materials, while also estab-
lishing contacts with a wide range of groups: anarchists, syndicalists, 
bourgeois radicals, and Marxists. 
The emphasis Szabo placed upon individualism perhaps not 
surprisingly elicited less response in Hungary from the organized workers' 
movement than from the 'bourgeois' or citizens' reform movement. After 
all, the latter provided the audience, readership and producer-base of 
virtually all the counter-cultural achievements of the first two decades of 
the century. In 1901 sociologists, journalists and philosophers organized 
the Association for the Scientific Study of Society (Tarsadalomtudomdnyi 
Tdrsasag), and in 1914 some of its leaders formed a 'Radical Bourgeois 
Party' which advocated reform and also mounted educational programs in 
collaboration with the HSDP. On account of his disagreements with the 
party, Szabo resigned from an editorial position with Nepszava in order to 
become an editor of the Association's new journal Huzsadik Szazad 
(Twentieth Century). Through this move, he would find among its reader-
ship's democratic-radical intelligentsia, particularly the youth, his most 
appreciative audience. 
'Home' with the Galilei Circle 
Ironically, it was within the institutional bourgeois framework of the 
Sociological Society and the related Association of Free Thinkers that 
Duczynska, albeit reluctantly, allowed herself to be pressured into finding 
a temporary "home". This was the Galilei Circle, established in 1908 by 
radical students of the University of Budapest, dedicated to reforming the 
outdated university curriculum through seminars on new areas of study 
and research, pioneering outreach programs for working people, and 
discussions on western radical ideas.59 Initially, Duczynska made a show 
of despising the Circle's intellectualism. Only later, when undertaking 
research on the early years of her husband Karl Polanyi (the Circle's 
founding president) and with the probable aim of writing about its left-
wing members, would she overcome her earlier prejudice. As it happened, 
there existed two more radical groups in which she might have felt more 
at home, but these Szabo did not think it wise, for reasons that will 
become clear, to bring to her attention.60 
"Join the Galilei Circle," Szabo abruptly advised Duczynska at some 
point during the first week of May, "you're a student, so that's the place 
for you." Perhaps he viewed it as a solution as to what to do with her, for 
he could not risk compromising himself and his trade union contacts 
through the possible indiscretions of this relatively unknown young 
woman. Duczynska implies that she already knew enough about the Circle 
to be sceptical, and that Szabo was of like mind: "Incidentally, he didn't 
like the Galilei Circle either; in fact, he hated it. But he said there was no 
other way, I had to join, people had to get to know me." (Tisza, UL) So 
that was the point. The Circle would serve as Duczynska's cover. Having 
a Polish name, being a student recently arrived from the most radical 
centre in Europe — "from Switzerland, the homeland of spies" — with 
no admissible motive for being in Budapest, having chosen not to live 
with relatives while possessing no visible means of support, and the very 
fact of her isolation, Szabo argued, would sooner or later attract the 
authorities' attention. Thus, he concluded, for the time being it was 
prudent for her to belong somewhere, and to be seen to have a place. She 
understood: "Otherwise I could even be labelled an agent of the Entente." 
Accordingly, Duczynska duly presented herself at the Galilei 
Circle's meeting place, in one of the row of narrow neo-classical build-
ings in the curiously semi-circular Anker koz (Close), 2. II. 4 in the Vlth 
district in the centre of Pest. (BM) Her worst fears were confirmed: "The 
first meeting was devastating... theoretically, every one of them was more 
left-wing than the next." 
It cannot be denied that it was a disastrous experience. They 
were very nice, enthusiastic young people; they were studying, 
and wanting to have perpetual peace. — Oh, not here and now! 
Not against this war, not a revolution against this war — j u s t a 
sort of "perpetual peace"... As if they would have been living 
outside of history: as if from their organs of feeling they were 
missing the one which registers political reality. Perhaps I was 
unfair in my aroused impatience. (UL) 
Criticism even came from the liberal Oszkar Jaszi who declared 
that the Circle was home primarily for "utopian" reformers trusting solely 
"in the power of ideas" and in the weakness of the "ancien regime".61 (In 
contrast, a Hungarian-American historian accused the Circle's founders of 
sowing "the seeds of troubles" that all too soon began "sprouting!")62 
Initially, Duczynska sat in on a seminar on philosophy and sociology, 
which she soon left "feeling very discouraged". Her lack of interest in 
ideas was never more obvious than in her disapproval of those Galileists 
who were studying the writings of Ernst Mach (1838-1916). "The over-
ture to a new age in Austria", was how Peter Hanak63 described Mach's 
Analysis of Sensations, a much-reprinted work that would rank with 
Freud's in questioning the concept of stable identity. It is difficult to avoid 
concluding that Duczynska's attitude was determined by Lenin's attack on 
Mach (and the Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius) in his Materialism 
and Empirio-Criticism. True, it is possible that the tone and level of 
discussion failed to stimulate her. In which case, she was not alone. 
Gyorgy Lukacs also recorded his dissatisfaction, after witnessing a 
seminar in which Karl Polanyi — perhaps arguing in favour of Comte's 
positivism against metaphysics — struck him as doing less than justice to 
his theme. 
It was typical of the state of public opinion before the dicta-
torship... that Polanyi once read out a passage from Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Mind in a seminar at which I was present, 
caricaturing it by his manner of reading. He read out a long 
sentence which was followed by uproarious laughter, and then 
another long sentence that provoked a similar reaction.61 
However, Duczynska could not deny that she was made to feel 
welcome. Some students were genuinely interested in Duczynska and in 
her experiences; enquiring about her background, about Zurich, and about 
"what sort of people Russians are." But when she started speaking of 
what really interested her, the Zimmerwald movement, it became clear 
that they had little interest in the political workers' movement. The 
students' reaction to the war was "the mailing out of postcards, on which 
they wrote that they were in favour of perpetual peace. This formula 
plunged me into despair," she admitted, "because for there to be peace, 
there must — and at once — be action!" 
Action, not theory 
Duczynska never questioned Szabo's strategy of seeming deliberately to 
ignore her desire — craving, rather — for action. Later, though, she came 
to realize that he himself yearned to give practical expression to what 
perforce remained mere theory. Being of a generation who looked to 
poetry to convey what could not be clearly or honestly expressed, 
Duczynska prefaced her second article on Szabo with lines from Holder-
lin: "...perhaps there will come / like a sunbeam through clouds, the deed 
/ that has been spiritualized by thought?" At least by that time she had 
matured enough to hold Szabo's theoretical writings in high regard, 
perhaps even as a species of action. His conspiratorial nature was already 
legendary, and Duczynska seems to have accepted that this accounted in 
part for what she found missing in him. In 1917 though she was not to 
realize that Szabo probably consciously chose not to put her in touch with 
oppositional groups and individuals already experienced in the type of 
activities she would later undertake. Cautiousness on Szabo's part — or 
desire personally to oversee the political education of a young female 
admirer — were hardly adequate reasons for causing her, in effect, to 
waste valuable months. Why, for instance, did he not send Duczynska 
first to the offices of Nepszava where associates had set precedents for her 
later antiwar actions a good two years before her arrival? As early as May 
1915, radicals on the newspaper had been involved in producing ship-
ments of pacifist leaflets to the armed forces (though they were inter-
cepted by the police). At the same time, some individuals on the newspa-
per established contact with Swiss and Entente socialists, and sent one of 
their number, Mandel, to Zimmerwald. Then it must have taken consider-
able initiative to include an advertisement, in the May 11, 1916 issue, for 
"The Workers Education Circle," inviting subscribers to request the 
"Library of Awakening" to send free books and pamphlets to soldiers at 
the front or in hospital. Furthermore, some in the HSDP leadership 
tacitly encouraged these clandestine activities. It was only when such 
efforts failed that, fearing the authorities might impose martial law, the 
leadership decided to focus, together with other parties, on electoral 
reform,65 though this did not hinder further peace initiatives by individu-
als.66 
These activities set the stage in early 1917 for the unlikely 
appearance of the first major war-time opposition group. Engineers, 
technicians, draftsmen, and administrators — thus far rejected by estab-
lished trade unionists as 'representatives of capital'67 — formed the 
movement known as "engineer socialism," later the National Association 
of Engineers. Their radically new interpretation of the theory of surplus 
value and plans for revolution through industrial action were alluded to in 
a novel set in those times by Duczynska's close friend of the 1960s the 
writer Jozsef Lengyel ("the Hungarian Solzhenitsyn").68 Engineer socialist 
leaders would be joined by representatives of twenty major factories in 
Budapest to form the Inter-factory Committee, which led to proposals for 
a general strike (which predictably the HSDP refused to support). 
Duczynska would have been equally puzzled, if not dismayed, 
had she known that Angelika Balabanov had omitted to brief her on the 
interest already shown in the Zimmerwald movement by some of the 
HSDP's leaders. In 1915 indications of mass discontent in Hungary 
caused the leadership to write to the International Socialist Committee 
(ISC) on July 15th, and then to send Mandel to the Zimmerwald Confer-
ence. Subsequently, the Nepszava published an article (September 25) 
praising the Conference (though according to a police report this indicated 
no change in the party's position).69 In January 1916 two HSDP leaders 
tentatively approached the ISC regarding peace initiatives, but the party 
rejected the notion of joining the Zimmerwald movement and ignored the 
appeal of the Kienthal Conference.70 In the autumn, two leaders went to 
the Hague, censorship's blank spaces appeared more frequently in the 
Nepszava,71 and the police reported that elements within the party had 
been engaging in peace propaganda.72 In May 1917, a Hungarian delega-
tion visited the ISC which had by then moved to Stockholm; and in the 
summer an expanded delegation — including Szabo's bete noire Jakab 
Weltner, along with Mano Buchinger" and four other party leaders — 
went there for discussions with the preparatory committee.71 In as much 
as Balabanov was the ISC Secretary, and would thus have been aware of 
these Hungarian initiatives, it may be concluded that she regarded 
Duczynska as little more than a courier whose responsibility — and 
presumed limited ability — extended no further than delivering the 
Manifesto to known leftists in Vienna, and presumed leftists in Budapest. 
Beyond that, she had no reason to place any confidence in the former 
student's political abilities. Hostility to the HSDP's leadership probably 
explain why Szabo himself did not attend the European conferences, quite 
apart from the problem of obtaining the necessary accreditation and 
financial support.75 In the final analysis, though, it cannot be ruled out 
that it was part of Duczynska's agenda to ignore these earlier initiatives in 
order to portray her own activities in Hungary between September 1917 
and January 1918 relating to Zimmerwald and anti-war propaganda as 
pioneering undertakings. 
Still, Duczynska's blanket profession of ignorance on matters 
Hungarian have to be taken seriously. It was a measure of her isolation 
from the Hungarian political scene, that, as she admitted, she was ignorant 
of the long campaign to extend the franchise. This had peaked with the 
demonstration before the Parliament, on "Bloody Sunday" on May 23, 
1912, when the party's proclamation — soon withdrawn — of a general 
strike for a full extension of the franchise, resulted in the deaths of six 
workers and the wounding of 182 others. Like Rosa Luxemburg, Duczyn-
ska was too ready to regard parliamentarianism as diverting energies from 
the class struggle. It was certainly significant that Trade Union member-
ship — in 1906 129,332, but declining to a low in 1916 of 55,338 — had 
increased to 215,222 by late 1917, and now included white-collar work-
ers, engineers and civil servants, whose conditions were worsening.76 Yet 
the franchise issue could not be viewed in isolation from the need to 
politicize the peasantry — of whose plight Duczynska seems to have 
remained ignorant until the early 1940s — and from resolving the crucial 
problem of the nationalities' desire for independence from Magyar 
hegemony. In effect Duczynska viewed politics not as work on a continu-
ing basis across a broad and varied human terrain, but as a series of 
violent events. 
Master and disciple 
In the beginning conversations between Duczynska and Szabo probably 
took place in the Madzsars' living room. However, she became aware that 
her presence was inconvenient on occasions when Szabo wished to be 
alone with Alice, while the presence of numerous social democratic 
visitors likewise inhibited hers. So some time in the first week of May 
Duczynska moved out from the apartment and into a furnished room she 
rented for one month in a building on a nearby major thoroughfare, the 
Fehervari ut. The experience of living alone made Duczynska more aware 
of her surroundings, more conscious too of how the war cast its shadow 
over all aspects of life. Every morning the tantalizing smell of freshly 
baked bread wafted up into the street from the bakery in the basement. In 
the evening, war's shadow cast a pall of apprehension in her room. "It 
was a ghostly room," she recalls. She was alone now. Uncertainty again 
took hold. 
The new room turned out to be not entirely secure either, for the 
landlady was well placed to observe visitors (also a hazard at the previous 
address). Therefore, during the next three weeks — the period during 
which she turned over in her mind the second plan she felt she had to 
resort to — Duczynska and Szabo, seemingly by that time meeting every 
day or two, continued their talks "about various things," as she puts it 
evasively, not in Szabo's apartment, of course, and "absolutely not" at his 
library. Instead, after his daily visit to the Madzsars', the two of them 
would walk during the lightening evenings in neighbouring small side 
streets. On Sunday mornings, though, they met in the Farkasret 
Cemetery77 in the bright spring sunshine, to Duczynska's mind a better 
time and place. "We would walk among the large crowds alongside the 
graves; where could we have spoken more freely?" 
How freely did they speak, this ill-matched pair? A degree of 
intimacy seems to have coloured their relationship. Perhaps Duczynska 
would not have returned so often, and in such detail, to Ervin Szabo, had 
there not been subtle bonds of affection between them. According to 
Oszkar Jaszi, Szabo had "an almost magical influence on idealistic youth 
and on women."78 It seems to have been the case with Duczynska too. At 
their first meeting in 1915, she saw in him the likeness of her father, until 
then the only person she had ever loved.79 Concerning Szabo, when 
pressed Duczynska declared, "certainly I loved him."80 As to his feelings 
for her, Duczynska retreats into affirmative metaphor.81 But according to 
"historical gossip" Szabo was in love with her.82 When asked whether 
Szabo ever displayed emotion — he who lost his father early, never 
married, and remained very close to his mother — again Duczynska 
replied evasively: "Rhetoric was completely alien to him....". (A) At the 
time, Duczynska was almost certainly a virgin who had known only 
platonic love for her brilliant cousin, the poet Ferenc Bekassy. Yet she 
would always represent a curious mix of puritanism and assumed worldli-
ness, such as caused her almost always to refer to Alice as "Mrs. Mad-
zsar." Thus, even from the perspective of old age, she would not presume 
to elaborate on what sort of man Szabo was. According to her, he ap-
peared almost every day at the home of his close friend Jozsef Madzsar, 
because "he was very affectionate towards Mrs. Madzsar." They had "a 
very intimate personal relationship," which she chose to describe as "a 
very great love." "It was a triangle: the life of mature people." (A) 
The age difference between master and disciple seems hardly to 
have mattered, though a curious incident made Duczynska aware of it for 
the first time. Most days she went to the Galilei Circle. But one afternoon 
it chanced that Ervin Szabo took the unusual step of calling without prior 
arrangement, only to find that she was out. The incident later struck 
Duczynska as showing how young people misguidedly exaggerate age 
differences. She was surprised to hear from the landlady that "a young 
man" had called round, for the only young men she knew belonged to the 
Circle, and none were on close enough terms to visit her. She soon 
learned that the mysterious caller was Ervin Szabo, who "of course," to 
her at that time was an "old man". "Or so he seemed to me," she re-
flected, "though when he died he was not yet forty, just thirty-nine."83 
Nevertheless as director of the Budapest Municipal Library, an 
established author and leading intellectual he was on a different plane. 
Szabo's uniquely activist concept of the book, and indeed of the Library, 
was memorably described by Jozsef Madzsar. 
For him, a book was... a living organism: each one of them had 
its own function, and his mission lay in marshalling books and 
dispatching them in all directions in the fight for culture. Each 
book enters like a corpuscle the body's cells, bringing with it 
the oxygen of culture, afterwards re-assembling before going 
again and again in different direction. (Farewell Address, 
October 1, 1918). 
At least one such book came into Duczynska's hands a few months later. 
An issue of an anarchist-socialist journal,84 it bore a circular emblem (of 
two hands breaking a rifle) that she would use on one of her anti-war 
leaflets. Though she ill-advisedly called Szabo a "bookworm", she would 
never have questioned the value of his creating such an institution for the 
wider diffusion of knowledge. Furthermore, Duczynska had a naive awe 
of Szabo's self-discipline: he worked from six (others say from five) until 
eight o'clock every morning ("in his cloistered study," she adds archly), 
writing his history of 1848-49 in a firm hand on grey paper. (OM) And 
yet, age did count for something, in terms of registering the passage of 
time. Duczynska now found herself becoming aware of the impermanence 
of life. Thus, on one of their walks, they passed a construction site. "I 
remember that Ervin said that not even our foot-prints will remain, 
because somehow they [who have power] control the streets, will re-plan 
them, and break up the very concrete."85 (K) She, on the other hand, was 
convinced that a new age was about to dawn upon the ruins of the old. 
Inevitably, then, later that year Duczynska sought out radical students of 
around her own age — their youth seemingly a guarantee of the activism 
she valued beyond any theory. 
One lesson Duczynska did learn from Szabo — and would 
attempt to apply from September on — was his conspiratorialism. She 
liked to think it was typical of the Russian illegal movement whose 
principles he had absorbed in Klatschko's Vienna apartment ("the high 
school for conspiracy"). "Through him there percolated down to us in 
some measure the principles of the illegal movement and conspiracy," she 
claimed. (OM) This practice was apparent in the caution Szabo exercised 
in what he said even to Duczynska, whose inexperience and gentry family 
connections he could hardly ignore. "He always acted according to the 
rules of conspiracy," she notes, "and never told anyone, not even his 
closest friends, anything that wasn't strictly their business." (Beg. & OM) 
Nevertheless, it may be that her own liking for conspiracy, which became 
almost a way of life86 as well as infatuation with what she thought were 
'Russian' tactics, caused her to exaggerate it in Szabo's case.87 
During their unequal conversations, Duczynska was painfully 
aware that she was the disciple, rightly in awe of one whom she was 
already inclined to regard as her "master". Yet her impetuous ambition 
ran up against Szabo's cautiousness, creating a dilemma. She could not 
ignore that he was deliberately steering discussion towards theoretical 
questions, rather than practical solutions. Her initial plan of contacting 
workers in factories was getting nowhere. Although Szabo gave her a 
disproportionate amount of his limited free time, to Duczynska he seemed 
like someone from "another world". The first two weeks of May (which 
she would call "Bitter May") were, as she recalled so clearly, "a time of 
roads without direction, a time of sterile endeavour, inner indecision, 
isolation, impotence. Later discussions hardly opened a way out, however 
sincere and intense they were." (OM) 
It was a new experience for Duczynska to try to discuss, in her 
mother tongue, subjects that she had only limited acquaintance with, and 
that in German. Probably, she availed herself of the Madzsars' personal 
library in order to begin to familiarize herself with Szabo's writings. At 
least since 1913, she had become to some extent politicized while at 
school in Braunschweig — principally through reading the "always very 
radical" daily Braunschweiger Volksfreund — though it was the outbreak 
of the Russian Revolution that reclaimed permanently her allegiance to 
socialism. Yet she had felt no desire to read Marx until her Zurich mentor 
Henryk Lauer recommended The Communist Manifesto as a start. Never-
theless, Duczynska seems to have deliberately given the impression of 
being poorly read, never speaking of exemplars (other than Szabo), nor of 
what she may have read against the war (unlike Lukacs who mentions 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht). After describing her 1917 experi-
ences Duczynska would never again refer to Marx. It may have sufficed 
that Szabo's interpretation accorded with the dictates of her rebellious 
nature. What she learned from him was the significance of certain deriva-
tives and applications of Marxism, not its essence. "I did not hear him 
speak of theory, of Plekhanov for example," Duczynska says, adding, 
"theoretical matters were of another world." (A) 
From syndicalism to anarchistic individualism 
Despite Duczynska's allegation that Szabo, even if reluctantly, was con-
cerned with theory at the expense of action, nevertheless she granted, at 
least with the benefit of hindsight, that some aspects of theory were more 
potentially action-oriented than others. Thus, though it was not clear to 
her in 1917, she came to grant that Szabo did emphasize the essential role 
of "the individual" (if not all individuals). This was because he was a 
syndicalist "in the fullest sense of the word" — indeed, Duczynska 
emphasizes, "an anarcho-syndicalist". Later, her rudimentary political 
philosophy seemed to have been influenced — if not arrested — by 
Szabo's argument that anarchism was in the best Marxist tradition: "Today 
it is mostly the anarchists who call themselves communist, and collectiv-
ism is the social ideal of the Social Democrats."88 What direct experience 
he'd had came from his short-lived early association with the small 
Hungarian anarchist movement led by the curious figure of Count Ervin 
Batthyany. The correctness of his instinct was to a degree confirmed by 
Lenin's statement that Bolshevism must seek allies within the best ele-
ments of the anarchists.89 
That Duczynska was impressed by what Szabo said on the 
subject is suggested by her declaration, on virtually no evidence, that her 
father Alfred von Duczynski — who in her eyes could do no wrong — 
was an anarcho-syndicalist. However, it was clear that syndicalism was 
Szabo's active political concern. For he had formed a Syndicalist Propa-
ganda Group dedicated to establishing independent trade unions with the 
objective of revolution.90 Duczynska was interested to know what Szabo's 
syndicalism amounted to. Eventually she concluded that he believed 
neither in purely political movements nor in the usefulness of street 
demonstrations; his aim was simply to bring the workers out onto the 
streets, though without even the sort of programme which at least the 
Zimmerwaldists had. Whether or not it was possible to achieve such a 
thing, she commented with obvious scepticism, was another question. In 
any event, the working class would remain, for both of them, a preferred 
though little-known dimension of humanity. When Szabo warned Ducz-
ynska that it "wasn't easy" to make contact with the workers, he could 
have been speaking of his own limited experience. According to his 
biographer, "he did not idealize the working class and did not try to 'rub 
shoulders' with them."91 In Duczynska's case, too, although after 1946 she 
idealized the peasantry as the most likely catalyst of world revolution, her 
milieu remained the intelligentsia. Master and pupil were typical of the 
Hungarian intelligentsia who, drawn from the upper and middle ranks of 
society, looked to the West, in contrast to the Russian intelligentsia that 
came from the people and went back "into the people."92 However, 
recognition did eventually come from the workers, if only on the occasion 
of Szabo's funeral. The large factories stopped work for ten minutes, of 
which Duczynska observed, "Ervin Szabo in death moved the masses as 
he never did in life. In death he acted." (UL) 
Not until late September 1917 would Szabo provide Duczynska, 
along with the student group she had by then assembled, with introduc-
tions to those formerly elusive intermediaries necessary for contacting 
factory workers in armaments factories. These turned out to be long-time 
syndicalist associates of his, shop stewards who like him regarded trade 
unions as vehicles of class warfare. In the short term, Duczynska's goal 
accorded with theirs: to organize a general strike as prelude to the long-
awaited proletarian revolution. But over the long term, she did not share 
Szabo's view that 'after the revolution' government should consist of a 
national federation of syndicates. In her last years, though, the distortions 
arguably inherent in 'existing socialism' seem to have caused her to 
ponder whether a syndicalist system might not be preferable to a central-
ized state apparatus. (UL) Here perhaps was the reason for her having 
chosen to write about Ervin Szabo in the first place — to present anar-
chism and syndicalism as fruitful critiques of 'existing socialism.' This 
was at least partly confirmed by what she wrote about the Austrian 
Schutzbund,93 For on the basis of her experience in its activities from 
1934 to 1936 she became convinced that communist renewal could come 
only through "the trend towards autonomy." Above all, from "respect for 
humanity [wherein lies] direct democracy,... acting as an antibody on 
bureaucratic structures, and spontaneous initiative in all walks of public 
life." 
The state and bolshevism 
The March Revolution may have been an inspiration to Duczynska, but it 
inclined Szabo to anticipate crucial weaknesses in the bolshevik mode of 
socio-political structuring. For according to his syndicalist principles, the 
class struggle must be waged through direct action on the part of indus-
trial workers themselves, not by a political party claiming to act for them. 
The latter course would be the breeding ground of bureaucracy and 
ultimately etatisme. Duczynska expressed this in a particularly striking 
formulation — indeed, one more prescient than she could have dreamed 
of at the time — "He almost feared more the statist deformation of the 
coming revolutionary transformation than that it might never come at 
all." But in 1917 she would have regarded this as totally removed from 
reality. It was natural for Duczynska to have been impatient with Szabo's 
seeming hostility to the coming Bolshevik people's state. Even later, she 
could not bring herself fully to accept that Szabo's objection had a ratio-
nal basis. Thus, she attempted to trace it back,94 as others had done, to 
underlying psychological factors that induced lack of confidence resulting 
in awareness of contradictions and self-doubt. The result, she concluded, 
was that he whom she decided to call "the unhappy lover of action" (UL) 
was doomed to remain ineffective in practice. 
Even subsequent bitter experience — expelled by two communist 
parties, the liquidation of her first husband and old comrades of different 
nationalities in Stalin's Purges — did not alter her conviction that at that 
time the formation of socialist statehood in the motherland of the Revolu-
tion had been necessary. However, following Szabo into theory and some 
unspecified future, she could not disagree with Ervin Szabo's conviction 
of the need to realize — via a bridge leading to tomorrow from everyday 
disappointments — the vision of Marx and Engels of the withering away 
of the state. (UL) But who would be the bridge-builders? For Szabo, they 
would be the trusted "few" who alone had the ability to discern "the more 
distant great objectives of the future." It is not obvious to what extent 
Duczynska objected to this. "Basically, Szabo was not of a democratic 
way of thinking, but was for an elite which would transform society in 
which there was democracy (in an intensive, not broad sense), not a mass 
movement, but based on direct action in the factory." (K) Still, it troubled 
her that "he was like Lenin, in that basically he did not believe in the 
working masses as a political force," preferring an elite social formation. 
At the time of writing, Duczynska was despairing of 'socialism' as theory, 
and turning towards individual action. Years of disappointment had taken 
their toll: the Stalinist system, its imposition upon Hungary, the ossifica-
tion of 'existing socialism'. Perhaps it was her despair of 'socialism' at 
least as it was commonly understood that caused her to write that "every 
practical movement is the seat of continual disillusions, constant contra-
dictions." In May 1917 too Duczynska was feeling dissatisfied. The 
openness and optimism of neutral Zurich was very different from Buda-
pest's climate of irresolution and suspicion. No one took seriously her 
half-thought-out scheme. "It was a time of untrodden ways, futile at-
tempts, gestation, isolation and helplessness," she remembered only too 
well. 
On Saturday May 12th, Ervin Szabo delivered a lecture in 
Golyavar, under the auspices of the Galileo Circle's Peace series, entitled 
"Imperialism and Lasting Peace."95 Duczynska was in the audience. As 
she watched and listened she was forced to conclude that for Szabo, "to 
lecture, to speak from a rostrum, like some 'actor', was torture." Sitting 
beside Alice Madzsar, she was nervously trying to follow "with half an 
ear" the to her totally irrelevant line of Szabo's reasoning concerning 
Cobden and Bright, Free Trade, economic liberalism, and English trade 
unionism. For she was restless, her mind elsewhere. 
Why? What good is it? What it is good for? Two months ago 
in Petersburg the soldiers did not shoot, the workers downed 
tools, they wouldn't make munitions; starving and in misery 
they demonstrated in the streets. This happened, and that it did 
actually happen will never be forgotten. This is already our 
era... 
What Szabo said had not the slightest impact. "In my all-embracing 
ignorance," she later recalled, "I believed implicitly that all this consti-
tuted no great problem, that it counted for nothing...." It was also a 
measure of Duczynska's ignorance concerning Marxism that she failed to 
grasp the obvious significance of Szabo's liberating observation that "the 
primacy of economic over political structure is by no means as obvious as 
many used to believe." (UL) When the lecture ended she left the hall 
more convinced than ever of his limitations. She kept recalling Zimmer-
wald's stirring summons to revolution that had galvanized her personally 
to action. She had been sure that in Ervin Szabo she would find someone 
of the same mind. Instead, here he was presenting a scholarly lecture 
from under his trademark "drooping melancholy moustache." This was no 
way, she thought, to bring the masses out into the streets. 
I think I didn't understand a word, and it wouldn't have given 
me any guidance even if 1 had. The youthful ear 'picks up' only 
what has previously vibrated within that 'receiving' ear, what 
has been previously formed in the depths of the mind. It was 
listening only to the dream: to the rebellious crowd streaming 
out from Csepel's factories... But is there no step that can take 
us closer to it, no possible plan of action? Is there no ray of 
light? One that will reveal all? (Beg) 
The March Revolution may have been on Duczynska's mind, but 
not on Szabo's, or at least not in the same sense. It is difficult to judge 
from her accounts — written for publication in 'communist' Hungary — 
whether self-censorship caused her to omit the sceptical comments he 
likely made. However, one disclaimer, made in the course of the Ackerl 
interview, strains belief: "I didn't dare to enquire whether he approved or 
not," she says concerning the Revolution. "But I never heard him say 
anything against it either, because, after all, it was an immense event and 
a great Revolution — and so he preferred to remain silent." Evasiveness 
characterized Szabo's reported attitude on the subject. Nevertheless 
Duczynska felt obliged to conclude that, if "only obliquely," "the whole 
structure" of Szabo's way of thinking was different, and that there was "a 
complete difference" between the two of them in their assessment of 
bolshevism. When asked flatly whether Szabo approved of the Bolsheviks' 
seizure of power, Duczynska replied, "It's doubtful, very doubtful." 
According to her, all he said on the subject was, "never believe every-
thing you see in print." Again, she tried to account for this in terms of 
personality: "Certainly, he refrained from making any statement on it... 
due to inner uncertainty." Finally though she accepted that his response 
was in accordance with his deeply-held principles: "It was the develop-
ment of etatisme that would have struck him most certainly as a danger, 
from the very first minute." For this reason, Duczynska adds, "he was 
thoroughly distrustful of the Bolshevik leadership." 
Curiously, it seems that Lenin's name, according to Duczynska, 
"did not come up once" in their discussions. She tries to account for this 
by pointing out that news from Russia was slow to reach Budapest, and 
that the nature of Lenin's role was still not clear. Of course, at that time 
she was focusing on her own projected plans, perhaps even to the exclu-
sion of developments in Russia. In any case, she was hardly up to 
debating such matters with Szabo. After all, as she confessed, she still had 
not grasped the basic difference between Lenin and the Left Zimmer-
waldists — "I was very far from understanding the Bolshevik way of 
thinking." It would not have been surprising if Szabo had deliberately 
decided to deflect her questions. At the time it must have irked Duczyns-
ka to realize that "to him, everything and everyone who became organized 
was suspect." Later though, after saying this (on the Ackerl Interview 
tape), after a pause, she adds, "It was a very profound insight...." (A) 
Unlike his disciple, Szabo was spared from having to confront the 
dilemma presented by onrushing events. He died on September 29, 1918, 
a few weeks before the first of the two Hungarian revolutions. His funeral 
was held at the time when ex-prisoners-of-war were returning from Russia 
to found the Hungarian Communist Party, and some months later the 
Republic of Soviets. Then, as Duczynska points out, Szabo would surely 
have found it difficult to maintain his anti-statist position. Yet already the 
Bolsheviks had acknowledged Szabo's historic role in the workers 
movement. "He was invited — news reached him before his death — to 
be the first foreign member of the Socialist Academy which had just been 
created in Moscow. He accepted. It was a great honour." Honours he 
could accept, but not the responsibility of acting. "I cannot imagine him 
participating in the 1919 Hungarian Republic of Soviets,"96 Duczynska 
declares. Even though it would claim him as one of its patron saints.97 
Activism and the individual 
Against all the evidence, writing and theorizing were for Szabo not 
enough — he wanted to act! "A thoughtful person... who philosophizes 
— is no more than half a man. The whble man is the active man!" That 
was what one who knew him said he affirmed.98 It was his tragedy that he 
was constitutionally unable to become one. Later, this was held against 
him under 'existing socialism', when his scruples and awareness of 
contradictions were dismissed as inhibitions which ought to be 'solved', as 
Duczynska duly noted.90 Later in life, though, she seemed prepared to 
grant that more thought and less action would have done a lot less harm. 
She blamed herself for failing to grasp the profound significance of the 
issues Szabo raised. "How could it have been otherwise?" she asks, "my 
theoretical-political ignorance was boundless." Yet the full extent of the 
issues would only become intelligible with the tragedies of the intervening 
four decades. Then Szabo's ethical critique of communist party practice 
would strike her as "more realistic than anything else." Even then, though 
Duczynska was more aware of what she calls "the spiritual projections of 
the attributes of the contradictions," there is no evidence that she was able 
to comprehend "the theoretical dissonances hiding behind them." (UL) 
Impatient for 'action', as always, it is not clear that Duczynska fully 
appreciated the distinctive ethical dimension of Szabo's thinking. As 
Litvan100 points out, this "incorruptible" thinker's earlier syndicalist view 
of the leadership role of a "moral elite" would eventually broaden into a 
vision of what he himself represented. Thus, he could be seen as a model, 
"one of a few, who will be devoted to far-away goals and are courageous 
enough to present these constantly to the masses... who serve as steady 
drivers of present-day mass movements... towards the morrow." In this 
respect, Szabo would be pointed to as the "the guiding spirit" of Du-
czynska's group of student revolutionary socialists. Yet they had neither 
the status nor the ambition to assume any such leadership role. 
However, there was another perhaps more crucial dimension to 
Szabo's concept of activism and the individual. Thus it would come as 
something of a revelation for Duczynska personally when she read, in a 
new edition of Szabo's works, that for him all social progress "was the 
positive achievement of critically thinking individuals." (UL) Typically 
though she tried to associate this with his early reading in "the heroic 
theory of Russian populism" (in order perhaps to differentiate between 
this and the western form of individualism), noting that his view "must be 
the complete opposite of the Leninist concept" which points to the party 
organization as representing the subjective element. (UL)In this regard her 
lack of interest in Marx would have found justification in Szabo's letter to 
Karl Kautsky (1904): "I think that it is necessary to establish the role of 
the individual in history," because "[historical] materialism explains only 
short passages of the development of society."101 It followed that he 
opposed the fatalism of revisionist German Marxism which was content to 
await the "automatic" fulfilment of the objective laws of history (UL), its 
"a priori party truths" blocking "the free expression of different opinions." 
"For socialism one must not create soldiers [but] rebels, spontaneous 
fighters, who know why they are fighting," he wrote.102 To this extent 
Duczynska would follow him, criticizing the Austrian SDP in 1934 for 
cloaking policy in "the magic mantle of historical necessity."103 From 
another perspective, for Gyorgy Lukacs too the concept of "Ought" would 
involve accepting that things do not change of their own accord, "but as a 
consequence of conscious choices."104 However, though he declared that 
Szabo was "the only one of the Hungarian thinkers of my day to whom I 
am seriously indebted,"105 Lukacs would never have elevated the critically 
thinking individual over the Party. 
The urgency of the need to renew the fabric of European culture 
that world war had torn asunder affected Szabo profoundly. But he was 
consumed by the sense of inadequacy that came from his inability to 
resolve to engage in action. Duczynska took Szabo's self-criticism to 
heart, though it meant setting aside his critical standards. During the next 
three years, action would become her watchword: anti-war street propa-
ganda (for which she was jailed), membership of the Hungarian Commu-
nist Party, propaganda in Switzerland for the Hungarian Soviet republic, 
and work for the Comintern in Russia. Even had she read Szabo's last 
article "Culture and Civilization," she would still have ignored its recom-
mendations which struck at the heart of her action project. 
Hence, those who know and proclaim the good, but want to 
realize it with means that are contrary to their moral convic-
tions, are not truly cultured, and are not worthy of leadership. It 
is better to allow the bad to remain than to change it by immo-
ral means.1"6 
"Those whom the gods love die young," Duczynska wrote of 
Szabo, decades later. At least he was spared having to witness the 
Hungarian Republic's collapse and the quarter-century of clerical-conser-
vative counter-revolution. Likewise the fatal consequences of the Austrian 
SDP's intellectual elite which, by showing itself "incapable of action," as 
Duczynska charged, thereby "paved the way to the abyss" of the Nazi 
years.107 Yet if intellectuals could not unite knowing and doing, who else 
could? Members of the working class, was Duczynska's answer. Szabo's 
preference was for a directing "elite social formation," hers was "the 
working masses as a political force." The resolute workers whose resis-
tance to fascism she described in her book on the February 1934 rising of 
the Schutzbund, proved, to her satisfaction at least, superior to their 
intellectual "betters" through being able both "to determine on and carry 
out a course of action."108 The "spontaneous upsurge" in Vienna of 
working men who hitherto had known only how to obey, turned "the 
improbable into the real."109 They demonstrated, in Duczynska's words, 
that the individual must be viewed as active subject rather than passive 
object.110 Through focusing on "close-ups" of turning points in the 
campaign, she sought to reveal how "the action of a single person may 
well determine which way the 'wheel of destiny' will roll."111 But, of 
course, they regarded themselves as being within the workers movement. 
To that extent, Duczynska rejected Szabo's concept of an elite: "I very 
consciously turned against Ervin Szabo's world view, in that from first to 
last, it was directed towards individual action, which I viewed as no 
solution at all." 
Back in the autumn of 1917, Duczynska's feelings were a mix-
ture of awe and puzzlement. If she is to believed, she and her student 
activist group regarded their "master" Szabo, "this scholarly, strange saint 
of the revolution," as their "spiritual father,"112 though "outwardly he 
lived a completely petit bourgeois life." (OM) Nevertheless, they were 
uneasy. Perhaps it was his illness: "He was very mild, and bore himself 
with a certain sadness," and in appearance he was "more haggard". (A) 
But it was his demeanour that most affected them most: "He was so aloof 
that there was no way to get to know him... he was not so much cold as 
very silent; a certain sadness never left him." She would later learn that 
even Samuel Klatschko had noted in him "the absence of some funda-
mental psychic quality," at least as far as his becoming a leader. (UL) It 
was this, she declared — with a degree of dramatic exaggeration charac-
teristic of her in old age — that in political life caused him to go "from 
one defeat to another, from set-back to set-back. (UL) Szabo might have 
been predicting his own fate, when he wrote of Marx, "the full impact of 
his influence will be felt only in the future... [meanwhile, we have] the 
example of his heroic life." Duczynska adapted her master's words to 
stand for a final judgment on him: "A happy life is impossible; the most 
one can attain is a heroic life."113 The last words she addressed to her 
master were sent from prison. During her trial for treason before a 
military tribunal, the defense counsel Gyula Mero came over to Duczyns-
ka and the other defendants and asked whether a wreath in their name 
could be placed on Szabo's grave. (UL) It was determined that the 
wreath's ribbon would bear the inscription "From Ilona Duczynska and 
her comrades." 
The assassination plan 
When it was becoming clear that Ervin Szabo would not assist her to 
publicize the Zimmerwald Manifesto among factory workers, Duczynska 
resorted to what must all along have been a fall-back plan, the assas-
sination of prime minister Istvan Tisza. It is a measure both of her isola-
tion and the ties of affection between them that she confided in Ervin 
Szabo. It might have been thought that the scholarly theorist would have 
tried to dissuade her. And he did, though but half-heartedly. But that 
could have no effect now. She was no longer his disciple. "Existence was 
now weightless; time flowed smoothly," Duczynska felt. It was as though 
she had entered a new dimension of the Will. Indeed, she might not have 
been aware, when she started writing, of just how deep-seated this 
dimension was. 
This second plan of Duczynska's probably began taking shape 
even before she left Zurich, when Katja Adler handed her a letter to 
smuggle into Vienna. At the prospect of meeting Adler, Duczynska 
remembered, "I was in seventh heaven!" (A) It was to be forwarded via 
her to her husband Friedrich Adler (1879-1960) who was awaiting trial 
for having shot the Austrian prime minister Count Karl Stiirgkh. Appar-
ently, the importance of Adler's act was widely understood including in 
Hungary where, according to Duczynska, "it suggested, so to say, quite 
naturally, the thought of a similar attempt against Tisza." (Gyoffy) The 
issue, in both cases, was the continuing war. Count Stiirgkh had refused 
— having since March 1914 been governing Austria without summoning 
Parliament (under 'Article XIV' of the Constitution) — to reconvene it, to 
discuss the war and ways of ending it. It was this that provoked Friedrich 
Adler to assassinate him on October 21, 1916. 
Istvan Tisza (1861-1918) was a major Hungarian landowner for 
whom preservation of the hierarchical social order and its cultural values 
was a sacred mission.114 As for supporting the war, even Friedrich Adler 
declared: "Tisza rules the Monarchy in fact, and Stiirgkh is only a mere 
tool of Tisza who is Austria's dictator."115 The mood in Hungary was one 
of desperation: to continue the war meant increased casualties, to end it 
would lead to the country's suppressed nationalities demanding indepen-
dence. Michael Karolyi was moved to observe that "people went around 
as if their brains had been surgically removed."116 It was in this environ-
ment that Duczynska could think only of ending the war. With Adler's 
action, she thought, "the first spark has been struck." (M) Now she 
determined to strike the regime at its heart.117 
At a deeper level, Adler's act had a liberating effect upon 
Duczynska. It demonstrated what one person acting alone could achieve. 
By following suit, she may have thought, she would show that she did not 
need Szabo's advice or the cooperation of workers' representatives. At yet 
another level, Duczynska's opting for a voluntaristic solution was expres-
sive of the "identity problem" current among contemporary Hungarian 
intellectuals, for whom the choice seemed to be between inaction due to 
the supposedly unbridgeable barriers between human beings,118 or revolu-
tionary involvement as a means of creating a new sense of community. 
Not of course that Duczynska had time to think things through. She 
viewed Friedrich Adler's act as having been precipitated by a sense of 
"despair and hopelessness," similar to her own frustration at "the absence 
of any way out of isolation." In Austria the absence of a supportive 
anti-war movement,"9 she thought, had led to Adler's "self-sacrificing 
action." (OM & Beg) In Hungary too Duczynska felt herself "in truth to 
be fatally isolated." She rebelled against it. "I am not, I cannot be alone 
in this fatal isolation from the working classes!" she told herself.120 But 
she was. Szabo's evasive theorizing confirmed it. Her state of mind at that 
time is re-captured in the otherwise incomprehensibly violent outburst that 
prefaces her "Early Morning." 
A single experience is enough to shape a human life. Our 
conclusion: attack with bare hands if necessary, with faith too 
attack the inhuman machine of an inhuman establishment — 
revolt and incite rebellion, to help society and life to become 
more human." 
Ilona Duczynska was the only Hungarian woman ever to plan to 
assassinate a political figure, the only one also to be convicted of high 
treason. In a newspaper report of her trial, she was referred to — more 
truly than was then appreciated (for her assassination plan remained 
unknown) — as "the nihilist gentry girl." It was clear why. It called to 
mind those turn-of-the-century Russian social-revolutionary and anarchist 
women who had inherited the Narodnik mystique of heroism and self-
sacrifice. Indeed, Duczynska actually claimed that it was "love for the 
heroes of Narodnaya Volja (The People's Will)" that caused her to follow 
Adler's example. (A) Hungary had developed nothing similar to the 
Russian movement probably because the Hungarian intelligentsia were of 
the upper and middle classes and looked towards the West rather than the 
people. Duczynska was only partly an exception. She consciously aligned 
herself with the Russian intelligentsia and its revolutionary tradition solely 
in order to legitimize projected acts violence, not because she sympathi-
zed with its Byzantine-Slavonic background, and even less because she 
"came from the people and went back 'into the people.'"121 Her fascination 
with its radical culture had begun through reading and continued in 
Zurich where she got to know working-class Russians, having lodged with 
two such families in each of which there was a girl around her age. 
The two-day trial of Friedrich Adler began on May 18th and 
received considerable coverage in the Hungarian press, including the 
accused's impassioned speech in his own defence. This determined 
Duczynska's timing: "The dramatic impetus... was perhaps exceptional, 
scarcely more than a day being taken to decide upon it," she explained. 
(M) Yet the plan had been maturing for at least two weeks. By early May 
for Duczynska "the Question", as she put it, was not whether but how to 
assassinate the prime minister.122 It may by then have become almost the 
sole topic of conversation with Szabo. She was even encouraged: "I saw 
in Ervin Szabo's world view a major place for individual action as 'a road 
leading ahead'," Duczynska explained. However, pangs of conscience 
were only partly allayed by Adler's description of his act as the moral 
equivalent of war: "I am no more guilty of murder than the military 
officer who kills or orders others to kill in time of war."123 For as the 
clock ticked down, Duczynska admitted to feeling troubled. "I atoned for 
it in advance: with agony, doubts, thirst for life, and sense of guilt," she 
explains, "because all humans are brothers and sisters, and to kill one of 
them is always fratricide." (K) 
Providentially, as she would regard it, Duczynska came upon a 
suitable weapon: a Browning automatic pistol with cartridges stowed 
away at the back of a drawer in Jozsef Madzsar's writing desk. Surp-
risingly, she claims that she already knew how to "handle" a pistol — 
indeed, that she had possessed one of the same make in Zurich where she 
practiced shooting "with some success." (UL) That she at once matter-
of-factly pocketed it, and thereafter carried it around with her, suggests 
that she had been thinking of emulating Adler's action from the begin-
ning.124 The weapon's comforting weight, she said, helped to strengthen 
her resolve. On May 6th, the first Sunday when she met with Szabo in 
the Farkasret cemetery,125 she spoke frankly of her plan. She had expected 
him to object. But to her surprise, "basically, he was not against it." 
Apparently, the reason was — as she puts it in an oddly flowery passage 
— that he regarded her as motivated by "purity of heart, sacred convic-
tion, and sacrifice." (UL) — Still, his qualified approval hardly justified 
the curious story, circulated in Budapest shortly after Duczynska's death, 
with romantic embellishments, to the effect that she acquired the pistol 
directly from "the pale, scholarly" Szabo, who, "with his slim hands" 
actually taught her how to use it!126 — Perhaps Szabo's grudging acquies-
cence logically followed from his condemnation of Tisza (in the Nepszava 
just a few days before) as the greatest obstacle to peace, "a serious danger 
to suffering, bleeding humanity."127 On the following Sunday, the 13th, 
meeting at the same hour (11 am), they continued the discussion, in daily 
expectation of news of the Adler Trial. By the time of their final meeting, 
on the 20th, the trial had ended with Adler being condemned to death. 
(UL) As they paced between the graves, Szabo again voiced feeble 
objections — "not that he was against it on principle," Duczynska 
observes — though with little conviction, concluding lamely, "it isn't 
right." (UL) All to no avail. "I had already made up my mind," Duczyns-
ka concludes. (S&S) 
Master and disciple no more, the two friends (or perhaps some-
thing more) met again on Monday, probably in some side-street as of old. 
Certainly they met on Tuesday when it was decided that Duczynska 
would execute her plan the following day. On the morning of Wednesday 
the 23rd, Duczynska took the unheard-of step of visiting Ervin Szabo — 
to say farewell, of course — at his library on Karolyi Street. For the last 
time he argued with her, saying "it was all wrong", even protesting that 
"he ought to be the one to do it." But Duczynska's mind was made up — 
"It was somehow predestined," she felt. (Tisza). By the time she left, they 
had agreed that her act was both sensible and necessary.128 
After leaving the Municipal Library, there were still more than 
two hours remaining. So Duczynska decided to pass the time in the 
Galilei Circle's premises which were on her route.129 It was with an odd 
feeling of security that she sank down into a chair, lulled, as she put it, by 
the familiar buzz of student voices. She again went over her plan of 
action. Duczynska had established Tisza's daily routine of leaving Parlia-
ment at the same hour in the early afternoon, and driving straight to his 
Andrassy ut residence. It would be at the moment when he descended 
from his carriage, she decided, that she would take out the pistol from her 
handbag, and fire. That was the plan she was going over in her mind. But 
suddenly the door from the street was flung open. There stood Simon 
Darvas (she would never forget the name), a newspaper in his hand. 
"Listen everyone," he shouted, "Tisza has resigned." So history had 
outrun the plans of a mere individual... On May 22, 1917 King Charles 
IV, who succeeded Francis Joseph the previous November, had revived 
the Austrian constitution and, favouring peace initiatives, had now 
dismissed Tisza whose Cabinet resigned the next day.130 Duczynska sat, 
stupefied; she was one of the last to leave the Circle's premises. 
Towards collective action 
After wandering the streets, it was early evening by the time Duczynska 
arrived at the house where her Budapest adventure had begun. She still 
had a key to the Madzsars' apartment. No one was at home. She replaced 
the pistol in Jozsef Madzsar's desk-drawer, then lay down exhausted on 
the familiar sofa. She slept, until awoken by the sound of voices, Szabo's 
among them. She got to her feet and joined the familiar trio in the next 
room. Then after a few minutes, the Madzsars left the room. Duczynska 
was the first to speak: "What did you think, when you heard the news?" 
Szabo answered in a low voice: "I felt sorry for you." (UL) He confirmed 
the significance of the day's events. The target no longer existed. Tisza 
lived — but no more as "the vulnerable, destroyable symbol" of the war. 
He had retreated within the collectivity of the political regime for which it 
would be war as usual. It would no longer be possible to hold a lone 
individual accountable. By the same token, any future oppositional action 
would have to be undertaken also not by a single individual, but an 
organization. That is what Duczynska wrote later. At that time, though, 
Szabo seemed to have had nothing more to say. She took her leave, and 
returned to her room. There she pondered her future — just as her in-
tended victim was doing. For Duczynska, of course, there would be 
options. Tisza would have none. "It had to be this way", he murmured, 
when a group of ex-soldiers shot him in his villa on October 31, 1918.131 
With the arrival of summer imminent, the Galilei Circle would 
soon be closing down. Anyway, Budapest held nothing for Duczynska 
now. Ervin Szabo had no parting advice, other than that she should 
translate Emile Vanderwelde's Le collectivisme. She would never bring 
herself to open the book. Yet the title was suggestive of Duczynska's next 
step on returning to Budapest in September. She was leaving the city 
"under the sign of miscarried individual action"; when she returned, it 
would be with the conviction that only collective action could be effec-
tive. She boarded a train, "like a whipped dog." The reason Duczynska 
left Pest so suddenly was because she no interest in staying to observe the 
political consequences of the change in the government. As a young 
dissident author who knew her at the end, wrote: "The romantic revolu-
tionary instinctively feared the possible success of political reforms."132 "I 
shall have to think everything over again," were her last thoughts as the 
outskirts of Pest were left behind. Duczynska had no money, and nowhere 
to go other than to the family who now seemed strangers to her. She duly 
arrived at the western city of Szombathely, capital of Vas County, where 
her uncle was lieutenant governor. After a day or so, sickened by the 
official ritual, patriotism and glorification of the war, Duczynska escaped 
to her mother's old family home, the Eden of her childhood, "the castle" 
(as it was called) of Zsennye. She could not then have known that who 
(or what) she later called the "great director" had reserved for her a 
leading role in the all-important second act of the drama of Hungary's 
anti-war movement.133 
Future of the myth of violence 
The second act would begin in September and end five months later. 
Thereafter the drama of Duczynska's lifetime political engagement would 
continue in different forms within the wider framework of the twentieth 
century's ideological conflict. During that time, conviction as to the 
legitimacy of assassination remained deeply embedded in her conscious-
ness. Later, she would become aware of the process of re-emergence: "If 
a person still preserves the spark within... in a moment, in an act of 
protest, in the twinkling of an eye it flames up again." (UL) Thus, while 
in 1917 she had been prepared to kill in order to bring an end to the 
state-sponsored violence of the war — in the 1970s she seemed to have 
come to regard acts of terrorism as legitimate means of opposing the 
'social' violence of the liberal capitalist order. She was attracted to 
anti-colonialist and national liberation movements (in which she saw Che 
Guevara as a key figure), the Student Revolts of the late 1960s in the 
West, and eventually and more ominously to the West German terrorist 
movement. 
It was against this background that Duczynska committed to 
paper an account of her plan to assassinate Istvan Tisza — for which, of 
course, she is the sole source. Furthermore, she chose to present it in the 
form of an encounter with Ervin Szabo (who left no reference to it in his 
papers). This way, she could portray her assassination plan as having the 
approval of the nation's most respected socialist thinker. Her timing may 
even suggest that Duczynska may have hoped that her revelation might 
encourage young Hungarian dissidents to follow her example — despite 
there having been no assassinations (apart from those instituted by the 
state) in the totalitarian societies of 'existing socialism'. 
Perhaps, though for reasons beyond her control, Duczynska was 
not fully consistent in her story. Thus, having written down what must be 
regarded as her authorized version of events, she may also have told 
Gyorgy Konrad something different. Perhaps the discrepancy resulted 
from the pain of disappointed desire. Thus she told Konrad what she 
would have liked to have happened: to have confronted Tisza face to face. 
Or better still, as she fantasized at the time, to have killed him. Of course, 
the historical record shows that she didn't. Yet a few hours later on that 
fateful day, in a waking dream, trauma collapsed into fantasy, in which 
she watched herself fire the fatal shot. 
She herself described, at the time, how she had been affected 
physically and mentally by spiritual strain in anticipation of guilt. She 
began to be aware of it while trying to relax in the Circle's meeting room. 
Then the sudden shout. The realization that Tisza had resigned caused her 
to lose control. Random thoughts passed through her mind. "My hands 
were lying on the arm of the chair like strange, sleeping animals.... The 
body had been abandoned, spirit and will had deserted it." "Previously, 
nothing else had been on my mind... now existence was weightless." 
Having steeled herself for self-sacrifice, now she felt rejected. It was as if 
sentence had been passed on her: "Sacrifice declined." (UL) 
She followed the students out into the street — she wandered 
about. She entered a restaurant, and things became clearer. She sat at a 
table. She did not touch the food set before her. She could think only of 
one thing — what she had intended should happen! Idly, she looked 
about her. Her gaze fell on a middle-aged man sitting at the next table. 
The image of Istvan Tisza.... Trauma gave way to fantasy. 
Now, in your mind, you cock the Browning that's still in your 
pocket; in your mind, suddenly take it out, you take quick aim 
at the nape of his neck, and fire.... He gives a shudder — his 
body really does, it really does; there's fear in his eyes, sweat 
on his brow. People go on eating — surprised, embarrassed. 
She had not forgotten. That was how Friedrich Adler had shot Count 
Stiirgkh while he was lunching at his usual table in his usual restaurant in 
Vienna. 
The next thing Duczynska knew, she was fumbling with the key 
in front of the Madzsars' apartment. There was desultory talk. After a 
while she left. The last thing she remembered was Szabo's: "I felt sorry 
for you..." (UL) What did he mean? That he'd never expected her to 
shoot? That he foresaw how disappointed she would be? But why disap-
pointed? Perhaps he was remembering how during the past month she 
had revealed her ignorance. Had she been reduced to having to shoot 
someone, simply to prove that she could act, and that her action could 
equal — or surpass — his theorizing? Szabo seemed to consider her 
incapable of anything more than translating a monograph from the 
French. Or had he intended it as therapy, having sensed that she was on 
the brink of breakdown? Something had broken. Failure had left her with 
nothing. The ground gave way beneath her feet. "I was like someone 
falling down a bottomless abyss in a dream," she wrote in "Bitter May". 
That dream state she was in was one of partial consciousness. It 
was certainly not the type of dream that she — in an oddly conventional 
reference — thought Lenin would approve of.134 For weeks she had been 
removed from life, people (other than Szabo), and possibility. She had 
shut herself off from the wider world of politics in order to focus on her 
dream of 'action'. It hadn't mattered to her that hers would have been a 
copy-cat crime. She had tried to follow in the footsteps of the Russian 
women students of Narodnaya Volya, and of course Friedrich Adler's. 
Basically, they were her mentors — not him whom she called her "mas-
ter". Hers was a dream of violence as solution for the world's ills. One 
from which she would never fully awaken. Adler received a pardon, and 
resumed a 'normal' life in the service of his country. Duczynska had no 
desire for such a life; what was normal for her was lifelong struggle 
against the type of society both she and her husband categorically re-
jected. As things worked out, she would be restricted to typically 'radical 
women's work' — as courier, secretary, editor, writer and translator. Also 
marriage would make increasing demands on her time and energy. Only 
after Polanyi's death in 1964 did she begin writing sections of what might 
have been a somewhat more ambitious autobiography. 
Her decision to write of her assassination plan may not have 
been unconnected with developments in the world at large. In the context 
of the Cold War, 'unofficial' conflicts of varying dimensions proliferated 
all the way down to self-defining violent 'political' acts on the part of 
individuals. The turn-of-the-century tradition of assassination of high state 
officials had degenerated into the new terrorism of indiscriminate acts of 
murder and destruction. The former 'cause' of revolutionary activism was 
becoming a species of 'performance art' for the alienated. Duczynska 
seems to have decided to descend from the real world of apparently 
fruitless political activism into the dream realm of violence — again. 
As had been the case in 1917, she would be inspired by the 
deeds of others in other places. This time it was another shooting in 
Central Europe by "the most important woman in German politics since 
Rosa Luxemburg," Ulrike Meinhof (1934-76).133 Even prior to that, 
though, Duczynska was becoming interested in the wider issues of terror-
ist violence, as shown by her collection of relevant books and articles. To 
Isabelle Ackerl with whom Duczynska recorded in Vienna her most 
detailed account of her life (1976) she declined to speak of her 1917 
assassination plan: "I am at the moment writing about it so I would 
sooner not talk about it." (Ackerl) She had already published a short 
account in 1968, one which she expanded in 1978.136 Furthermore, she 
had gone about obtaining photocopies of contemporary Hungarian news-
paper reports of the 1917 Adler Trial, suggesting that she was intending 
to write at some length also on that subject.137 Then, at eighty-one, she 
summoned up her last reserves of energy in the cause of a young West 
German. To her mind, often romantic, never sentimental, Peter-Paul Zahl 
(1944-) had all the right stereotypical anti-bourgeois qualifications — 
young (with obligatory long hair, beard and dark glasses), poet, worker, 
communist, in addition to being prepared to use violence against the 
'capitalist order'.138 Convinced that he was the victim of great injustice 
done by the 'fascist' authorities through having his jail sentence extended 
— he had been sentenced for shooting a policeman — Duczynska entered 
into correspondence with him, and was preparing to go to considerable 
lengths, to the dismay of family and friends, to obtain his release by 
means apparently not excluding bribery. Thereupon "the great director", 
as Duczynska had called him, decided to ring down the final curtain. 
A significant clue as to the nature of the mainspring driving 
Ilona Duczynska is to be found among her notes. There are four typewrit-
ten pages based on Hans-Magnus Enzensberger's article, "Dreamers of the 
Absolute,"139 a study of the second generation of Russian terrorists of 
1904-5. For such as them, he wrote, political commitment was all the 
more personally attractive because it represented empowerment of the 
individual, for whom action became "liberation in and of itself." Action, 
a blow struck in the struggle, was personally fulfilling, and thus was itself 
fulfilment. Such had always been Ilona Duczynska's dream. "'Utopia?' So 
what? To live without U t o p i a ? " 1 4 0 That had always been her goal. 
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French Intellectuals and the Image of 
Austria-Hungary in France: 
Prelude to the Break-up of Historic Hungary 
Dany Deschenes 
"La veritable histoire unit les peuples d'Eu-
rope centrale plus qu'elle ne les separe. Ce 
qui les oppose, ce sont plutot des versions 
truquees du passe." 
Bernard Michel1 
In the centuries before the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in the 
wake of World War I, relations between France and Austria had been 
often marked by hostility. This fact explains why the traditional image of 
the latter in France had been that of an enemy. Yet, during the last 
decades of 19th century, a different image of Austria emerged in France: 
a country that could help France to face the threat posed by Prussia and 
later by the Prussian-dominated German Second Reich. The birth of this 
new image of Austria resulted in a division among French intellectuals 
who dealt with Austrian affairs. One group remained hostile to Austria; its 
members tended to sympathize with the Austrian Empire's numerous 
nationalities who struggled for self-realization within or even outside of 
the Habsburg Monarchy. A second group favoured a united Habsburg 
state in which they saw a potential ally against German expansionism. 
In his work on the disappearance of the Danubian Monarchy, 
Francois Fejto, the French historian of Hungarian background, focused on 
the role of the first group while almost forgetting those who had favoured 
the Habsburgs.2 If the president of the French Republic, Raymond 
Poincarre, was correct in saying, in his appeal to the people following the 
4th of August 1914, that the country's intellectuals contributed with their 
writings to the "sacred union of the sons of France before the enemy,"3 it 
should be interesting to explore the roles their ideas had played before the 
tragic events that followed the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdi-
nand in Sarajevo. Without denying the powerful influence of the intellec-
tuals who supported the "oppressed peoples" of the Danubian Monarchy, 
it is nevertheless necessary to examine the reasons for their outlook and 
to present a more refined image of these intellectuals' attitudes toward the 
Dual Monarchy from the Compromise of 1967 until the dawn of the 
1914-1918 conflict. 
* * * 
Since the end of the Second World War, we have been witness to a re-
evaluation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; from being denounced as 
the "prison of nations" it has become seen as a relatively positive multi-
national experience. In this perspective, the causes of its collapse are 
certainly conducive to divergent interpretations. In France, the debate 
centred around the book of Franc is Fejto.4 In his book, Fejto blames the 
Monarchy's collapse on international developments: the foreign policies of 
the Entente and associated powers, the role of Freemasonry, the propa-
ganda of certain nationality leaders such as Edvard Benes and Tomas G. 
Masaryk, and the influence of certain intellectuals especially in England 
and France. Some historians disagreed with Fejto's argument. Most 
prominent among there were Bernard Michel5 and Jean Berenger.6 Accor-
ding to Bernard Michel, Fejto's thesis is rather philosophical in its appro-
ach and conjures up the idea of a plot. In his own book on this subject, 
Michel argues that internal factors were the main causes of the Monar-
chy's collapse.7 
Although Berenger by and large agrees with Michel's argument, 
there seems to be a certain similarity in the way he and Fejto interpret the 
role of external factors and especially that of Benes and Masaryk in the 
disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.8 Berenger nevertheless 
criticizes Fejto's work for being excessive, notably in its assessment of the 
role of Freemasonry,9 the role of Clemenceau, and the role that certain 
French intellectuals played.10 According to Berenger, the internal prob-
lems of the Monarchy, from both an economic and human point of view, 
cannot be ignored. In his view, however, the seeds of the Monarchy's 
destruction were sown by its own foreign policy, especially its involve-
ment in the Balkans. To Berenger, the first miscalculation was the occu-
pation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1879, as this resulted in an Austro-
Serbian antagonism that had not existed before. The second mistake was 
the annexation of this part of the Balkans in 1908. This action reinforced 
the Russian-Serbian alliance. The final blunder was provoking a European 
conflict with the ultimatum delivered to Serbia." 
Fejto's thesis at least had the merit of challenging a kind of 
historical determinism that implicity condemned the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire for its multinational character.12 He achieved this by emphasizing 
the elements of cohesion within the Danubian realm.13 Fejto also under-
lined the importance European international developments played in the 
affairs of this region. 
During the First World War France played a predominant role in 
preparing the destruction of Austria-Hungary and in the rise of the new 
international order in the Danubian and Balkan realm based on the 
principle of the self-determination of nations.14 Although the responsibility 
of France for this development is indisputable,15 her role has been over-
emphasized in many respects.16 
In view of the fact that France played such an eminent role in 
Austria-Hungary's demise, as a result of the war and in consequence of 
the work of the peacemakers in 1919-1920, it may be appropriate to 
examine the role intellectuals played in this process through shaping the 
image of the Dual Monarchy in France in the decades before, and even 
after, the outbreak of the First World War. It would be also interesting to 
see to what extent Berenger's assessment of the impact of these intel-
lectuals is appropriate. Accordingly, this article will explore how French 
intellectuals — and, especially, historians — depicted Austria-Hungary 
from 1867 to 1918. In doing so attention will be paid also to the image of 
Hungary itself, keeping in mind that the evolution of French attitudes to 
Hungary can only be understood in the context of French perspectives of 
the whole of the Habsburg realm.17 
From One Perception to Another: France and the Habsburg Empire 
Since about the 15th century, in France the Habsburgs had been consi-
dered enemies of French interests on the European continent. It was at the 
end of the 15th century, due to the engagement, in 1473, of the Habsburg 
prince Maximilian, son of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III, and 
Marie de Bourgogne, daughter of Charles the Bold — the Duke of 
Burgundy and an enemy of Louis XI of France — that the first squabble 
between the Austrian and French royal houses took place. The Habsburgs 
made a miscalculation however, for Louis eventually succeeded in elimi-
nating the Burgundian threat to the French throne. Yet the bitter memory 
of Vienna befriending an enemy of the French king remained.18 
During the following centuries, French sovereigns including 
Francis I, Henri IV, Louis XIV, and their ministers — especially Cardinal 
Richelieu who was obsessed by the idea of France being encircled — 
often fought the Habsburgs.19 According to historian Pierre Behar, French 
hostility against the Habsburgs became pervasive largely as a result of the 
War of Spanish Succession (known in England as Queen Anne's War) 
between 1701 and 1714. The idea of the House of Habsburg ruling both 
in Madrid and Vienna was repulsive to the court of Louis XIV and he 
took on much of Europe, foremost of all Austria and England, to resist 
this prospect. Louis' appeal to the people of France of June 1709, which 
took the form of a letter sent to the country's provincial governors, helped 
to mobilize French public opinion against the Habsburgs.20 
In the middle of the 18,h century, Chancellor Kaunitz of Austria 
managed to "reverse the alliances." As a result, France and Austria, ene-
mies in the War of Spanish Succession and in the War of Austrian Suc-
cession (1740-1748), became allies (against the Prussia of Frederick the 
Great and his English backers) in the Seven Years War (1756-1763). This 
alliance between Bourbon France and the Habsburg Empire lasted until 
1792. The end of the Ancien regime and the French Revolution, however, 
reactivated Franco-Austrian animosity infusing into it ideological differ-
ences between a revolutionary order and the "old order" that had been 
abolished in France but not in the Habsburg Empire. French popular 
hostility against "Austrian" Marie-Antoinette was "but a secondary and 
demagogical translation of a massive rejection that even the reversal of 
the alliances had not fundamentally transformed."21 
From the middle of the 19,h century on, however, the French 
perception of the space between Germany and Russia became dominated, 
from both a diplomatic and intellectual perspective, by a fear of the 
German takeover in Ostmitteleuropa.22 France progressively became 
conscious of the danger of Prussia's German policy, and concomitantly, of 
the role played by Austria to resist it. Nonetheless, it was truly the 
Sadowa-Sedan effect,23 i.e. the successive shocks of the Austrian and 
French defeats at the hands of Prussia, that gave rise to the vision of an 
Austria that was useful to French interests, without however totally 
eclipsing the traditional French aversion to that state. In effect, Sadowa 
caused Austria to become one of the prime concerns of French diplo-
macy.24 From 1867 to 1870, there was a rapprochement between the 
French and Austro-Hungarian Empires.25 The 1870-1871 war and the 
French defeat at Sedan created a preoccupation in France with the 
German threat and a reassessment of France's relations with other na-
tions.26 
This reassessment resulted in a new French perception of the 
Slavic peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. German unity also fostered 
feelings of greater solidarity among the Slavic nations. These were the 
halcyon days of the Pan-Slav movement in Eastern Europe. The fear and 
resentment of ever increasing German power and influence made French-
men and Slavs natural allies.27 The Sadowa-Sedan effect thus resulted in 
the emergence of pro-Slav sentiments in France and the rise to promi-
nence of Slavonic studies in French institutions of higher learning. 
The French Intellectuals and the Dual Monarchy 
The transformation of French attitudes to Austria took root between 
Sadowa and Sedan. After Sadowa most of France's politicians and diplo-
mats began to see Austria in a different light. The situation was different 
among the country's intellectuals whom the "Austrian question" divided 
into two camps.28 The first of these agreed with the country's political 
leadership and viewed the Habsburg Empire as a potential ally against 
Prussian-German ambitions. The members of this group favoured the 
maintenance of the Empire's unity. The second group maintained a tradi-
tional anti-Habsburg stance, but on this time-honoured attitude became 
superimposed a sympathy for Empire's underprivileged nationalities. Most 
members of this group were supportive of the Monarchy's Slavic minori-
ties, while a few supported the Magyars.29 All of them questioned the 
Habsburg state's existing internal political order. 
Actually, during the mid- to late 19,h century, there was a strong 
Hungarophile trend in France. This trend had been generated by the anti-
Habsburg revolution and war of 1848-49. It was under the influence of 
these events that Edouard Sayous wrote his Histoire generale des Hong-
rois depuis les origines jusqu'au Congres de Vienne. As well, the founder 
of Nouvelle Revue, Juliette Adam, in 1884 published an essay entitled La 
patrie hongroise. There are also the writings of geographer and anarchist 
Elisee Reclus. In the third volume of his Nouvelle geographie universelle, 
published in 1878, he declared that Austria-Hungary was plagued by 
"political chaos complicated by administrative fantasies."30 However, in 
comparing Austria (Cisleithania) and Hungary (Transleithania), he deemed 
the Hungarian part the more solid and coherent entity: 
[l]e royaume de Hongrie est une des parties de l'Europe qui 
presente, en depit de la variete des races juxtaposees, l'en-
semble le plus homogene et le plus complet. Tres inferieure a 
l'Autriche allemande en nombre d'habitants, en richesse et en 
civilisation, la Hongrie lui est en revanche bien superieure, au 
point de vue politique, par la forme de son territoire et le 
groupement de ses peuples [...]. II est bon, pour l'avenir de 
l'humanite, qu'en Europe meme, et dans une partie vitale du 
continent, ce soit precisement une nation non aryenne, quoique 
fort apparentee aux autres Europeens par les croisements, qui 
exerce le role principal.31 
Furthermore, Reclus extolled the nature of the Magyar character: 
"[t]res brave, il aime a redire les hauts faits de sa nation, a reciter les 
grands exploits de guerre; mais souvent il est naif aussi ou plutot insouci-
ant, et l'Allemand, le Juif, reussissent facilement a le tromper en le 
prenant par les hauts sentiments, car de tous les peuples dEurope, il est 
celui qui a le plus la passion du grand."32 In fact, as emphasized by Le 
Rider,33 the opinions of Reclus "elles sont les archetypes des prejuges 
frangais a l'egard de la monarchie danubienne: antipathie naturelle pour un 
empire dont le maintien apparait comme un defi permanent a la raison et 
au droit des peuples; sympathie, au contraire, pour les Slaves et les 
Magyars."34 
By the end of the century it was becoming obvious that the 
sympathy of French scholars was predominantly toward the Empire's Slav 
minorities. The trailblazers of these sentiments were Louis Leger and 
Ernest Denis, the two founders of Slavonic studies in France."35 Louis 
Eisenmann should also be added to the list. Leger, Denis and Eisenmann 
were champions of the Dual Monarchy's Slavs, especially the Czechs. Not 
surprisingly they were hostile to the Habsburg regime, which they consid-
ered despotic, especially after the outbreak of the First World War. 
The lasting influence these three scholars had on the French 
perception of Austria-Hungary and on French historiography cannot be 
questioned.36 Jean-Marie Valentin, for example, believes that French 
perceptions of the Danubian region cannot be understood without refer-
ence to France's pre-1914 Slavists.37 This opinion is shared by Antoine 
Mares. He goes even further and states that the division between France's 
Austro-Hungarianophiles and her Slavophiles (more specifically the 
Czechophiles), still exists today in French research and writing on this 
part of Europe.38 
Thus, it may be appropriate to take a closer look at the pioneers 
of French Slavonic studies and the way they shaped the image and 
perception of Austria-Hungary in France, and the extent to which they 
influenced the views of a generation of French scholars of East-Central 
Europe. 
The French Slavists: Leger, Denis and Eisenmann 
Louis Leger was born in Toulouse in 1843 and died in Paris in 1923. He 
became interested in the Slavs of Eastern Europe during the 1863 Polish 
Revolution. His interest was reinforced through his contacts with members 
of Paris' large colony of exiles from the Habsburg and Russian Empires. 
According to Jacques Droz, Leger "learned the hatred of Austria" from 
the Czech emigre Josef Vaclav Friv.39 In 1867 he published with Friv the 
book entitled Boheme historique, pittoresque et litteraire in which the 
Habsburgs were denounced as the shock troops of German expansionism. 
A year later Leger published his thesis on Cyrille et Methode. Etude 
historique sur la conversion des Slaves au christianisme, which he 
dedicated to Croatian prelate Strossmayer in recognition of his struggle 
for self-determination of the Habsburg Empire's South-Slav populations. It 
was in this book that Leger first used the adjective "jugo-slave."40 The 
term was unknown in France at the time but would become a name 
recognized by everyone within a generation. In the conclusion of his book 
Leger wrote: "the Slavs of the [Balkans] (...) could have founded, as early 
as the Middle Ages, this jugo-slave empire that they can only dream of 
today (...)." Had that happened, Leger continued, the "artificial state" of 
the Habsburgs "could not have come into existence."41 
In 1868, Leger lectured at the Sorbonne on Russian grammar, as 
well as the literary history of the Czechs, Poles and Serbs. Then in 1873, 
he became professor of Serb, and later of Russian, at the Ecole des 
langues orientales. Finally, in 1885, he was admitted to the College de 
France and became the incumbent of the Chair of Slavonic languages and 
literatures. 
Following the 1870 defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, 
Leger became associated with the journal Correspondance Slave. Accor-
ding to Jacques Droz, this publication reflected the desire of certain Czech 
leaders to have closer relations with France to curb German influence.42 In 
effect, up to the 1914-1918 War, Leger believed in a politically united 
Danubian Europe. However, he did not believe that this entity should be 
the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, which was, according to him, the 
bastion of Germanism in Central Europe. In his Histoire de I'Autriche-
Hongrie, he stated: "[t]ant qu'elle n'aura pas trouve le secret d'accorder a 
tous ses peuples l'usage loyal des memes libertes et de les grouper dans 
un harmonieux equilibre, rAutriche-Hongrie restera un Etat provisoire et 
jouera un role plus negatif que positif dans la politique europeenne."43 
Ernest Denis was bom in NTmes in 1849. Already as a young man 
he advocated close relations between France and the Slavs of Eastern and 
Cenral Europe, especially the Czechs and the Russians. In 1869 he was 
admitted to the Ecole normale superieure and became an associate profes-
sor of history in 1872. In 1878, he became Doctor of Arts with his thesis 
on Huss et la guerre des hussites. In 1906 he became the incumbent of 
the Chair of Modern History at the Sorbonne. After the war, he taught 
briefly at universities in Belgrade and Prague. He died in Paris in 1921. 
On the occasion of his death, his successor as Chairman of Modern 
History at the Sorbonne Louis Eisenmann paid homage to him in the first 
issue of Revue des Etudes Slaves, launched in 1921: "ju]ne sympathie 
naturelle l'avait attire vers les Slaves, dictee par la claire conscience de la 
solidarity d'interet qui les unit a la France dans la lutte defensive contre 
les ambitions et les agressions du germanisme prussien. II n'a jamais varie 
dans cette sympathie, ni dans la conviction de bien servir la France en 
s'attachant a lui faire connaitre les Slaves et a la faire connaitre d'eux."44 
Denis wanted to build a new Danubian order based strictly on the 
principle of the self-determination of nationalities. Accoding to him 
neither a 1848-style revolution nor the arrangement represented by the 
1867 Ausgleich with Hungary offered a solution for the region's problems. 
These ideas seem to make him an unquilified opponent of the Habsburg 
Empire, however, Berenger notes that Denis was a supporter of Austro-
Slavism. Indeed, a comment in his book La Boheme depuis la Montagne 
Blanche suggests that to Denis a Danubian monarchy that addressed the 
needs and desires of the region's Slavs would have been accepteble. "Les 
necessites qui ont amene la formation de I'Autriche au XVIe siecle n'ont 
pas disparu et, quelque legitimes que soient les griefs des Polonais, des 
Tcheques et des Slovenes, ils n'en demeure pas moins un interet manifeste 
au maintien de la monarchie."45 
The last member of the triumvirate is Louis Eisenmann. He was 
born in Haguenau in 1869. Following the 1870-71 disaster, his family 
moved to Dijon. What is interesting in his case is that he is the only one 
of the three to have had an explicit interest in Hungary. In fact, for his 
doctoral thesis, he learned the Hungarian language.46 Eisenmann, as Denis, 
was educated at the Ecole normale superieure, where he became an 
associate professor of History in 1892. He was later licensed in Law, and 
in 1904, he became Doctor in Law with his thesis on Le compromis 
austro-hongrois de 1867. Etude sur le dualisme. 
In 1897, he published an article in La Revue de Paris entitled "La 
crise austro-hongroise."47 He argued that the future of the Monarchy 
necessarily involved democratization, notably the adoption of universal 
suffrage. In effect, he noted that Austria was an Old Regime state, i.e. a 
dynastic creation. Because of its nature, its domestic policy was deter-
mined by its foreign policy.48 In this perspective, dualism may be under-
stood as an attempt to rebuild the strength of the Habsburg state following 
the Sadowa defeat.49 Eisenmann firmly believed that the 1867 Compro-
mise between the Habsburgs and the Hungarians resulted in a double 
centralism in favour of the latter.50 To him, the fact that the Hungarians 
accepted dualisme was explained by the fact that they 
ont un patriotisme national enthousiaste, un respect profond de 
l'idee magyare. Ils ont toujours voulu conquerir, pour leur 
nation, une premiere place sur la grande scene europeenne, et 
ils ont toujours refuse de transiger sur ce point. Etre, comme le 
proposait en 1865 le comte Belcredi, cinquieme dans une 
Autriche ou les Tcheques, les Polonais, les Allemands et les 
Slaves du sud auraient eu des parts egales a la leur, ne suffisait 
pas a leur ambition. Ils ont accepte le dualisme, parce qu'il leur 
offrait la satisfaction si longtemps poursuivie: a l'aide des 
ressources de la monarchie commune ils allaient faire figure 
dans le monde, et ils l'ont faite.51 
According to Eisenmann the political centre of the monarchy had 
moved from Vienna to Budapest. He believed that the Magyars dictated 
the Dual Monarchy's the foreign policy agenda: they were the "firmest 
supporters" of the Triple Alliance.52 To support this claim, he referred to 
the fact that Hungarian Prime Minister Kalman Tisza was decorated with 
the Black Eagle when William II first visited Vienna.''3 The German 
Emperor next visited Budapest, a fact that placed the Hungarian capital on 
an equal footing with Vienna. To Eisenmann, the Triple Alliance bene-
fited Hungary by giving it a guarantee against possible Russian aggres-
sion.54 It also supported Hungary against the Vatican in her legislation on 
civil marriage and religious freedom for Jews. According to Eisenmann, 
from the very beginning of dualism, Hungary had a specific advantage: its 
parliamentary system. Despite its malfunctioning, this parliamentarianism 
helped to explain further why the political centre of power in the Monar-
chy moved to the Hungarian capital. 
In 1894, a dispute pitted Emperor-King Francis Joseph against the 
Hungarian Parliament. Eisenmann explained: 
le Parlement avail vote des lois politico-ecclesiastiques qui 
blessaient la conscience tres catholique du roi. Celui-ci signifia 
a son ministere, pourtant en possession de la majorite, qu'il lui 
retirait sa confiance et voulut essayer de former un ministere 
place au-dessus des partis, selon le type autrichien. La majorite 
lui refusa sa confiance, et obtint ainsi du roi la reconnaissance 
du principe parlementaire et la sanction des lois laicisatrices 
(sic). La fermete du Parlement, son union avec le gouverne-
ment, ont acheve d'assurer a la Hongrie la preeminence dans la 
monarchie dualiste.55 
This was the time when historian Ernest Lavisse, who had been 
commissioned by Cambridge University to produce a history of the world, 
noticed the young historian. He asked Eisenmann to write the Austrian 
chapters of this planned work that Lavisse was preparing in cooperation 
with Alfred Rambaud, the future Minister of Education. Notably, Lavisse 
preferred him to no other than Denis. Eisenmann later wrote the chapter 
on Austria-Hungary in The Cambridge Modern History. 
Nonetheless, Eisenmann's most important contribution to the 
subject before the war was his thesis presented before the Faculte de Droit 
de Dijon, in 1904, for his Doctorate of Political and Economic Sciences. 
As has been mentioned, this thesis dealt with the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise.56 Eisenmann criticized the Ausgelich for its archaic and 
static structure which, in his view, propelled Austria-Hungary toward 
eventual ruin. To him, a solution involved democratization and federal-
ism; in fact, he wished and believed that Austria-Hungary should become 
a Switzerland. The most important obstacle to such transformation, 
according to the author, were Hungary's "reactionary" Prime Ministers: 
Kalman Tisza and Istvan Tisza. There was also a deeper historic problem: 
the monarchy "wanted to be a power more than a state."57 For Eisenmann, 
there was a possible remedy to this situation through the implementation 
of the program of the Diet of Kremsier and of the ideas of Jozsef Eotvos 
which favoured national autonomy for the peoples of the monarchy.58 
Eisenmann's proposals for the reform of Austria-Hungary and the 
solution of its nationality question were less radical than those of Leger. 
His work was well received even in Germany and Austria. Not surpris-
ingly, he was invited to present the results of his research, in 1905, at the 
Forschrittliche Reformklub.59 
Eisenmann was not a Hungarophobe. In a 1909 or 1910 study,60 
he explained the causes of the Hungarian attempt at the Magyarization of 
Hungary's nationalities. To him, there were four reasons: 
premierement, par le sentiment qu'ont les Hongrois de 
se trouver entre les deux branches d'un gigantesque casse-noix; 
deuxiemement, par la conscience d'etre une goutte 
d'eau dans l'ocean slave; 
troisiemement, par l'experience negative de l'Autriche, 
qui a laisse aux nationalites des espaces de liberie suffisants 
pour qu'elles puissent ainsi s'affirmer, au detriment des Alle-
mands; 
quatriemement, par des traits de caractere de la race 
hongroise, une espece d'autoritarisme inne, le reste de 1'esprit 
conquerant, un instinct de domination qui se trouve represents 
dans cette noblesse dont Tisza etait le representant par excel-
lence.61 
For Eisenmann then, the solution was to return to the ideas of Ferenc 
Deak who felt that there "should be formed in Hungary a bilingual middle 
class...." This meant forming a kind of intermediate class that would 
ensure the transition between the inferior classes and the Hungarian state, 
i.e. that would guarantee a "simply profound and intimate union obtained 
by free consent."62 
In February, 1913, Eisenmann,63 supported by Ernest Denis, was 
appointed lecturer in Hungarian Language and Literature at the Faculte 
des Lettres of the University of Paris. In the competition for this post he 
beat two applicants who had the backing of Budapest: Andre de Hevesy 
and Louis Joseph Foti. It is interesting to note that this course had been 
launched in January 1907,64 at the request of the Budapest government, 
and that this government funded the course until September 1913. Despite 
the withdrawal of Hungarian funding after the outbreak of the war, 
Eisenmann kept this position until 1919. 
During the war Eisenmann began favouring openly the Monar-
chy's Slav minorities and began advocating Austria-Hungary's dissolution. 
And thus it came to pass that the vision of the Slavophiles merged with 
that of the traditional opponents of the Habsburg Monarchy. More than 
ever, the Habsburgs became perceived as the agents of Germanization in 
Central Europe. 
The Supporters of the Dual Monarchy 
It would be inaccurate to say that this pro-Slav and anti-Dual Monarchy 
vision was the only view held by French intellectuals before 1914. There 
were also supporters of the Habsburg Empire. The pioneer of such a 
stance was the journalist Saint-Rene Taillandier. He had been one of the 
first among his countrymen to become interested in the Danubian 
Monarchy. To him, the Austrian Empire, and later the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, played a unifying force in Danubian region.65 
Similar opinions were expressed by Alexandre Thomas. In 
November of 1848 he commented on the developments of that eventful 
year in the Revue des deux mondes and pointed out the stabilizing role 
that Austria had played between Germany and Russia.66 In his Histoire de 
la formation territoriale des Etats de I'Europe centrale published in 1876, 
geographer Auguste Himly expressed the same sentiments. He argued that 
the Habsburg Monarchy was a necessary factor that protected the peoples 
of the region from Germany and Russia. He stressed that the intermin-
gling of the peoples forced them to live together and that this situation 
invalidated the idea of their geographical separation into independent 
nation states.67 
A group of historians teaching at the Ecole libre des sciences 
politiques, including Albert Sorel and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, also 
favoured the preservation of the Danubian Monarchy as a counterweight 
to German imperialism.68 Leroy-Beaulieu in particular kept stressing the 
importance of the Danubian Monarchy as a factor of balance: in 1888, in 
his book La France, la Russie et 1'Europe, in March 1902 in an article in 
the Revue des deux mondes\ and in 1904 in the prefaces he wrote to 
Georges Weil's Le Pangermanisme en Autriche and to Rene Henry's 
Questions d'Autriche-Hongrie et Question d'Orient. In the latter preface 
Leroy-Beaulieu stated: "[i]l importe a 1'Europe que l'Empire des Habs-
bourg ne soit pas a la merci de la politique allemande. L'Autriche-Hongrie 
reste la pierre angulaire de 1'Europe. L'Occident et l'Orient ont un interet 
egal a ce qu'elle demeure independante de fait comme de droit."69 
During the years preceding the conflict, the intellectuals travelling 
in the Dual Monarchy noticed what they felt was a strengthening of the 
Habsburg power. For example in 1912 historian and economist Rene 
Gonnard, in a political and parliamentary review, wrote about the idea of 
trialism (the co-opting of the Empire's Slavs into the political leadership 
of the Monarchy) that seemed to develop around the person of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the throne: 
[m]on opinion personnelle, comme celle de la plupart des 
Frangais qui ont, dans ces dernieres annees, voyage sur les 
rives du Danube, est que la monarchic des Habsbourg se 
consolide. Et quant au trialisme, je ne me hasarderai pas a 
prophetiser ce qu'il donnera, si jamais il se realise, mais ce que 
je sais bien, c'est que ses partisans autrichiens, loin de voir dans 
le developpement de cette doctrine une cause d'affaiblissement 
et de separatisme, la preconisent comme un moyen de fortifier 
le pouvoir de l'autorite centrale, le prestige de la dynastie, les 
chances d'expansion de la monarchie vers les Balkans et de 
diminuer au contraire les resistances particularistes les plus 
redoutables, j'entends celles que les Magyars opposent aux 
pretentions de Vienne.70 
For his part, Rene Pinon, in the Revue des deux mondes, wrote 
during the 1912-13 Balkan wars: 
[p]resque tous les peuples qui vivent sur le territoire de la 
monarchie dualiste souhaitent d'en modifier le statut, non pas 
d'en ruiner les fondements. En cas de guerre, meme avec la 
Serbie et la Russie, il y aurait sans doute des incidents, des 
defections individuelles ou des rebellions de petites unites; mais 
l'armee dans son ensemble, est loyaliste; elle a un patriotisme 
d'Etat qui repose sur le serment au souverain; elle restera fidele 
a ce serment.71 
From this evidence it seems that many French observers of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were more or less favourable to it. Only one 
author was openly hostile to the Habsburg regime: Louis Leger. It is 
essential to point out that the reflection of all these groups is based on 
two fundamental elements: 1, the opposition to pan-Germanism and 
German (Prussian) power; and 2, the possible ways by which France 
could fight against this power. 
If we look closer at the image of Hungary, we note that the 
government of Budapest was accused of being authoritarian, of seeking to 
assimilate the minorities on its territory,72 of being de facto a faithful ally 
of Germany, and finally of blocking any structural reform of the Habs-
burg Monarchy. However, according to historian Istvan Hunyadi, if it 
cannot be denied that the government of Budapest was reactionary, the 
observers of Hungary, during the war, lost sight of the need to put the 
facts into their context and to find out if government's behaviour was not 
the result of the leading elite's attitude to the underprivileged and the 
working classes.73 However, according to Hunyadi, "this in no way 
reduces the repugnance of the condemned practices but transposes them to 
a different level."74 
The Great War: French Intellectuals and the Disappearance of the 
Danubian Monarchy 
With the outbreak of the war, French intellectuals contributed one way or 
another to the war effort, mainly by what they had written. Obviously, 
because of the war, the group more or less favourable to the Habsburgs 
was toned down. It is also difficult to define exactly the influence the 
three most prominent Slavophiles had on French policy. However, they 
certainly played a role that was not inconsiderable. 
Leger and Denis were the first intellectuals to support the claims 
of the leaders of Austro-Hungarian political emigres such as Masaryk and 
Benes. They clearly took a stand in favour of the liberation of the Slavs 
of Austria-Hungary and of the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy. 
Leger, who was by then over 70, was a convinced Slavophile. In 
1915, he published the brochure La liquidation de I'Autriche-Hongrie. His 
argument is based on the argument that Austria was the vassal of Ger-
many and that it missed its historic mission. In this perspective, it can 
only be reconstructed on the basis of the nationality principle. For his 
part, Ernest Denis played a fundamental role at the beginning of the war 
in favouring Masaryk and Benes and their proposals relating to the 
destruction of Austria-Hungary in French public opinion. Denis lent his 
prestige as a Sorbonne professor to the ideas of the Czech leaders in 
exile.75 
In 1915, he published La Guerre, Causes immediates et lointaines, 
L'intoxication d'un peuple, Le traite, and La Grande Serbie. In 1917, he 
published La question d'Autriche, Les Slovaques. We do not know if 
Denis et Leger consulted, but they share almost identical points of view. 
In his 1915 publication he argued that Austria-Hungary was Germany's 
vassal. Because of this, he continued, the Dual Monarchy was bound to 
disappear. According to historian Bohumila Ferencuhove, Denis' 1915 
writing contained "le fondement ethique du programme de la paix de 
l'Entente: la Societe des nations, le droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-
memes, [en plus de] la liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie et de la nais-
sance des Etats tcheco-slovaques et yougo-slaves ce qui convenait d'apres 
lui, aussi a l'interet frangais.76 
In his 1917 book La question d'Autriche, Les Slovaques, Denis 
painted a negative picture of the Hungarian policy toward Hungary's 
nationalities:77 "[d]epuis le debut de la guerre, les Magyars ont poursuivi 
dans les pays croates, serbes ou roumains une politique d'extermination: 
ils ont deporte les habitants par dizaines de mille, ils les ont remplaces 
partout ou il leur aura ete possible par des colons magyars."78 To put an 
end to this situation, he reiterated an idea developed in La Guerre, Causes 
immediates et lointaines, Lintoxication d'un peuple, Le traite: that 
Austria-Hungary must be destroyed: 
[i]l faut partager l'Autriche en Etats independants; le royaume 
serbo-croato-slovene d'une part s'etendant jusqu'au Danube entre 
Vienne et Raab, et l'Etat tchecoslovaque d'autre part, qui s'etend 
depuis le Danube jusqu'a la Pologne et la Russie. Ces petits 
Etats sont trop faibles pour courir des aventures, ne menacent 
personne mais surveilleront l'Allemagne. Ils pourront menager 
les susceptibilites des autres ethnies par leur experience. Les 
Tcheques et Slovaques vivront en intelligence (...) car ils sont 
freres (...). Si on ne brise pas les liens qui rattachent les 
Slovaques a la Hongrie, on les condamne a devenir la proie des 
Hongrois; ils seront done les victimes de l'Allemagne.79 
Another example of Denis's ideas is expressed his preface to a 
book written by Jules Chopin.80 According to Denis, Emperor-King 
Francis Joseph and Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Tisza were mainly 
responsible for the onset of the First World War.81 Denis believed that the 
outbreak of the war undoubtedly represented "the only hope of salvation 
for both groups, the Magyars and the Germans, who, although they were 
a minority within the Empire, had exercised power since the 1867 
Compromise."82 Denis went so far as to say that the Austro-Hungarian 
leaders were "insane... [and] possessed. We all know that the most charac-
terized madness does not always exclude external logic, and Tisza, 
Buryan, Tchirsky, and their accomplices methodically prepared the plan 
they hoped would submit the world to their shameless fantasy."83 He 
denounced the Hungarians for being bloodthirsty, unscrupulous, and 
responsible for the worst atrocities especially against the other nationa-
lities: 
[u]n frisson d'epouvante nous court a travers les epaules quand 
nous entendons Tisza dire a la tribune que dans aucun pays les 
nationalites ne trouvent un terrain aussi favorable a leur deve-
loppement qu'en Hongrie. Dans un eclair, defile devant nos 
yeux l'infinie theorie des victimes qu'a egorge l'orgueil magyar 
et une odeur de sang nous prend a la gorge.84 
Louis Eisenmann, the third member of the triumvirate, moved 
toward a radical position more slowly. At the beginning of the war he 
wrote to the ministere de l'lnstruction publique asking that relations with 
Hungary be maintained. To him, France must fill the vacant space follow-
ing the German defeat. He stated: 
[n]otre influence intellectuelle est une force et une richesse 
nationales, notre arme peut-etre la plus precieuse dans la 
concurrence des nations; dans une certaine mesure, l'extension 
de notre clientele intellectuelle contrebalance les funestes 
consequences de la faiblesse de notre natalite, et reduit la 
disproportion numerique du groupe de culture fran^ais face aux 
groupes anglo-saxon ou russe...; nos ambitions sont volon-
tairement limitees par la faiblesse de notre population et par les 
principes au nom desquels nous combattons. Mais nous devons 
songer a garder autant que possible notre place parmi les 
puissances de premier rang. C'est dans l'ordre moral et intel-
lectuel, par l'affirmation et l'extension de notre mission tradi-
tionnelle de protecteurs et d'eveilleurs de nationalites jeunes, 
faihles et opprimees, que nous trouverons, avec notre role 
original, la plus sure garanti de notre influence, de notre pres-
tige, de notre autorite en Europe et dans le monde. Tout peuple 
qui la merite par un sincere esprit de liberte et de justice a un 
droit a notre aide. A une Hongrie renouvelee, de democratic et 
de progres, quelle raison aurions-nous de la refuser?*5 
The horrors of war caused him to abandon his moderation. In 
April 1916, at a conference at the Sorbonne, he came out for the destruc-
tion of the Dual Monarchy.86 To him, the First World War was the comp-
letion of the 1789 French Revolution.87 This idea he reiterated in an 
article he published in August of the same year. He stressed the important 
concept according to which the World War was the clash of two diametri-
cally opposed ideas: "one, of the Middle Ages, is the imperial idea, the 
idea of a universal empire; the other, modern, is the national idea, the 
idea of freedom for peoples and nationalities."88 Thus the World War was 
to complete the Revolutionary wars. To Eisenmann, Austria failed in its 
age-old mission to have different nationalities live together. 
Eisenmann never forgot to admit that Austria had had a few 
faithful advocates of this concept of the peaceful coexistence of the 
nations of the Danube region, among them the Czech historian Frantisek 
Palacky and the Hungarian Jozsef Etovos.89 The Hungarian thinker was 
the greatest mind of mid-nineteenth century Hungary, according to 
Eisenmann. His concept of the nationality issue, which can be found in 
Hungary's 1868 nationality laws, was consistent with the principles of 
equality and justice.90 In a preface to a joint publication by Chopin (Jules 
Eugene Pichon) and the Slovak writer Osusky, Magyars et Panger-
manistes, Eisenmann regretted that Hungary had turned its back on these 
ideas.91 
In Eisenmann's opinion, if Hungary suffered a long time under the 
Habsburgs, the 1867 Compromise radically changed this situation: 
[l]es Magyars qui avaient souffert de l'idee imperiale a l'egal 
des autres peuples, sinon meme davantage, qui avaient avec 
tous les autres luttes (sic) contre elle, s'y sont accommodes. Des 
qu'elle ne les a plus menaces92 d'une menace immediate et 
directe. lis se sont associes a la politique de la dynastie, politi-
que d'iniquite, dans l'espoir d'en partager les imaginaires profits. 
lis ont renie la tradition de leurs plus nobles esprits, du grand et 
sage Deak, du profond et sensible Etovos; ils ont dementi les 
principes inscrits par leur Parlement dans un texte solennel, la 
celebre loi de 1868 sur les nationalites. Ils ont prefere faire, 
avec Coloman Tisza, le pere du Premier ministre actuel, le 
comte Etienne Tisza, une politique etroite de chauvinisme 
violent et de brutale magyarisation.93 
Finally, if the Hungarians, after the Compromise, accepted 
Habsburgs' plan to become the faithful ally of imperial Germany, only the 
victory of the Entente and associated powers could revitalize their coun-
try. Moreover, this victory would prevent Hungary from being Germani-
zed as a result of a German victory. 
Les Magyars echapperont a ce danger. Ils y echapperont grace 
a la victoire des Allies. Ce qu'ils garderont de l'independance 
nationale, ils le devront au secours que les Allies leur auront 
prete - prete non point pour eux, qui ne l'ont point merite, qui 
ont ete infideles a la justice, infideles a leur mission, infideles a 
l'espoir que, trop confiante, avaient mis en eux les puissances 
liberates de l'Occident, la France et l'Angleterre, dont les 
sympathies les avaient toujours soutenus, reconfortes, encoura-
ges dans leurs epreuves et leurs malhcurs, mais prete pour les 
autres peuples de 1'Autriche-Hongrie, pour ces nationalites qui 
ont ete, elles, fideles a la justice, fideles a leur mission, et que 
les Allies ne pourraient jamais consentir a abandonner a l'avi-
dite germanique, auxquelles ils doivent et ils donneront l'affran-
chissement, la liberte. Les Magyars comme les autres nationali-
tes echapperont au peril parce que les Allies detruiront l'Aut-
riche, qui est devenue le simple instrument passif, le simple 
valet de l'Allemagne.94 
As reported by Charue: 
On ne peut qu'etre frappe par la violence des propos tenus par 
L. Leger et E. Denis a partir de 1915 [et Eisenmann des 1916], 
a un moment ou la destruction de la double monarchic n'est 
envisagee a peu pres nulle part. [.. .] On est conduit a se 
demander pourquoi ces attaques sont dirigees de preference 
contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie. Deux series de causes se conjuguent 
ici: les unes tiennent aux circonstances; les autres touchent a la 
nature meme de rAutriche-Hongrie.vs 
Denis' feelings were impacted also by the death of his son 
Jacques, attorney at the Paris Court of Appeal, lieutenant in the 226th Line 
Regiment, who was killed at Courbessaux in Lorraine on August 25, 
1914. There was also the fact that Leger, Denis, and Eisenmann wished to 
arriver a une paix durable, appuyee sur des garanties pour 
assurer la securite, non seulement la leur, mais et surtout celle 
de leurs descendants. (...) II s'agit en fait, chez eux comme 
chez leurs contemporains, d'une forme de patriotisme: intellec-
tuels, universitaires, ils ont mis au service de la patrie leurs 
connaissances de savants et leurs relations personnelles, en 
l'occurrence des Slaves, allies officiels ou potentiels de la Triple 
Entente.96 
Another factor influencing the opinion of the three, especially 
Denis, was the Catholicism of Austria. Denis was Protestant, and his 
choice of thesis on John Huss was no accident. For example, in La 
Guerre, he wrote: "The Catholics, eager to seize the opportunity to extend 
the domains of the Roman Church to the East, weighed on the lethargic 
conscience of the old Emperor in the decisive weeks of 1914."97 The 
decisive element, however, was political and, for Denis and Eisenmann at 
least, philosophical. 
Ce sont deux principes fondamentaux voire deux conceptions 
du monde qui s'affrontent. Au principe des nationalites et au 
droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes s'oppose la notion 
d'equilibre europeen, c'est-a-dire en fait d'accords conclu plus 
ou moins a l'amiable entre souverains. Pour la democratie issue 
de la Revolution frangaise, toute souverainete reside dans le 
pcuple, et il y a incompatibility totale avec l'idee de monarchic 
de nature ou de vocation universelle, voulue par Dieu ou deri-
vee de Dieu selon le principe omni potestas a Deo.9* 
Conclusions 
The perception the French had of the Habsburg Empire, and after 1867 of 
Austria-Hungary, evolved gradually. In this evolution the most dramatic 
change was caused by the rise of Prussian power, specifically the 
Sadowa-Sedan effect. Starting with the last decades of the nineteenth 
century French intellectuals — and, especially, historians who were 
interested in the Dual Monarchy — found themselves divided into two 
camps. The members of one of these sympathized with the Monarchy's 
Slavic minorities while the adherents of the other, tended to favour the re-
organized and re-vitalized, post-1867 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
It was particularly the group that sympathized with the Slavs, 
especially Louis Leger, Ernest Denis, and Louis Eisenmann, that suc-
ceeded in influencing how the French in general viewed the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy. During the world conflict that broke out in 1914 
they, above all, took a stand in favour of the dismemberment of Austria-
Hungary. Although it is difficult to measure their true influence, it can 
nonetheless be argued that they, more than anyone else, were responsible 
for the Habsburg Empire's very negative image in France, and even for its 
eventual dismemberment. The negative image of Austria-Hungary they 
created persists to our days. 
With regard to Hungary itself, it is evident that its image in 
France of the late 19th and early 20th centuries gradually deteriorated. 
Despite a wave of Hungarophile sentiments in the late 1860s and early 
1870s, in time the Hungarophobe attitudes of Leger, Denis and especially 
Eisenmann prevailed. Deemed authoritarian, oppressive, assimilative, and 
a faithful ally of Germany, Hungary had lost nearly all sympathy in 
France by 1914. This negative perception only grew with the war. The 
consequences were profoundly harmful for the future of the multinational 
kingdom. Not surprisingly, when France's leaders worked toward Hun-
gary's dismemberment after the war, there were few protests from French 
intellectuals. 
RESUME: 
Du compromis de 1867 a 1'eclatement du premier conflit mondial, les 
intellectuels frangais se divisent en deux groupes dans l'appreciation de la 
monarchie danubienne des Habsbourg. Le premier groupe est favorable 
aux nationalites et le second groupe privilegie l'Empire des Habsbourg. 
Toutefois, c'est veritablement le groupe favorable aux nationalites qui va 
structurer la vision de l'Autriche-Hongrie dans les ecrits de langue franga-
ise: c 'est l'image d'un Etat decadent. La partie hongroise de la monarchie 
n'echappe pas a cette perception negative. Ainsi, l'objet de cet article est 
de s'interesser a l'image que les intellectuels frangais vont brosser de la 
monarchic danubienne, en insistant plus part icul ierement sur celle de la 
Hongrie. 
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Militia Violence and State Power 
in Hungary, 1919-1922 
Bela Bodo 
This essay deals with an under-researched and an over-politicized topic in 
Hungarian history: militia violence against civilians after World War One. 
As far as this topic is concerned, historians before the collapse of the one-
party state in 1989 focused their attention on two inter-related questions: 
the responsibility of Regent Miklos Horthy for the atrocities and the con-
tinuity between the White Terror, as this period of militia and state 
violence had been known in Hungary and Europe since the 1920s, and the 
interwar regime. Ignoring evidence that could have suggested a more 
nuanced conclusion, they argued that Admiral Horthy controlled the 
militias and, as their "Leader," he bore both direct and indirect responsi-
bility for their crimes. Seeking to paint as dark picture of the interwar 
regime and elite as possible, Marxist historians argued that the elite had 
never eliminated the militias. Integrated, they claimed, in large numbers 
into the police, the army and the state bureaucracy, the militias continued 
to function as a reserve army until 1945.' 
The quality of books and articles on the interwar regime has 
improved significantly during the last fifteen years. In regards to militia 
violence, some of the gross oversimplifications have been eliminated. 
Recent studies point out that many army units and militias were not under 
Horthy's control; even those militias that recognized Horthy as their 
leader did not necessarily carry out his orders. Present-day historians also 
tend to a draw a more solid line between the post-war period, character-
ized by chaos and random violence, and the subsequent rule of the con-
solidated conservative regime.2 Unfortunately, none of these works deal 
directly with militia violence. Thus many relevant issues still have to be 
explored and, because of the unreliability of earlier works, many old 
questions have to be revisited. We do not even know, for example, how 
many people were killed during the White Terror. The religious, social 
and ethnic compositions of both the perpetrators and the victims are still 
to be explored; the social causes of the White Terror and the psychologi-
cal motives of the perpetrators still have to be explained. Violence against 
women, a strong aspect of the White Terror, has so far been completely 
ignored. There has been no attempt, moreover, to compare the militias 
with similar units in other countries after the Great War, thus to put the 
issue of militia violence in a wider European context. Finally, the larger 
theoretical questions still have to be raised: does state power originate in 
violence? Was militia violence in Hungary a creative or a purely des-
tructive force? Does power grow out of the barrel of gun as the Chinese 
Communist leader Mao Tse-tung believed? Does violence function as the 
"midwife of history," constantly bringing forth social and political 
organizations and structures, or does it represent a purely destructive and 
historically barren force as philosopher Hannah Arendt argued?3 
In this essay I seek to answer some of these larger questions by 
examining the complex relationship between the local and national elite 
and the most important militia unit, the Pronay Battalion between 1919 
and 1923. In this paper I will argue that the militias played a complex 
role in Hungarian society: their destructiveness notwithstanding, the rogue 
military units fulfilled useful functions by responding positively to the 
material needs of at least some segments of the population. The economic 
and political consolidation of the counter-revolutionary regime made the 
militias as service providers obsolete; simultaneously, conciliation streng-
thened the hands of the political and military elite by giving them both 
the means and the nerve to threaten the militias. In this paper, I argue that 
moral outrage over militia crimes played only a minor role in the final 
break between the radical and the authoritarian Right. What separated the 
conservatives from the right radicals was not greater respect for human 
rights and more ethnic and religious tolerance, even if conservatives, 
indeed, tended to possess more of these qualities. Rather it was their 
ability to view politics as a multi-dimensional game and, if necessary, to 
control and even sacrifice their prejudices at the altar of power. The elite 
finally turned against the militias because, with the onset of consolidation, 
the rouge military units had lost their usefulness, and also because they 
had become a threat to the counter-revolutionary regime. The recognition 
of the threat posed by the extreme right, rather than the integration at 
least some of the members of the militias into the interwar army, police 
and bureaucracy, I believe, represented the most important legacy of the 
White Terror. Conservatives' fear and distrust of right radial movements 
and the behind-the-scenes conflict between the two remained the a salient 
feature of Hungarian political life until 1944. 
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Anomie and the Source of Militia Violence 
By browsing through the police reports, the court documents and the 
correspondence between military units and various ministries that can be 
found in the files of the Pronay Battalion at the Archive of the Ministry 
of Defense in Budapest, one is struck by the similarities between com-
mon, especially juvenile, crimes and those committed by the officers of 
this unit. Gang-style tactics, such as random violence and bullying 
validated as defense of personal honour, characterize many of the com-
plaints raised against the officers of the Pronay Battalion in police and 
court records. The perpetrators, like Lieutenant Laszlo Thiringer, were 
typical bullies who rationalized and, to the authorities, tried to justify their 
aggression by accusing their victims of having unpatriotic or leftist 
sympathies. On leave in his hometown in Western Hungary, Thiringer 
beat up a young blue-collar worker, Antal Veber, in the local movie 
theatre and then handed him over to the police. Thiringer claimed that 
Veber was a saboteur and an enemy of the Hungarian nation because he 
booed a documentary that demanded the restoration of Hungary's old 
borders. Veber told the court that politics was not on his mind at all; he 
did not understand the documentary and only wanted the feature presenta-
tion to start.4 
In an earlier article, I argued that militia violence had two sourc-
es: first, it had to do with the ways in which young soldiers from the elite 
and the middle class perceived and interpreted the actions of their real or 
alleged enemies, such as the Jews, working-class activists and radical 
peasants. This perception was in turn shaped by middle-class values 
fostered by elite and middle-class institutions, such as the nuclear family, 
schools and universities, social clubs, political parties and the army. 
Leaning heavily on the works of Adorno, Fromm and Theweleit, I 
contended that individuals with peculiar personality structure, i.e. "author-
itarian personality types," flocked into the militias. Rouge military units, 
such as the Pronay Battalion attracted exceptionally cruel individuals. 
With Christopher Browning, who looked at the history of a police unit in 
Nazi-occupied Poland, I also argued that perpetual violence, by constantly 
weeding out the faint-hearted and by turning the timid into hardened 
killers, tended to reinforce the results of self-selection. The militias 
differed from regular army units in many respects: recruitment and 
promotion were based political reliability and personal relations, rather 
than on qualifications and merit. Turnover in the officers' detachments 
was high: officers and soldiers often changed units or left the scene 
altogether. Pronay's leadership style was charismatic, while modem 
armies prefer bureaucratic leaders. The officers' detachments had no clear 
place in the military hierarchy and enjoyed privileges not awarded to 
regular units. The relationship of the Pronay Battalion with the civilian 
population both lacked structure and was wrought by distrust, violence 
and exploitation. The rogue military units in short displayed all the 
symptoms of an unsettled situation: they were both the product and the 
cause of chaos. Since the main militia leaders did not enter the army and 
the state bureaucracy, there was no direct link, I argued, between the 
militias and the interwar army, just as there was no direct link between 
the White Terror and the authoritarian regime.5 
In this essay, I intend to take the argument a step forwards. 
Militia violence, I plan to argue, cannot be reduced to self-selection and 
structural peculiarities: the torture and murder of civilians were also the 
product of a social phenomenon known as "anomie" or "normlessness." 
The term anomie was first used by the French sociologist Emil Durkheim 
at the turn of the century and after the Second World War was expanded 
upon by the American sociologist Robert Merton and his students. While 
Durkheim perceived normlessness as the result of modernization, Merton 
understood it as the possible outcome of creative discrepancy between 
"culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests held out as legitimate 
objectives for all members of the society" and culturally approved means 
of reaching these goals. In the absence of a rough balance between the 
two, aberrant behaviour and the development of aberrant personality types 
followed. Merton distinguished among five types of personality types; all 
except the conformist represented deviant responses. The conformist 
accepted both societal goals and means. The innovator accepted the goals 
but rejected the means for their achievement. Common criminals usually 
fell into this category: they usually subscribed to culturally accepted 
goals, such as wealth and high socials status, and used any means to 
reach them. The ritualist, typically a bureaucrat, obeyed and enforced the 
rules but forgot about their original purpose. The retreatist rejected both 
the culturally set goals and culturally approved means. This was the 
normal behaviour of alcoholics, drug addicts and other asocials who 
vented their aggression on their own body and mind. Finally, the rebel did 
not stop at rejecting both means and end but continued to search for and, 
if found, sought to realize alternative societal goals, even if this implied 
recourse to violence.6 
Anomie among officers took many forms; it manifested itself, 
among other things, in asocial behaviour and arbitrary violence against 
civilians. On return to the military base from a weekly leave, Erno Prost, 
another member of the Pronay Battalion, asked his fellow officer on the 
train to hold his seat while he had a drink in the train restaurant. A young 
civilian by the name of Janos Kaspar entered the compartment and took, 
despite the passenger's protest, Prost's seat. The returning Prost and his 
comrade manhandled the hapless civilian and then handed him over to the 
military police at the next station for allegedly making disrespectful 
remarks about the National Army.7 Just how little regard and patience 
officers of the Pronay Battalion had for civilians can also be seen from 
the case of Second Lieutenant Karoly Kmetty. He got involved in a minor 
car accident while transporting musical instruments in his vehicle. The 
neck of the cello (bogo) broke off and the infuriated Kmetty pulled out 
his revolver and threatened to shoot the offending driver and his passen-
ger. His men succeeded in calming him down; the officers in the end 
"only" punched their victims in the face and then tied their hands to the 
bumper of Kmetty's car.8 
Normlessness implied a disregard for professional codes of con-
duct, middle-class etiquette and everyday social conventions. The primary 
sources show that military officers represented a threat to civilians not 
only as in the roles of enforcers but also as private individuals, including 
customers. Pronay's men thus provoked a fight with the male staff and 
the friends of a local brothel in the second district of Budapest because 
the staff refused to open the door of the establishment after midnight.9 
While the female employees of the local brothel escaped the encounter 
with the intoxicated bullies, Istvan Bodor, a staff member in Hotel Impe-
rial in Budapest, was not so lucky. He was arrested by officers of the 
Pronay Battalion for allegedly stealing from them. The officers trans-
ported him to the military base in Kelenfold, on the outskirts of Budapest, 
where he was kept in jail and periodically tortured for four weeks.10 
Officers usually justified their actions by pointing to the alleged 
failure of their victims to "show respect." Hence they not only behaved 
but also talked like criminals: violent criminals too, sociologists and 
criminologists point out, cite lack of respect on their victims' part as the 
triggering mechanism for their aggression." Similarity in language and 
motive was not an accident. Both prisons and army barracks are in 
Merton's term "total institutions:" they use similar techniques to annihi-
late the old self and foster new personality types. Both criminals and 
officers follow rigid honour codes and keep their distance from civilians. 
This structurally produced gap between professional soldiers and civilians, 
if anything, widened in Hungary in the modern era. Professionalization 
increased segregation, while the ideology that buttressed this process 
encouraged officers to see themselves as physically and morally superior 
to the rest of the population. The officers' exulted view of themselves and 
their job clashed with the more negative perception of their profession by 
the general public, which continued to fear and distrust men in uniform. 
Some of this fear and distrust had political roots: in Hungary, the popula-
tion historically associated the army with the alien Habsburg dynasty and 
with German domination. While in the decades before the Great War 
population may have become more friendly towards professional soldiers, 
as careers in the army became more available to both ethnic Hungarians 
and talented men of the middle and lower classes, the lost war and the 
revolutions, all of which implied the abuse of recruits by officers, re-
opened old wounds. Arbitrary violence and the requisition of goods both 
by Red and White military units only fostered the popular view that 
officers were essentially middle and upper-class criminals in uniforms. 
Militia Violence as a Form of Profiteering 
As a result of enforced segregation, officers moved clumsily in the 
civilian world and tended to respond violently to any real or imagined 
threat to self-image and honour. Militia violence had multiple causes, and 
normlessness defined as the outcome of the growing gap between "cultur-
ally defined goals and socially approved means" was one of them. The 
post-war social and economic crisis touched the armed forces directly as 
officers complained bitterly about the inability of the government to 
provide their men with shelter, uniform, food and equipment.12 The 
military tried to solve this crisis by wrenching up the violence against and 
by exploiting more the civilian population. Marxist historians grasped 
upon attacks on civilians as a proof that militia violence had been in-
formed by class hatred and interest and that the rogue military units were 
doing the bidding of the elite. They were not entirely wrong: in dozens of 
cases the militias not only tortured and killed but also stole from poor 
peasants. One squad of the Pronay Battalion, for example, requisitioned 
the grain of poverty-stricken estate servants in the village of Solt in the 
fall of 1919.13 Yet, archival sources also show that the officers did not 
much care about the social background of their victims. In the village of 
Nagybajom, for example, Pronay's men emptied the cellars of the local 
tavern keeper, Mrs. Sandor Zavagyil.14 They also stole pigs from the 
estate of a noble man in the vicinity of Debrecen. They injected the poor 
animals with morphine to prevent them from squeaking.15 In short, the 
marauding troops if anything posed a greater threat to the relatively well-
to-do, in the process reinforcing the traditional distrust by the civilian 
population of men in uniform — regardless of their class background. 
Normlessness implied the transformation of values, the turning of 
allegedly selfless officers into armed criminals interested primarily in 
material gains. The leaders of the Pronay Battalion interpreted their 
privilege to requisition goods and equipment for military purposes broadly 
enough to enrich themselves. The Battalion seems to have worked out a 
system to steal motorcycles and automobiles. The chauffeur of the 
Battalion, Janos Kukucska, and two or three of his comrades, roamed the 
streets to gather information on vehicles and their owners. They reported 
their findings back to Lieutenant Istvan Devan, an enforcer and infamous 
torturer of Jewish Hungarians. Devan, or someone of his ilk, then paid a 
visit to owners and, by using a transparent pretext, confiscated the 
vehicle. Sometimes, as in the case of Sandor Sandor, they encountered 
resistance. Sandor, the son of a wealthy Jewish businessman and a reserve 
lieutenant, was not prepared to part with his beloved Puch motorcycle. To 
save his vehicle, Sandor told Devan that the motorcycle was still regis-
tered in the name of his non-Jewish friend, First Lieutenant Karoiy 
Matuska. He even had the courage to call in the police to settle the 
dispute. However, the guardian of law and order, rather predictably, took 
Devan's side. Pronay's man then took the vehicle and brought it to the 
officers' headquarters in Hotel Britannia.16 
The illegal confiscation of private vehicles created a public out-
rage among the well-to-do. In mid-1920, the Ministry of Defense, under 
pressure from the same group, ordered Pronay to hand over six cars and 
one truck (one Mercedes, one Opel, one Daimler, two Benz and one 
Sisere-Nandin) to the Ministry. It also demanded proof that the command-
ers of the Battalion were in legal possession of the vehicles they had been 
driving. At the time of the request, Pronay owned two, a Ford and a 
Puch, cars. His subordinate, First Lieutenant Ivan Hejjas was driving a 
Ford, while Captain Victor Ranzenberger had a Stoewer. Pronay was also 
asked to account for the Fiat that he had received the previous year from 
the Ministry.17 Pronay had failed to obey the orders because two weeks 
later the Ministry repeated the request.18 His men also seized the Merce-
des of a Greek citizen of most likely Jewish descent, Mor Schlesinger, 
sometime in 1920 or early 1921. To add insult to injury, they forced to 
the hapless man to pay 39,600 koronas for repairing the car that his men 
had crashed after the seizure. On May 20, 1921, Gendarme Colonel 
Rakosy, Pronay's new boss, sent a letter to Pronay demanding the imme-
diate transfer of the Mercedes to the Ministry of Defense. The request 
was repeated on June 14. Four days later the Battalion informed Rakosy 
that the car had been returned to the garage of the Ministry of Defense. 
On June 27, the Ministry of Defense responded that they had not seen the 
vehicle. The outcome of the affair is unknown, but it is clear from the 
correspondence that Pronay had been playing a cat and mouse game with 
the Ministry of Defense and had no intention of returning the car.19 In 
September, the increasingly frustrated Ministry of Defense decreed that no 
battalion could have more than three cars and two motorcycles and that 
the commander of each battalion had to report directly to the minister 
about carrying out this decree.20 In October the Ministry of Defense was 
forced to contact Pronay again about a car that they had confiscated from 
a liquor manufacturer. The administrator in charge demanded, most likely 
in vein, to hand over the vehicle, with as explanation of why they had 
confiscated it in the first place, to the Ministry or return it immediately to 
its original owner.21 
Occasionally, primary documents shed lights on the motives and 
mood of the perpetrators in action. They suggest that Pronay's men saw 
their actions as a pranks and their motives and mood resembled those of 
school-yard bullies pulling practical jokes on fellow students and teachers. 
On November 20, 1920, four officers stopped a truck carrying gasoline on 
the street of Budapest. The truck and the four barrels of gasoline belonged 
to Imre Gergely, a Catholic leather manufacturer from Transylvania who 
had set up shop in Csepel, the manufacturing district of greater Budapest. 
Instead of a receipt the officers handed the driver a note that read: "Thank 
you very much and please come again." Gergely estimated his damage at 
40,000 koronas, which represented a small fortune in 1920.22 The prank 
had of course a very practical purpose: stolen vehicle used gasoline which 
was also in short supply after the First World War. The Pronay files in 
the military archive show that Gergely was not the Battalion's only 
victim: between October 1919 and September 1920, at least a dozen indi-
viduals and companies were forced to hand over to Pronay's men their 
gasoline supply for little or no compensation.23 
The Pronay Battalion's large appetite was not satisfied with the 
confiscation of military equipment, food, vehicles and gasoline. In 
September 1920, a detachment seized three cabinets, six tables, six chairs 
and one bench from a Jewish school in Kecskemet. In vain did the leaders 
of the local Jewish community demand the return of school property. The 
right-wing mayor of Kecskemet also sided with Pronay's men by invok-
ing a war-time emergency law to justify the robbery, which had taken 
place almost three years after the end of the military conflict.24 Jews and 
civilians may have been the main but far from the only target of confisca-
tion measures. In February 1920, Pronay's men, in collusion with the 
guards, broke into the storage room of famous Komarom fort, stealing the 
furniture of officers permanently stationed there.25 The heyday of the 
militias came, however, during the border conflict with Austria in the fall 
of 1921. Exploiting the absence of legitimate authority in Burgenland, the 
contested border region between Hungary and Austria, the militia lined 
their pockets by acting as customs officers and by stealing cars, motorcy-
cles, pianos, oriental carpets, jewellery, clothing and food from the 
heavily German local population.26 
While the commanders focused their attention on luxury items, 
lower-ranked officers used every chance, no matter how small the promise 
of reward was, to take advantage of the civilian population. Officers, such 
as Lieutenant Zsigmond Hubert, ran up high tabs in hotels and restau-
rants. At Hotel Britannia, Hubert accumulated a 476 koronas debt, which, 
despite repeated warning from the head waiter, he refused to settle.27 
Political assignments also offered an excellent opportunity not only to 
vent aggression but also personally profit. Lieutenant Gyorgy Schefnik, 
who led the arrest of Laszlo Szamuely, the brother of infamous Commu-
nist Commissar Tibor Szamuely, at the end of 1919, provides a perfect 
example of such opportunism. Schefnik and his men rummaged through 
Szamuely's flat during the arrest and stole many of his valuables in the 
process. Despite repeated warnings from his superiors, Schefnik and his 
men failed to return the stolen objects at least until April 1921 28 Some-
times, at bogus orders of their own creation, they broke into houses and 
took valuables with impunity. Thus, in January 1920, using a transparent 
political pretext, a squad of the Pronay Battalion raided the flat of Vilmos 
Horeczky on the Arena Street in the heavily Jewish Seventh District of 
the city. During their search, they took jewellery and money in the value 
of between 14,000 and 15,000 koronas. The wealthy and politically 
conservative Horeczky was confident enough to report the case directly to 
Admiral Horthy's office. The head of the National Army in turn ordered 
Pronay to return the stolen goods immediately. Unfortunately, I found no 
evidence as to whether Pronay carried out or, as he was prone to, ignored 
his superior's order.29 
Anomie in a post-war context involved not only structural chan-
ges, such as a preference for charismatic rather than bureaucratic leader-
ship, but also transfiguration of values. The militia members did not 
simply violate the honour codes of their profession but, both in lifestyle 
and ideological outlook began to resemble mobsters. The gap between 
ideology and officers' action had become unbridgeable: while ideologues 
continued to paint offices as men inexperienced and uninterested in 
business, the primary sources show that military officers were quite 
capable of drawing up and carrying out elaborate schemes. In November 
1920, a civilian entered Mano Svirszki's candy shop in the Eotvos Street 
in Budapest. He introduced himself as Jozsef Kenez, a seriously injured 
veteran of the war. Then he made a business proposition: he wanted to 
buy Svirszki's store and was prepared to pay 70,000 koronas for it. After 
some hesitation, Svirszki accepted what looked to him a generous offer; 
the business partners agreed to sign the contract in presence of an attor-
ney the next day. Indeed, next day Kenez handed over the attorney an 
envelope with 20,000 koronas as his pledge, and told Svirszki that the 
rest would follow after all the necessary paperwork had been completed. 
Satisfied, Svirszki returned to his flat where three men, two officers and 
one civilian, however, had been waiting for him. They arrested him on the 
charge of having sold his store at an unreasonably high price. Svirszki 
was taken to the officers' headquarter in Hotel Britannia and tortured 
repeatedly. With a bayonet pressed against his chest, he finally gave in 
and signed a paper acknowledging that he had sold his business to Kenez 
for only 20,000 koronas, which he had already received. Svirszki was also 
forced to send a letter to his attorney, instructing him to hand over the 
envelope with the 20,000 koronas to the messenger. Svirszki's suffering 
did not come to an end with the loss of his livelihood. Emboldened by 
the success of their scheme, the officers demanded an extra 3,500 koronas 
from the unfortunate businessman "for their troubles." Under duress, 
Svirszki agreed but the officers then raised the price again to 100,000 
koronas. They told him that he should not hesitate to accept their offer 
otherwise they, the officers, "would feel compelled to resort to more 
forceful measures" both against him and his family members. Svirszki, at 
his wit's end, told the officer that he did not have that kind of money. 
Finally, the officers reduced the price to 10,000 koronas. Svirszki owed 
his life to an accident: the government troops and police squads, for 
reasons that had nothing to do with the tortured businessman, besieged 
Hotel Britannia in November 1920. In an effort to eliminate all incrimi-
nating evidence, the officers sneaked Svirszki out the back door. Encour-
aged by the government's action, Svirszki gathered enough courage to tell 
his story to the newspapers.30 
The internment of political prisoners, in addition to the psycho-
logical payoffs, represented another opportunity for officers to enrich 
themselves. Officers, like Lieutenant Antal Molnar, at Pronay's order, 
toured the country, collecting information from local dignitaries, spies and 
informers and arresting "Communists and Communist sympathizers who 
pose a threat to peace, order and social stability." On the basis of these 
vague charges, he and his men arrested 33 individuals in the village of 
Fegyvernek and its vicinity in early June 1920.31 Many of these detainees 
were brutally tortured and subsequently murdered by his men.32 The 
following week, Molnar and his men visited his home town Szolnok and 
extorted between 50 and 60,000 koronas, which was a fortune at the time, 
from local Jews eager to avoid deportation, imprisonment and possible 
death.33 The local military commander was so outraged by this event that 
he ordered the arrest of Molnar's brother and father as accomplices and 
also sent a letter to the military command in Budapest requesting the 
immediate detention of Antal Molnar.34 What punishment Molnar received 
from Pronay remains unknown, however; in any case, it could not be 
serious because he remained a member of Pronay's entourage for the next 
two years. 
The primary sources make it clear that the Pronay Battalion used 
politics to act out their ethnic prejudices, vent their aggression and, at the 
same time, steal from Jews. In Kiskunhalas, on May 13, 1920, three 
members of the Battalion ordered Sandor Schwartz to appear at the local 
police station. He was accused of having torn down a political poster or 
flyer of the National Army. It is unclear if they had advised Schwartz to 
bring 10,000 koronas as well or the hapless man just happened to carry 
the cash in his case. Be as it may, the money was duly confiscated, and 
Schwartz was allowed to return home. A few hours later, however, 
Pronay's men entered his house in search of more cash and valuables. 
They found the hapless Schwartz at home and beat him to death. Later in 
the night, two of the three men, accompanied by a local policeman, broke 
into the home of another Jewish businessman, Mor Hofmeister. They 
spared Hofmeister's life in return for 5,000 koronas and some jewellery. 
They also forced him to hand over an additional 14,000 koronas the next 
day.35 
House searches and the arbitrary arrests of middle and upper 
middle-class Jewish Hungarians were motivated by greed and ethnic and 
religious hatred; political considerations served either as a pretext or, as 
the following example suggests, as a retroactive justification only. On 
May 7, 1920, in the village of Abony, a squad of the Pronay Battalion 
broke into the house of a widow, Mrs. Laszlo Verhovay and forced her to 
hand over 1,600 koronas. The next evening, they forced their way into 
the home of Ignac Deutsch; under duress, Deutsch gave them 1,200 
koronas, two pairs of gold earrings and a few pieces of collectors' coins. 
Militia men then raped the seventeen- years old Margit Deutsch and the 
servant girl, Roza Mucsi; they took the gold ring off the half-conscious 
Margit Deutsch's hand and stole her gold earrings as well. The same 
night, the gang ransacked the house of Mano Pick; they got away with 
9,000 koronas in cash, 40 litres of rum, 20 litres of wine and a few 
kilograms of sweets. On May 28, the same group broke into the houses of 
Jakab Albert, Samuel Rechtschaffer and Miksa Veii. They killed Samuel 
Rechtschaffer and seriously injured Albert, whom they beat with a leaded 
stick. To their disappointment, however, the night netted only a few 
hundred koronas, two hand watches and other small valuables. Signifi-
cantly, none of the victims had anything to do with Communism or with 
politics.36 
Relations with the Local Elite 
Organizations, such as large businesses, tend to fulfil a wide variety of 
functions: some of these functions are legal, others operate in a morally 
and legally grey zone, while the rest are not only illegal but also harmful 
to the interests and wellbeing of the wider community. On the other end 
of the spectrum, the mafias tend to run not only illegal but also legal 
operations and sometimes even succeed in gaining public respect and 
official recognition. The rouge military units, such as the Pronay Battal-
ion, similarly had a foot in both worlds. The militias survived until 1922 
not only because they were made up by accomplished killers and bullies 
but also because they fulfilled positive social functions and had roots in 
some communities. Unlike regular army units, the militias relied heavily 
on the material, moral and political support of individuals and social and 
professional groups. In return for their support, the militias often acted as 
patrons, advocates and arbiters of power struggles. In the village of 
Marczali, for example, Pronay's favourite was the local priest, Andras 
Toth. He wrote regularly to Pronay, passing on information and denounc-
ing municipal and county administrators as crypto-Communists or spine-
less opportunists. Toth also asked Pronay to help him to get his former 
job back, a request that Pronay immediately forwarded to Horthy's 
office.37 A year later, Pronay's right-hand man, Second Lieutenant Nandor 
Hertelendy, put pressure on the municipal council of Szentes to hire Toth 
as a teacher. He told the council that Toth had distinguished himself in 
the service of the counterrevolution. To extra weight to his recommenda-
tion, Hertelendy, however, also warned the civil servants that "if nice 
words do not do the job, well, then we will have to use something else." 
Outraged by this remark, the local notables denounced Hertelendy to 
General Kontz, the head of the gendarmes. General Kontz found no 
reason, however, to intervene and referred the case back to the battalion's 
commanders.38 
In the chaotic circumstances of the post-war period, many individ-
uals wanted to use the militias to cut through red tape and obtain unfair 
advantages. One of the most serious issues of the day was the lack of 
adequate housing, which, as the example of the sculptor Hugo Keviczky, 
who set his eyes on both the studio and the large flat of the famous 
Communist painter and cultural commissar Bertalan Por, shows, could be 
solved by the militias. By playing up his nationalist credentials, Keviczky 
was able to get Por's studio but not his adjacent apartment. The flat 
continued to be occupied by people whom Keviczky contemptuously 
described as Por's "Galician-Jewish-Communist relatives." The right-
radical newspaper, Ujlap (New Paper) also came to Keviczky's aid. The 
Ujlap told its readers that, while Communists, like Bertalan Por, still 
owned two large houses in Budapest, men of such impeccable Christian 
and nationalist credentials and obvious talent as Keviczky, who had 
sculpted the legs of saints in the main Catholic Cathedral, the Basilica, in 
Budapest, had to live in a cramped apartment located in the outskirts of 
the city. The decision of the municipal government to deny Keviczky's 
request "violated the spirit of Hungarian nationalism because it favoured 
a guilty Communist emigre over an oppressed and much deserving 
Christian artist."39 In the name of "true art and Hungarian natural culture," 
Keviczky turned to Pronay and asked him to evict the present occupants, 
a family of five, from the coveted flat.40 
The bureaucratic chaos and inefficiency, combined with the 
increased propensity of civilians to resort to violence in the aftermath of 
the war, forced in rare cases even Jews to turn to the militias for help. 
Miklos M. Lampel, a twenty-eight-year old Jewish wine merchant sought 
in vein to get back a large barrel from Janos Tarr. Tarr refused to return 
the barrel or provide compensation, by using the meek excuse: the barrel 
had been borrowed by his wife whom he had meanwhile divorced and the 
court had ruled that his ex-wife could not have more claim on him. The 
frustrated Lampel turned to the Pronay Battalion, because, as he later 
testified in the court, "I knew that the detachment could arrange every-
thing quickly, and because by following the customary route I knew that 
I would never get my barrel back from Tarr." Lampel asked First Lieuten-
ant Elias to pay a visit Tarr in his hometown, Cegled, and impound his 
wife's bracelet to cover all the expenses. At first everything seems to 
have gone according to plan: Elias found Tarr in his vineyard in Cegled 
and scared him into promising to return the barrel. Then he began 
bargaining with Tarr, demanding first 1000 koronas and then only 100 
koronas. Tarr must have bought him off because in the end the barrel 
remained in Tarr's possession. The hapless Lampel had no other option 
but to seek justice in the court.41 
The militias were locked in a mutually profitable relationship not 
only with selected individuals, but also with communities and professional 
organizations. The village of Orgovany, for example, requested Pronay's 
help for getting badly needed coal for the winter. In return they promised 
one wagon wheat as "a gift" next year, adding that they might give even 
more to "the best of the Hungarian soldiers" in the case of a good 
harvest.42 In his letter, Pronay thanked the "upright Hungarians of 
Orgovany from the bottom of his Hungarian heart." He warned that "in 
time like this we decent Hungarians have to stick together; we have to 
show iron will and stubborn determination and do everything in our 
power to prevent the repetition of the Red scandals of the recent past." He 
then added that he had already talked to Gottlob Rauch, the Commissar 
for Coal Procurement, who promised to send two wagons of coal to 
Orgovany in October. In closing, Pronay expressed his wish that he and 
the villagers "would continue, shoulder-to-shoulder, their life-and-death-
struggle against the enemies of our nation."43 In early July 1920, Pronay 
asked the Ministry of Defense to not purchase goods from Jews or 
employ them as intermediaries. The Ministry, he argued, had to draw 
lessons from the lost war and the two revolutions. Instead of giving 
favours to "court Jews" (udvari zsidok), it should avail itself of the good 
services of the Baross Alliance, an umbrella organization of Christian 
artisans and shopkeepers, whose leaders he knew and whom he trusted 
because they had proven their loyalty to the counter-revolution.44 
Among the right radical organizations, it was the Awakened 
Hungarians' Association (Ebredo Magyarok Egyesiilete or EME) that had 
the strongest ties with the Pronay Battalion. The leaders of the EME in 
Orgovany trusted their ties with Pronay enough to request the discharge 
of their members from military service.45 In Papa, EME members were 
infuriated by the arrest of Dr. Bela Zakos, a high school teacher and one 
of the leaders of the organization. Zakos was accused of providing 
support for the Communists before August 1919. The local landowner, 
Dr. Miklos Jokay, wrote Pronay a long letter on Zakos' behalf, asking 
him to facilitate his immediate release.46 Laszlo Bokor, a right radical 
journalist and head of the EME in Szeged, begged Pronay to do the same 
for his friend and fellow EME member, First Lieutenant Tibor Farkas. He 
was detained on the order of by Major Shvoy for forcing the Gypsy 
violinist in a local tavern to play repeatedly the infamous anti-Semitic 
ditty, Ergerberger, and for resisting arrest by the military patrol.47 Bokor 
described the whole incidence as the work of Jews and told Pronay that 
the local EME stood solidly behind Farkas.48 
The boundaries between right radical civilian organizations and 
the militias were fluid: Pronay was one of the leaders of the EME and he 
and his men helped to establish and maintain EME cells in many commu-
nities. On the other hand, many EME members, especially university 
students but also local notables, served in the militias for a few months. 
Right radical civilian organizations provided the militias with material 
and, through their newspapers, schools and clubs, with moral support. In 
return, they used the rogue military units to carry out pogroms and settle 
scores with their local political adversaries. Thus, in an anonymous letter 
written in mid-July 1920, "the "Christian population of Fegyvernek" 
denounced the local physician, Dr. Zsigmond Klein, as a trouble maker. 
According to the letter, Klein spoke ill of the Pronay Battalion in public, 
calling the officers and rank-and-file of the unit murderers.49 A week later, 
the local notables, including the village mayor, sent a second letter to 
Pronay. In it they informed Pronay that after the departure of his battal-
ion, Dr. Klein told the people around him that "these White bastards are 
responsible for everything; you can be sure that they will all end up on 
the gallows. I will not forget their faces and will tell the Russians every-
thing so that each and every one of them will be hanged."50 The Pronay 
Battalion reacted to the letters of denunciation in their customary manner. 
On July 28, 1920, Dr. Klein's remains were found in the outskirts of the 
village. The county physician, Dr. Janos Gimpel, noted the deep wound in 
the left side of Dr. Klein's chest and blood stain on the back of his right 
hand. From this evidence, he concluded that Dr. Klein must have commit-
ted suicide.51 
Conflict with Police and Military Authorities 
The murder of Dr. Klein and similar crimes must have provided local 
EME members with a certain degree of satisfaction. Grasping onto similar 
events, traditional Marxist historiography argued that the militias and the 
local elites not only shared the same interests but the rogue military units 
also acted as the latter's puppets. Archival sources show that the relation-
ship between the two was indeed very complex, and in many cases local 
gendarme and army officers and civil servants either looked the other way 
or actively encouraged the atrocities. However, the same sources also 
indicate that that the relationship between the two groups was wrought 
with tension, and perhaps in the majority of cases local authorities, not to 
mention the wider population, were opposed to continued violence. As the 
following case studies demonstrate, traditional authorities were increas-
ingly frustrated by the inability and unwillingness of militia members to 
observe the officers' codes of conduct. Worse still, Pronay's men often 
succeeded in turning what were essentially petty crimes into political 
events. On leave Lieutenant Molnar, for example, showed up uninvited at 
the ball of the local manufactures' association in his home town Szolnok. 
The organization had many Jewish members and, to insult them, Molnar 
called on the Gypsy musicians to play the infamous anti-Semitic ditty 
"Ergerberger." To the outraged organizer Molnar responded that "I am a 
member of both the EME and the Pronay Battalion; therefore, I can do 
anything." Molnar also shrugged off the arriving police with the remark 
that "go to hell, you nothing, you lowly (kozonseges) policemen." He 
finally left the establishment screaming that "I am going to report every-
thing to Lieutenant-Colonel Pronay; you'll see, he will come down here 
and clean up this place."52 
It seems that Pronay' men went out of their way to insult local 
policemen and military officers. In April 1920, lieutenants Laszlo Vannay 
and Arpad Rath forbade a gendarme in the village of Solt to look into the 
pogrom, which their unit had committed only a few months earlier. They 
sent him back to the gendarme headquarters with the message that the 
gendarmes had no right to prevent attacks on Jews and if they had 
continued to insist on carrying out the investigation "they would be swept 
away along with the Jews."53 In most case, local gendarmes, who had 
come from peasant backgrounds and were therefore likely to be deferen-
tial towards officers of middle-class and often gentry background, simply 
complied with their orders. Yet, especially in larger towns and in the 
capital, police officers displayed more courage. Thus gendarme officer 
Lajos Labat Ligeti did not hesitate to arrest Ferenc Nagy for having 
started a brawl, even though Nagy told him that he would notify Pronay 
and with his help he would smash the entire gendarme unit.54 The militias 
also stopped the car of a high-ranking police officer, Janossy, in Budapest 
and told him to "get out of the car, you Jew and take your slut with you!" 
Janossy neither forgot nor forgave the incident; a few days later he and 
fifteen of his policemen, dressed in civilian dress, prepared a surprise for 
the officers. The militia men entered a downtown cafe, frequented mainly 
by Jews, and demanded that the clients identify themselves by pulling 
down their pants. Janossy and his men were not amused by the rough 
joke and arrested the trouble makers on the spot. The officers were 
transported to the district police headquarters, where they were severely 
beaten.55 
By the summer of 1920, the police in Budapest had recognized 
the threat that the Pronay Battalion posed not only to the wellbeing of 
individual policemen but also to the survival of the new counter-revolu-
tionary regime and, as the story of Reserve Lieutenant Vilmos Racz 
shows, they were prepared to act. Vilmos Racz was a gentleman farmer-
turned-businessman, who operated a number of "theatres" in the main 
amusement park, the Angol Park, in Budapest. When the police closed 
down his theatres because he had failed to pay his fees on time, Racz first 
had written a long letter to the police chief of Budapest, Dr. Gyorgy 
Mattasovszky requesting a new permit. Having received no answer, he 
then paid a visit to Mattasovszky's assistant and told him that he was now 
going to turn to the Pronay Battalion as "the only forum where people 
with a just cause were listened to." The increasingly agitated Racz finally 
broke into Mattasovszky's office and gave him an ultimatum: either he 
issued a permit immediately or Racz and the Pronay Battalion would 
"smash the Budapest police to pieces." The police chief "shrugged me off 
in the coldest possible manner," Racz latter recalled the confrontation. 
Seething with anger, Racz then sent his friends, Istvan Balassa and Istvan 
Csaba, both officers of the Pronay Battalion, to Mattasovszky to "demand 
an explanation." The two friends did not find the police chief at home but 
left him a message challenging him to a duel. However, Mattyasovszky 
was in no mood for duelling. Instead he put Racz behind bars and ordered 
the immediate detention of the two officers as witnesses to a crime. Then 
he placed the entire police force in the city on alert in expectation of a 
militia coup. As the air cleared the next few days with no coup having 
been attempted, the police chief decided to release Racz on bail. The ex-
lieutenant used his newly found freedom to write a long letter to the 
Ministry of Defense, denouncing Mattasovszky for failing to accept his 
challenge.56 He also wrote a letter to Pronay explaining what had hap-
pened, asking for his continued support, and warning him that the whole 
case revolved around Mattasovszky's pathological hatred for the Pronay's 
Battalion, which was "thorn in his side."57 
If the police increasingly saw militias "as a thorn in the side," 
local military commanders then had even more reason to complain, since 
the anti-social behaviour of Pronay's officers threatened their own reputa-
tion as officers. By behaving like bullies and issuing threats, Pronay's 
men, as the story of Lieutenant Rezso Schmidt shows, both embarrassed 
and made themselves hated by fellow officers. Schmidt disrupted a ball 
organized to honour local cadets in the town of Kecskemet by forcing the 
leading violinist to play only for him. Local officers got involved, put 
Schmidt in his place and thus the ball continued. Later in the night, 
however, the already drunken Schmidt jumped, or rather climbed, on the 
table and announced that, as a member of the Pronay Battalion, he had 
the right to have the Gypsy musician for himself. Taken to the balcony by 
fellow officers to get some cold air, Schmidt called the entire officer 
corps of the local Kecskemet regiment "destructive" and just before 
leaving the event challenged one of them to a duel.58 
Schmidt's behaviour was ill suited to lowering tensions between 
the Pronay Battalion and regular army units, which in any case resented 
the favoured treatment that Pronay and his men received from Horthy. 
Just how poisoned the relationship between Pronay and many of local 
commanders had become by the summer of 1920 can be seen from the 
weekly intelligence reports that Pronay sent to the Minister of Defense. 
Pronay used these reports to destroy the reputation and undermine the 
career of his colleagues. Thus he described Captain Rattinger, the military 
commander in Bekes County as a one-time collaborator and Communist 
sympathizer. In the same letter, he called the head of the army unit in the 
town of Bekescsaba a "friend of Jews." While critical of high ranking 
officers, Pronay staunchly defended Lieutenant Huszka, his man on the 
ground. Huszka had a fallout with the local officers over the beating of a 
Romanian peasant whom he suspected of hiding arms. Pronay was 
infuriated by the soft-heartedness of his colleagues and demanded the 
reorganization of the military in Bekes County on a strictly nationalist and 
anti-Semitic basis.59 
The cause of tension between Pronay and the commander regular 
military units was not limited the lack of personal sympathies. In the final 
analysis, the conflict was rooted in differences in organizational structure 
and ideology: the militia leaders tended to be charismatic, while the 
commanders of regular army units practiced what Max Weber called a 
bureaucratic leadership style. The switch from charismatic to bureaucratic 
leadership style was, as the next case study suggests, difficult, if not 
outright impossible. Captain Kalman Racz, with Pronay's support, set up 
his own detachment recruited mainly from ex-soldiers in the Maramaros 
region at the end of 1919. The Detachment was to be used to re-occupy 
the newly separated region at the first favourable opportunity. In March 
1920, at the order of the Ministry of Defense, the militia was integrated 
into a regular army unit, the Infantry Regiment of Mateszalka. At the first 
review, the Division Commander, Colonel Rubin asked Captain Racz how 
he had been able to create such a disciplined unit. Captain Racz replied 
that it was love and mutual trust between him and his soldiers that kept 
the unit together. Colonel Rubin's responded that "I spit on love and 
trust; what I need here is unconditional obedience." His remark was only 
the first of the many humiliations that the Detachment, according to Racz, 
had to endure the following months. His officers especially resented 
Rubin's attempt to curtail political activities. On Racz' and his officers' 
behalf, Pronay collected damaging information on Rubin and passed it on 
to the Minister of Defense. In one of his weekly intelligence reports, 
Pronay described Rubin as an inept professional and a spineless careerist. 
Rubin's incompetence, according to Pronay, caused the life of thousands 
of Hungarian soldiers at the Italian front during the last stage of the war. 
Instead of being demoted, Rubin, thanks to his political skills and connec-
tions, moved further up on the bureaucratic ladder after the war. Still, his 
appointment as the Division Commander (hadosztaly parancsnok) in 
Debrecen came as shock to everyone who had known him. Pronay closed 
the long litany of complaints about Rubin with the rhetorical question: 
"Why are we even pretending that the troops could ever come to trust 
such as a leader?"60 
Archival sources make abundantly clear that regular army officers 
responded to Pronay's back-stabbing and intrigues in kind. By the end of 
1920, rumours began to circulate in military circles about the imminent 
dissolution of the Pronay and the Osztenburg battalions. Regular officers, 
as the following short story shows, welcomed the news. A military patrol 
of the Abony-Zemplen Regiment questioned Lieutenant Istvan O. Gyenes 
in the Helveczia cafe in Budapest in November 1920. The leader of the 
patrol, Lieutenant Jeno Korom, told Gyenes that he was going to take him 
into custody because "Pronay's men usually forge their identity papers." 
At the police station, Korom made further inquires, and in the end, in a 
disappointed voice, remarked to Gyenes, "so, after all, your battalion has 
not yet been dissolved." After his release, Gyenes reported this humiliat-
ing incident immediately to his superior.61 
Relations with the Political and Military Elite 
Constant frictions with local administrators, policemen and army officers 
suggest that the militias, without a stable social base, could not take find 
their place in Hungarian society. Their greed and penchant for violence 
had an alienating impact not only workers and the agrarian poor but also 
on better-off peasants, professionals and civil servants. Unlike the fascist 
militias in Italy and the SA in Germany, the Pronay Battalion and similar 
units did not recognize the supremacy of any political party or movement. 
The logical choice of the militias in Hungary should have been the 
Christian Socialist movement, whose leaders shared Pronay's nationalism 
and violent racism and whose members were behind many pogroms after 
August 1919. Yet the movement lacked both strong leadership and 
cohesion, and soon became fragmented into a number of parties. Per-
ceived by the entente powers as supporters of the Habsburg restoration, 
the Christian Socialist parties, moreover, did not have English and French 
support, without which, no government could retain power for long in 
East Central Europe after The Fist World War. 
Pronay was smart enough not to tie his fortunes to the Christian 
Socialist parties; he also made the right decision by supporting Horthy 
and the National Army against the various civilian, mainly Christian 
Socialist, governments in late 1919 and early 1920. In short, political 
calculation, distrust of civilian politicians, shared family and professional 
backgrounds and personal sympathies landed Pronay in Horthy's camp. 
He seems to have chosen well, since the Admiral was acceptable to 
Western powers and he shared Pronay's intense hatred of liberal and 
leftist politicians and the Jews. Yet, in the long run, Admiral proved to be 
a bad choice for Pronay. In his memoirs, Pronay painted Horthy as an 
intellectual lightweight, a babbler, a snob and an indecisive and somewhat 
spineless leader. This picture was more of caricature, since Horthy, his 
many weaknesses notwithstanding, did possess political talent. Unlike 
Pronay, Horthy at least recognized his limitations, and was wise enough 
to listen to his much better informed and more experienced advisors. 
After 1920, his circle of counsellors was increasingly dominated by 
conservative aristocrats. These advisors, like the socials group that they 
came from, were not interested in social and political experimentations', 
their goal was to restore, with minor modifications, the pre-war liberal-
conservative system. In the fall of 1919, out of paranoia and as a form of 
retribution for Communist crimes, they tolerated and occasionally even 
encouraged state and militia violence against left-wing politicians and 
Jews. Interested in traditional domination rather than in power through 
direct violence, they tried to reduce and ultimately eliminate the atrocities 
as a feature of social and political life. Unlike Pronay and his officers, 
Horthy's aristocratic advisors had a more nuanced view of politics: they 
did not equate, for example, every liberal and socialist group with 
Communists. More moderate politicians, such as Prime Minister Istvan 
Bethlen, were prepared to make concessions even to the Social Demo-
cratic Party in return for social peace, political toleration and entente 
support.62 While Horthy would have liked to ignore socialist complaints 
about the White Terror altogether, he was smart enough not to close his 
ears to whispers coming from his moderate advisors and the representa-
tives of the entente powers, both of which had expressed concern about 
the continued suppression of the socialist movement and the trade unions. 
The same can be said about militia violence against Jews. His dislike of 
the Jews notwithstanding, Horthy could not overlook the negative impact 
of the pogroms on public opinions abroad and on the heavily Jewish 
entrepreneurial class at home. 
The exclusion of the militias from political life took more than 
two years because the officers' detachments had powerful friends both in 
the army and the state bureaucracy. Horthy counted as one of their sup-
porters, even though the militia leaders' influence over him was more 
limited than many contemporaries and later historians believed.63 The 
members of the rough military units could always count on the Regent's 
sympathy: while he did not necessarily support or even know about the 
atrocities, Horthy regularly became involved on the militias' behalf by 
preventing the civil and military courts from prosecuting militia men and 
by ordering the immediate release of those arrested or already convinced 
of crimes. Just how close he must have been to the militia leaders can be 
sensed from Horthy's memoirs: written more than thirty years after the 
events, in it the ex-regent of Hungary continued to make excuses for the 
murderers.64 
Horthy and his political and military advisors were slow to get rid 
of the militias for a number of other reasons as well. First, they overesti-
mated the power of the Left and remained paranoid about Communist 
coups. Second, the elite had a use for the militias in their multi-dimen-
sional political game: the rogue military units with their well-known 
penchant for violence were well suited to frighten political opponents, 
ensure the desired outcome of elections and kept workers and peasants in 
their place. The members of the elite, Horthy included, were not ashamed 
to ask for the same kind of personal favours that helped to forge the 
alliance between the local elite and the militias. According to Pronay's 
memoirs, Horthy once asked him to recover some of his goods lost during 
the Communist regime. Horthy's advisor, Gyula Gombos, and his aide-
de-camp., Laszlo Magashazy, allegedly requested his help to beat up the 
Minister of the Interior Odon Beniczky and other legitimists politicians.65 
The officers' detachments served a representative function as well: young 
and relatively good looking officers preferably from gentry background 
were often asked to serve as bodyguards, protect important sites and 
accompany Horthy and his trusted advisors, including the conservative 
Istvan Bethlen, on longer trips. Finally, as mentioned above, there were 
cultural affinities reinforced by similar social origins, shared upbringing 
and family, friendship and professional ties that made the break with the 
militias especially painful for Horthy and some of his advisors. 
It was the decreasing need for the militias as enforcers and 
bodyguards, combined with the fear of a right-wing coup, rather than 
moral outrage over militia crimes that put an end to the collaboration 
between the conservatives and members of the extreme Right. By the fall 
of 1921, the political and military elite had become as paranoid about a 
possible right-wing takeover of power as they had been about communist 
plots at the end of 1919. While not eager to provoke a confrontation, by 
the fall of 1921, the government felt strong enough to confront the 
militias by relying on regular army and police units. 
The government's reluctance to confront the militias shows the 
depth of the economic, social, political and moral crisis in Hungary after 
the lost war the failed revolutions. The government sought to domesticate 
the militias by both gradually trimming their power and changing their 
structure. Both measures had produced, until the end of 1921, only 
limited results, as the quarrel over military intelligence demonstrates. 
In the fall of 1919, the National Army created its own intelligence 
service to deal with domestic, mainly Communist, threats.66 This intelli-
gence function was essentially abrogated by the Pronay and the Oszten-
burg detachments, which, by using their network of spies, arrested, 
tortured and murdered people in large numbers. To end the abuse of 
power by the two battalions, in May 1920, the new Minister of War, 
General Karoly Soos, proposed the creation of a central intelligence 
agency under the direct control of his ministry. This proposal, however, 
also led to a fight between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of 
the Interior, which wanted to reclaim what it perceived to be a police 
prerogative from the military. The Ministry of Defense in the end got its 
way by creating the Centre for Defense against Bolshevism (vorosvedelmi 
kozpont) under its tutelage.67 
On June 11, 1920, bureaucrats in the Ministry of the Interior held 
a high-level meeting to deal with the public outcry over the continued 
arrest and imprisonment of innocent civilians by the militias. They 
decided to put an end to the military's intelligence service. The relevant 
decree by the Ministry of the Interior (4710/1920.ME.) was published in 
the Budapesti Kozlony on June 13, 1920. The law forbade military units 
to arrest and interrogate civilians. On June 13, 1920, as a reaction to the 
new law, the Minister of Defense met with his close advisors to discuss 
the issue of military intelligence. They concluded that military intelligence 
units had produced too many important results and "in spite of the 
mistakes of a few young officers, and the atrocities committed by non-
military elements," it would be a mistake to put an end to their operation. 
Determined to keep the power of the military intact, Soos issued a new 
law (1010.215/eln.C. 1920.) on June 17: he renamed the Centre for 
Defense against Bolshevism the Information (tajekoztato) Service without, 
however, seriously cutting its prerogatives.68 
Resolute to maintain its intelligence service, the army leadership 
nevertheless recognized the need to curb the power of Pronay and the 
Osztenburg battalions. In the summer of 1920, both the Minister of 
Defense (H.M. 100951/eln. Sz. rendelet), and the District Military 
Command (5082 Sz. rendelet) decreed that the Pronay and the Osztenburg 
battalions had no longer had the right to operate separate intelligence 
services; battalion members who worked on intelligence matters had to 
report directly to the Army's newly-renamed Information Service. The 
power of the Service became more circumscribed, too: it could no longer 
prosecute currency smugglers and speculators, and had to coordinate its 
intelligence operations against Communists closely with civilian authori-
ties.69 A separate decree by the District Military Command ordered the 
two battalions to refrain from arresting "politically dangerous individuals 
and those engaged in illegal economic activities." The document made 
reference to the militia practice to arrest and keep in prison individuals 
without due recourse to the courts of law. These activities, the order 
reads, added extra ammunition, both at home and abroad, to enemy 
propaganda about the White Terror. The military authorities gave the 
militias credit for their past achievements; they also warned them, how-
ever, to leave intelligence gathering and arrest to the appropriate authori-
ties.70 
The fact that the order had to be repeated with minor changes 
several times suggests that the two militia units had no intention of giving 
up profitable and emotionally satisfying police powers. In November of 
1920 the Ministry of Defense issued a new decree; in it, the Ministry 
admitted that measures taken to limit the intelligence and police functions 
of the militias had been a failure and that excesses committed by military 
detectives had remained common. The order stipulated that militia 
detectives could arrest only renegade soldiers, people who incited against 
conscription, spies and Communists; and that the arrest could proceed 
only on the basis of solid evidence. Military detectives were allowed to 
detain people only for 48 hours; after two days, they were obliged to 
release or hand thern over to civilian authorities. The Ministry also sought 
to limit the power of officers to patrol streets and ask for identification 
cards; only officers with special orders were allowed to carry out police 
duties. They had no right to confiscate anything from the detainees.71 
The order by District Military Command in Budapest a few weeks 
later displayed even greater frustration with the militias. The District 
Military Command deplored the fact its earlier decrees forbidding political 
activity among officers "have not been correctly understood." Officers had 
not stopped spreading rumours, denouncing one another and intriguing 
against their superiors. Worse, some military units had built up a veritable 
spy system. These activities reflected a revolutionary mindset and there-
fore had to come to an end. Officers who were not able to keep their 
subordinates in line and those who set a negative example for their men 
had no place in the armed forces of Hungary. To avoid ambiguity about 
the continued existence of intelligence operations, General Dani declared 
that that "I do not tolerate the existence of a spy system (spiclirendszer) 
in the army.72 
The government sought to trim the power of the militias and 
effect structural changes in order to end the atrocities. In early April of 
1920, the Office of the Supreme Commander ceased to exist and its 
prerogatives were transferred to the Ministry of the Defense. Whereas the 
new Minister of Defense, General Karoly Soos, had the reputation of 
being a man of the radical Right, his actions show that, as professional 
soldier, he opposed the militias. On June 16, 1920, in a parliamentary 
speech, he announced the reorganization of the militias: the provincial 
militias were to be integrated into the gendarmerie, while the militias in 
Budapest would remain under military command. Officers' detachments 
were to be dissolved with the exception of the Pronay and the Osztenburg 
battalions, which would remain under military control. In January 1921, 
the two units were reorganized as the first and second national gendarme 
reserve battalions and as such they became part of the gendarmerie.73 
Simultaneously the Pronay and the Osztenburg battalions lost their 
representative function. In mid-February 1921, as an indication of grow-
ing distrust towards the militias, Pronay's men were replaced by regular 
gendarmes to guard the royal residence, Horthy's favourite place, in 
Godollo.74 
The Ministry of Defense felt the need to address the matter of 
Pronay Battalion in a separate order. In September 1920, the Ministry of 
Defense decreed (Hon. Min. f. evi 78687/eln. A. 1920. szam) the immedi-
ate dissolution of the officers' squad stationed in Hotel Britannia. The 
same order put an end to the counter-intelligence operation of the Battal-
ion. To make the battalion more compatible with regular infantry units, 
the Ministry of Defense sought to reduce the number of officers as well. 
Each company of the Battalion was allowed to have only ten officers. The 
percentage of officers was to be reduced by integrating those on assign-
ment permanently into their present units, by transferring non-infantry 
officers to different battalions and by prohibiting the recruitment of new 
officers without higher authorization. The Ministry declared that only 
those who had been the members of the battalion before August 2, 1919 
should remain with the Pronay battalion. This implied a reduction of more 
than 50 per cent in the number of officers, since the unit had at least 180 
officers in September 1920, as compared to 70 in August 1919. The entire 
battalion, officers included, was to stay in the Ferdinand military base. To 
improve discipline and morale, the Ministry ordered Pronay's men to 
attend lectures on military discipline on weekdays.75 A separate decree 
radically cut the number of reserve officers in the militia. At the end of 
1920, the Ministry of Defense set the date for the discharge of reserve 
officers by January 15, 1921; then it extended the date to February 15.76 
The decrees of the District Military Command in Budapest reflected the 
same mindset: in April 1921, the District Military Command ordered 
officers stationed in the city to attend lectures on proper behaviour 
towards civilians. The lectures were to be held every Friday morning in 
the Officers' Casino in Vaci Street.77 
The frequent recurrence and duplication of the same orders at 
different levels of the military speak volumes about the difficulties the 
government faced in reining in the militias. In February 1920, the 
Osztenburg Detachment, by taking one of Horthy's thoughtless remarks 
literarily, murdered Bela Somogyi, the editor-in-chief of the socialist 
newspaper, Nepszava (People's Voice), and his young colleague, Bela 
Bacso. This murder angered both domestic and foreign public opinion and 
led to an ill-conceived, short and ineffective economic blockade of 
Hungary in the early summer. In mid-June, government was finally forced 
to take action: it cleansed the Budapest-Kecskemet railway line of the 
members of the Hejjas Detachment who had been harassing passengers 
and also rounding up scores of young men in the area "who abused the 
uniform of the National Army." The campaign meant to satisfy public 
opinion without insulting the militias. To square the circle, Horthy 
appointed Pronay to lead the cleansing campaign and determine who 
among those arrested should be charged. Since the Hejjas Detachment had 
closely co-operated with Pronay for months, and many of its members, 
including Lieutenant Ivan Hejjas himself, later entered the Pronay 
Battalion, the campaign predictably produced meagre results. To make 
sure that no important militia member would be charged, Horthy, more-
over, put an abrupt end to the investigation at the end of July. 
These fake measures failed to stem the flood of complaints or 
reverse the course of events. In August, for the first time, the court 
imposed heavy sentences on the members of an entire militia group for 
killing a lawyer and bank manager at the end of July. In November, as a 
reaction to the murder of a policeman by drunken officers, government 
troops raided Hotel Britannia, which housed officers of the Pronay 
Battalion and associated units, and the Ehmann military base: the raid led 
to the arrest of more than a dozen of officers at Hotel Britannia, while the 
skirmish with government troops on the base produced five deaths and 
scores of injuries. As part of the crackdown, the government, fearful of a 
right-wing coup, imposed a curfew, dissolved a number of radical organi-
zations and arrested their leaders. 
The government crackdown in November weakened but did not 
yet destroy the militias. In the summer of 1921, Ivan Hejjas sent an 
ultimatum to the Minister of the Interior of the previous government, 
Odon Bericzky. As the ultimatum provoked a great public outrage and 
Parliament demanded an investigation. A special prosecutor in the person 
of Albert Vary was appointed to look into the atrocities committed by 
Hejjas and his gang. Indeed, within a few weeks, Vary produced a list 
containing the names of more than 70 people murdered on the basis of 
racial and religious hatred and greed. He could not make any arrests, 
however, because Hejjas and his men had left the region for Burgenland 
to participate in an insurrection aimed at keeping the province under 
Hungarian rule. 
Meanwhile Hejjas' one-time commander, Pronay, also came under 
fire. In August 1921, in response to newspaper allegations that he had 
extorted money from a rich Jewish businessman, Lajos Kornhauser, 
Pronay sent a threatening letter to the President of Parliament, Istvan 
Rakovszky. He accused him, among other things, of being a traitor and a 
Czech spy. Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen used the Kornhauser Affair to 
destroy Pronay. After a humiliating trial, Pronay received a light sentence 
for having insulted the President of the Parliament, and was deprived of 
his unit. Deeply hurt, Pronay withdrew from public affairs to his family 
estate. Unable to give up the limelight, however, in the fall he had joined 
the nationalist uprising in Burgenland and soon became its self-appointed 
leader. Pronay did not support the second royalist coup at the end of 
October, even though recent political events made him to lean in that 
direction. His neutrality, however, failed to endear him to the holders of 
power in Budapest, while his stubbornness to leave the province raised 
the spectre of entente sanctions. Having run out of options, the Bethlen 
government was prepared to use military force against Pronay's and 
Hejjas' units and only their last minute withdrawal from the region saved 
them from destruction.78 Still, as a sign of his sympathy for Pronay, 
Horthy offered the discredited militia leader a minor position in the army. 
In early November, as an additional favour, he declared full amnesty for 
the crimes the militias had committed since August 1919. 
Predictably, Pronay was not impressed by these goodwill gestures 
but wanted full rehabilitation and control over control over his troops. 
The government was, however, no longer in the mood to negotiate: 
instead of giving back his troops, the Bethlen government, under pressure 
from the military elite, the civil service, local elite, trade unions and 
foreign governments, dissolved the last militias in early 1922. Using the 
reorganization of the army in the aftermath of the Treaty of Trianon, 
which ordered a drastic reduction in the size of the armed forces, as a 
pretext, the commander of the National Army, General Pal Nagy pre-
vented militia men from entering the army and the gendarmerie in every 
turn. Officers with criminal records were eliminated on the spot; reserve 
officers, despite distinguished war records, were accepted only in excep-
tional cases. Most importantly, Nagy used the Treaty as an excuse to 
cleanse the army of politically unreliable elements, which in his interpre-
tation included not only leftist sympathizers and legitimists but also 
members of the most prominent militias.79 By 1923, the militias and their 
supporters in right-radical organizations, such as the EME, had found 
themselves outside the gales of power. Their desire and determination to 
re-enter that gate, either by themselves or as allies of other political 
movements, remained one of the most important factors in interwar 
Hungarian history. 
Concluding Remarks: Modernity and Violence 
Contemporary liberal and leftist commentators and later historians de-
scribed the officers who had dominated the Pronay and the Osztenburg 
Battalions either as feudal remnants or as stooges of capitalists and semi-
feudal landowners eager to restore the pre-war social and political order 
both in the cities and the countryside. This view is untenable on many 
grounds: regular officers, despite their feudal decorum, were essentially 
modern professionals. Reserve officers came from the middle class; they 
had finished high school, and many had attended university. In their 
outlook and culture they were more modem and also more European than 
the majority of the population. The Pronay and, to a lesser extent, the 
Osztenburg battalions were envisioned by Admiral Horthy and his advi-
sors as elite units, and they were treated as such for more than two years. 
The members of the detachments wore military uniforms and displayed 
military decorations; they drew salaries from the state and attended and 
often played a major role in official ceremonies. Until the end of 1921, 
paramilitary leaders rubbed shoulders with leading politicians, who sought 
their advice and were not yet embarrassed to appear with them in public. 
The Pronay and the Osztenburg battalions were housed in military 
barracks; the life of soldiers and officers on these military bases followed 
rigid schedules passed down from the old army. In their free time, the 
officers frequented the same restaurants, casinos and brothels; they 
attended the same theatre performances, listened to the same type of 
music, read, if they read at all, the same type of literature and subscribed 
to the same nationalist newspapers. The officers of the Pronay and the 
Osztenburg battalions subscribed to the same nationalist ideology and 
harboured the same prejudices towards ethnic and religious minorities as 
the majority of their colleagues and indeed a large part of the elite and 
the so-called Christian middle class. The Pronay and the Osztenburg 
detachments may not have been the best units of the newly formed 
National Army, as they themselves believed and as they were often told 
by military and political leaders. But they were soldiers, and their beha-
viour can be best understood in the context of the state of their profession 
during and after the war. 
Violence against defenceless civilians did not make the officers 
less professional: after all, there was hardly any army and offices corps in 
modern Europe that did not violate the norms of their professions during 
foreign and civil wars. The atrocities committed by regular German troops 
in Belgium and the behaviour of Russian units in East Prussia and 
Austro-Hungarian soldiers in Italy during the First World War underlined, 
perhaps the first time, the ambiguous impact of professionalization on 
military-civilian relations. The complicity of the German army in the 
murder of civilians in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and their participa-
tion in the Jewish genocide during the Second World War made this 
problem even more salient. Yet every army, including those of the 
Western states, committed unspeakable crimes against humanity during 
the Second World War. As if the problem had not been clear enough, the 
senseless murder of civilians both by conscripted and professional armies 
continued during decolonization. The death of tens of thousands of Iraqis 
and the torture of civilians at Abu Ghuraib prison and in secret CIA 
facilities all over the globe suggest that neither the nature of the war nor 
the nature of soldiers and policemen have changed much for the better the 
last hundred years. 
In post-World War One Hungary, the militias' tendency to ignore 
professional codes of conduct can be attributed to the lost war and the 
two failed revolutions. The breakdown of state bureaucracy, unprece-
dented misery, lack of respect for human life and dignity, as well as the 
general lawlessness that prevailed in the country, created the ideal condi-
tions for the emergence of the militias. The roots of militia violence was 
anomie produced by socio-economic strains and decline in respect for 
human life and the rule for law, which transformed regular army units 
into criminal enterprises. The militias, like the most criminally-minded of 
all businesses, the mafias, fulfilled a wide variety of functions, some of 
which benefited at least some segments of the population. Yet the 
militias, like the mafias, were also too violent and too unpredictable and 
too much the product of the post-war crisis to become a permanent 
feature of the political and social landscape. The militias had to disappear 
from the scene because they violated too many interests and sensitivities. 
Their belated removal from the scene in 1922 allowed the conservative-
liberal regime to survive until 1944. 
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Gyula Gombos and Hungarian Jews, 
1918-1936 
Thomas Sakmyster 
In the history of fascist or radical right-wing movements in twentieth 
century Europe, Gyula Gombos played a distinctive role. He was the chief 
spokesman for and dynamic leader of the extremist right-wing movement 
that developed spontaneously in Hungary in the aftermath of World War 
I and the failed revolutions of 1918-1919. In 1919, before the concept 
had fully crystallized in the mind of Adolf Hitler, Gombos was calling 
himself a "national socialist." In a remarkable parliamentary speech in 
1921, before Mussolini's march on Rome, Gombos predicted that the 
"axis of European power will lead from Rome to Berlin."1 In 1925 he 
organized and presided over an international anti-semitic congress in 
Budapest, the only one of its kind in the interwar period. Finally, in 1932 
he became the second radical right-wing leader (Mussolini being the first) 
to come to power. Several months later, when Hitler became Chancellor 
of Germany, Gyula Gombos was the first foreign leader to pay him an 
official visit. Throughout his career, which spanned the years from 1918 
to his death in 1936, Gombos attempted to effect significant political, 
social, and economic changes, which, had he been completely successful, 
would have re-defined the concept of the Hungarian nation. Gombos 
championed the concept of "race protection," which he and his followers 
proclaimed to be a necessary campaign to protect Christian Hungary from 
the alleged rapacity and destructiveness of Hungarian Jews. Yet Gombos's 
anti-Semitism was at times ambiguous, and his policies as Prime Minister 
between 1932 and 1936 were remarkably pragmatic. 
Born in 1886, Gyula Gombos came from a German-Hungarian 
family of the lower middle class.2 Raised as a Lutheran, he developed a 
wary and suspicious attitude toward the Catholic Church, the aristocratic 
landowners (who were mostly Catholics), and the Habsburg Empire. 
Fluent in German (his mother, in fact, did not speak Hungarian), he 
embarked on a career as an officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army. His 
rise in the ranks was not a rapid one, no doubt in part because he barely 
concealed his strong Magyar nationalism, his distaste for the Habsburg 
dynasty, and his preference for the establishment of an independent 
republic of Hungary.3 
At the end of the Great War, Gombos was an obscure army cap-
tain who, by pre-war standards, did not possess the proper credentials to 
play a leading role in political affairs. Yet he soon emerged as a cham-
pion of what became known as the "Szeged idea": a proto-fascist move-
ment characterized by extreme nationalism, virulent anti-Semitism, 
hostility to all left-wing ideologies, and a willingness to mobilize the 
masses to achieve certain reforms in society and the economy. When in 
the spring of 1919 Gombos arrived in the southern Hungarian city of 
Szeged to join the counter-revolutionary government that was forming 
there, he became the chief propagator of the idea that the "Jews and 
Freemasons had caused the disintegration of the state" and their "enor-
mous world power" had to be smashed.4 Gombos's subsequent rise to 
political prominence was greatly facilitated by his close collaboration with 
Admiral Miklos Horthy, who led the National Army organized at Szeged 
and later, after the collapse of Bela Kun's Soviet Republic in the summer 
of 1919, was elected Regent of the counter-revolutionary regime. Gombos 
was among the first to realize that, his strong public statements notwith-
standing, Admiral Horthy did in fact have secret political ambitions. 
Gombos encouraged Horthy along these lines and developed a successful 
propaganda campaign that promoted him as the "man on horseback" who 
would rescue the Hungarian nation.s 
In the immediate post-war period Gombos was tolerated by the 
traditional political elite not only because he was the protege of Horthy, 
but because he demonstrated considerable talent for political organization. 
He played a key role in the establishment of the new Hungarian army, 
and efficiently carried out the task of "organizing" the first elections that 
established the government party as the dominant political force in 
Hungary. Before long, however, the more traditional right-wingers became 
alarmed at the radical nature of the program Gombos was propounding, 
which seemed to involve a fundamental reshaping of Hungarian society. 
For most of its history leading up to World War I, the "political 
nation" in Hungary consisted largely of the landed nobility or those who 
modeled themselves after that class. The great mass of peasants (whether 
Magyar or other ethnic groups) and, by the late nineteenth century, the 
growing industrial proletariat, were excluded from any meaningful 
participation in the national community. Although during the last half of 
the nineteenth century the political elite embarked on a project to modern-
ize the country and to combat Pan-Slavism and the threat from the 
emerging nationalist movements among Hungary's ethnic minorities, they 
were reluctant to mobilize the Magyar masses to support a nationalist 
program. 
As a way out of this dilemma the nobility found it useful to 
facilitate the growth of an economic elite that would be entrusted with the 
task of modernizing the country by stimulating trade and creating an 
industrial infra-structure. This economic elite, a new middle class consist-
ing largely of Jews, was granted extensive civil liberties and full access to 
the universities and professions, but for the most part was excluded from 
the spheres of government and administration. Most Hungarian Jews were 
willing to accept this "assimilationist contract."7 Indeed, the extent to 
which Jews, who represented about 5% of the pre-World War I popula-
tion, came to dominate the economic and professional life of Hungary is 
remarkable. By the early twentieth century about 85% of the leading 
bankers were Jews, 45% of the journalists, 60% of medical doctors, and 
there were similar high percentages in the other professions.8 Many of 
these Jews were so eager to assimilate into Hungarian society that they 
became, as one Hungarian writer put it, "more Magyar than the Magyars 
themselves."9 The symbiotic relationship between Hungary's political and 
economic elites thus led, in the decades before World War I, to a prevail-
ing definition of the Hungarian nation that implicitly embraced the Jewish 
community and that provided sterile ground for the growth of political 
anti-Semitism.10 This relatively favourable situation for Jews and Hun-
gary's liberal immigration laws proved quite attractive to Jews from 
surrounding countries, especially the Russian Empire. Hungary became, in 
the words of one historian, the "America of mobile East European Jew-
ry."11 
If, borrowing from Benedict Anderson, we can speak of nations 
as "imagined communities,"12 Gyula Gombos might be said to have set 
himself the task of "re-imagining" the Hungarian nation. When in 1919 
he declared himself to be a national socialist, he strongly implied that, 
though he rejected international socialism and communism and what he 
later termed the "dream world of Jacobin egalitarianism,"13 he intended to 
mobilize peasant farmers and industrial workers and make a place for 
them in the national community. Thus, he began to speak and write 
disparagingly about two pillars of pre-war Hungary: aristocratic landown-
ers and capitalists. The former, he declared, were afflicted with "parasitic 
idleness," although he conceded that the great estates were "canters of 
culture" for the Magyar nation.14 In the early 1920's Gombos made 
various land reform proposals that he justified by the necessity for "race 
protection." He demanded that those lands that had fallen into "foreign 
hands" (a code phrase for Jewish ownership) be returned to the Magyar 
peasant, the true progenitor of the Hungarian nation.15 Had the legislation 
proposed by Gombos been enacted, it would have created a large, new 
class of smallholding farmers and greatly diminished the political and 
economic power not just of the Jews but of the Christian nobility. In later 
years, however, Gombos's interest in land reform greatly diminished.16 In 
part this reflected his growing realization that the landowning nobility still 
retained enormous influence in governing circles, especially over Regent 
Horthy, who long remained an opponent of significant land reform. There 
was a psychological factor at work as well: Gombos, like many previous 
Hungarian politicians of modest birth, eventually found it expedient to 
emulate the very nobles that he had denigrated. Thus, in the late 1920's he 
suddenly discovered (or more likely invented) a noble pedigree in his 
ancestry, and began using a noble title.17 
Gombos proved much more consistent and zealous in his attacks 
on capitalists. He insisted, however, that his opposition to capitalism must 
not be equated with that of the Communists, for he made a distinction 
between "rapacious" and "creative" capitalists.18 The "rapacious" capital-
ists were the Jews, who dominated banking and industry in Hungary and 
whose activities, Gombos asserted, "embittered the lower classes" and 
curtailed "the development of the nation like an octopus."19 A central 
element in the program he developed in the early 1920's was thus the 
elimination of Jewish influence in Hungarian economic life and society, 
and the creation of a large, and presumably creative and vigorous, Magyar 
Christian middle class. Gombos used various terms to describe his prog-
ram: national socialism, Christian nationalism, race protection, but his 
guiding principle remained a fierce anti-Semitism. 
For the most part Gyula Gombos made no original contributions 
to the development of modern anti-semitic thought. Rather he borrowed 
the ideas of others and applied them to an analysis of Hungarian society. 
Of particular influence on Gombos were the racist theories of Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain, the Anglo-German writer whose book The Founda-
tions of the Nineteenth Century Gombos regarded as his "bible of racism." 
From it he gained the conviction that race was the key to understanding 
the course of history and the rise and fall of nations.20 Employing statis-
tics and interpretations gleaned from Chamberlain's work, and relying on 
his own experiences during World War I, Gombos published in Septem-
ber, 1918 a pamphlet entitled Die Juden in Ungarn.2] In it he asserted that 
the Jews were a disruptive, anti-national element that was leading 
Hungary toward defeat and revolution. The events of the following two 
years, particularly the disproportionately high representation of Jews in 
the leadership of Bela Kun's regime, seemed to many Hungarians to 
confirm Gombos as an astute political observer and prophet. He thus rose 
rapidly to leadership positions in those radical associations (such as the 
League of the Awakening Magyars) that sought to make the Jews a 
scapegoat for all of Hungary's problems. From 1919 to 1922 in frequent 
speeches and articles in newspapers and in the radical right-wing journal 
Szozat, Gombos established himself as the acknowledged expert on the 
"Jewish question" and the champion of Christian Magyars. He constantly 
emphasized a view that represented the touchstone for adherents of the 
Szeged movement: the "Jewish question" was not a religious but an eco-
nomic and, above all, a racial one. 
Gombos used a variety of statistics in his attempt to prove that 
the Jews were a corroding social and political element in any country 
where they gained a foothold.22 The Central Powers had lost the war, he 
insisted, because the percentage of Jews in those countries was signifi-
cantly greater than that in the Entente countries. By his calculations the 
ratio of Jews to Christians in the Allied countries was 1:227, in contrast 
to the more unfavourable ratio of 1:56 in the countries of the Central 
Powers.23 According to statistics compiled by Gombos, during the war 
Christian Hungarian losses in combat were 2.8% of the populations, while 
Jewish losses in combat were 1.1%. Since Hungary was the European 
country with the highest ratio of Jews to Christians, it was no wonder, he 
declared, that of the Hungarian officers who as prisoners of war in Russia 
were converted to Communism, 95% were Jews. And, Gombos constantly 
emphasized, it was precisely in Hungary that the worst revolutionary 
turbulence occurred after the war. It was not surprising that the Jews were 
"vastly over-represented" in the leadership of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic, since by their nature Jews were hostile to national ideals and 
goals and attracted to international movements of all kinds, including 
socialism and freemasonry. Thus, Jews continually strived for the estab-
lishment of a world order, "which for them means hegemony but for us 
represents slavery."24 
What Gombos most decried, of course, was the dominant influ-
ence of Jews in Hungary's economy, professions, and newspapers. Unless 
drastic action was taken, he warned, the "successors of the state-founding 
people led by Arpad" would within 50 or 100 years become slaves in 
their own country.25 Not surprisingly, Gombos was a strong supporter of 
the anti-Jewish law, known as the numerus clausus, that was passed by 
the Hungarian National Assembly in 1920.26 This established a racial 
quota for admission to Hungarian universities, limiting Jews in each class 
to 6%. Gombos supported this legislation, arguing that the "Jewish 
problem" became acute in any country that did not impose restrictions on 
the activities of the Jews. However, he regarded the numerus clausus as 
only a first step. On the one hand, he preferred that the quota be set 
instead at 5%, which was the percentage of Jews in Hungary's pre-war 
population; on the other hand, he suggested that what was really needed 
was the imposition of a quota that directly and immediately reduced the 
number of Jews in banking, journalism, art, culture, and even sporting 
life. Furthermore, he insisted that the concept of a quota should not be 
applied to the military officer corps, for in his opinion no Jews should be 
permitted to be officers.27 
In general, despite his vituperative rhetoric,28 Gombos rejected 
violent tactics, insisting that it was senseless to "repeatedly slap around 
the Jews." Moreover, unlike some of his radical colleagues, Gombos 
sometimes, albeit grudgingly, admitted that there were some patriotic 
Jews who had fought for their country in World War I. He also conceded 
that Jews who had arrived in Hungary before 1848 had stronger roots in 
the country and had some claim to citizenship.29 Often Gombos tried to 
emphasize a more positive interpretation of "race protection": it meant not 
so much an attack on the Jews, but rather the promotion of the economic 
and cultural interests of the Magyar "race."30 Still, it was clear that any 
attempt to implement his program would involve a massive expropriation 
of Jewish property and the enforced unemployment and probable impov-
erishment of large numbers of middle class Jews. Anticipating these 
consequences, Gombos suggested in 1921 that all further Jewish immigra-
tion into the country be prohibited and that arrangements be made with 
Zionist organizations for the resettlement of what he called "surplus 
Hungarian Jews," who would number several hundred thousands.31 The 
departure of a large number of Jews would have the added advantage of 
making room for the return from North America of Christian Magyars 
who had emigrated in large numbers in the decades before World War I. 
The radical remaking of the Hungarian national community pro-
posed by Gombos received little support from Hungary's traditional 
political elite. To be sure, Admiral Horthy was a self-professed anti-
Semite who agreed with the proposition that the Jews were too powerful 
in Hungary and that Christian Hungarians should be encouraged to enter 
middle-class professions. But both he and Count Istvan Bethlen, the true 
creators of Hungary's interwar regime, rejected extremist measures (such 
as expropriations of property) and argued that the reduction of Jewish 
influence would have to be a very gradual process. Horthy even placed 
part of the blame for the situation on Christian Magyars, who, he asserted, 
lacked entrepreneurial skills and shunned careers in industry and techono-
logy.32 Both Horthy and Bethlen acknowledged that Jews had played, and 
continued to play, important roles in the modernization of Hungary and 
tacitly supported a renewal of the pre-war relationship between the Jewish 
community and the regime. As a result, by the late 1920's the numerus 
clausus law had been watered down, and the representation of Jews in the 
economy and the professions had not changed significantly from that of 
the pre-war period. 
Foreseeing such a development, and frustrated by the refusal of 
the regime to take vigorous action against the Jews, Gyula Gombos broke 
away from the government party in 1922 and formed the "Party of Race 
Protectors." As the leader of this party during the 1920's Gombos de-
clared on many occasions that the minimum program of his party was the 
reduction of the Jewish role in society to 5% in any area of activity. Such 
action must be taken, he warned in 1925, because the Jews would not be 
satisfied until they had destroyed historical Hungary.33 Privately he spoke 
in even more radical terms. At the International Anti-Semitic Congress 
that he organized and presided over in Budapest in 1925, Gombos called 
for the total "removal of Jews" from Hungary and resettlement in some 
other land, but not Palestine.34 
Such extremist views found little support in Hungary in the 
1920's, as economic conditions stabilized and the memories of the Soviet 
Republic faded. The "Party of Race Protectors" had little success in the 
political process: in the 1926 elections of Parliament Gombos and his 
followers gained only 1.5% of the vote. Frustrated by this lack of success, 
Gombos finally concluded that he could fulfil his political ambitions only 
by toning down his radical rhetoric, regaining the confidence of Regent 
Horthy, and rejoining the government party.35 This strategy soon paid 
significant dividends. The world economic crisis hit Hungary particularly 
severely, forcing Count Bethlen to resign and prompting Horthy to seek a 
"strong hand" to prevent revolutionary outbreaks. Horthy thus offered the 
post of prime minister to Gombos, but only on certain conditions, the 
most important of which was that he would not introduce any anti-Jewish 
legislation.36 
Eager above all to gain power, Gombos not only complied with 
all of the Regent's requests, but also, in a stroke of breathtaking opportun-
ism, initiated secret negotiations with leaders of the Jewish community. In 
exchange for Jewish support for his governmental program, Gombos 
promised that he would abandon his attacks on the Jews, respect Jewish 
"material interests," and provide strong support for the development of 
Hungarian industry and rearmament.37 Given Gombos's reputation as one 
of Europe's most notorious anti-Semites, it would seem unlikely that any 
Jewish leaders would have regarded such an offer as sincere. Yet an 
agreement was made along these lines with leaders of the Neolog commu-
nity of Hungarian Jews, and in his inaugural speech to Parliament 
Gombos made a statement that startled all political observers in Hungary: 
To the Jews I declare openly and frankly that I have changed 
my views. That part of Jewry that acknowledges that it shares a 
common fate with our People I wish to regard as brethren, just 
as I do my Magyar brethren.... I saw Jewish heroes during the 
war... and I know that they fought courageously. I know 
prominent Jews who pray for the Magyar fate, and I know that 
they will be the first to condemn that part of Jewry which could 
not or would not assimilate with the national community.38 
Remarkably, Gyula Gombos was true to his word. During his four 
year tenure as Prime Minister no anti-Jewish legislation was introduced, 
despite the fact that during this period Hungary gravitated to the Nazi 
German orbit and Gombos spoke openly of his admiration for Benito 
Mussolini and his preference for Italian-style corporatism. Even while 
very strong restrictions were being placed on the Jews in Germany (such 
as the Nuremberg Laws), no attempt was made by the Hungarian govern-
ment to diminish the influence of the Jews, save for a futile attempt to 
impose a kind of numerus clausus in the legal profession.39 Gombos even 
made several friendly gestures to Hungary's Jews. He permitted the two 
major Jewish communities, the Neolog and the Orthodox, to hold national 
congresses and sent warm and sympathetic greetings to each.40 Moreover, 
he consulted frequently with prominent Jewish industrialists like Ferenc 
Chorin, and he was the first Hungarian Prime Minister to attend a meeting 
of and speak before the major Hungarian association of industrial 
managers and financiers, a large number of whom were Jews.41 And when 
in 1935 he put forward a plan that would have outlawed strikes and 
restructured labour laws along the lines of Fascist corporatism, the 
proposed changes would not necessarily have had a negative impact on 
Hungary's Jewish business elite. In fact, in 1936, when Gombos died 
suddenly of a liver disease, the percentage of Jews in the economy and 
the professions was little changed from the early 1920's, when he had 
declared that the racial situation in Hungary was intolerable. 
This overview of the career of Gyula Gombos provides a number 
of insights into the nature of radical right-wing movements and the 
difficulties that extremists like Gombos encountered in their attempt to 
remake the national community. Confronted by such authoritarian conser-
vatives as Admiral Horthy and Count Bethlen, who resisted a radical 
solution to the "Jewish problem," Gombos displayed a remarkable 
opportunism. One can only speculate whether, had he lived through 
World War II, Gombos would have reverted to his earlier, virulent anti-
Semitism. There is fragmentary evidence that shortly before his death he 
had given secret assurances to the Germans that he indeed planned in the 
near future to impose a totalitarian system in Hungary.42 In any case, 
Gombos did leave as his legacy a solid corps of radical right-wing 
government officials and parliamentary delegates who admired Nazi 
Germany and were imbued with the "Szeged idea."43 These " Gombos 
orphans" were responsible for the enactment of the anti-Jewish laws of 
1938-1941 that fulfilled the program that Gombos had proposed in the 
1920's. It was they, also, who offered their support, or stood by indiffer-
ently, when in 1944 the Germans deported 2/3 of Hungary's Jews to the 
gas chambers of Auschwitz. Thus, the reshaping of the national commu-
nity by the removal of Hungary's "surplus Jews," which Gombos had 
proposed in the 1920's, was achieved in 1945, though he could hardly 
have welcomed the aftermath of that horrible event: defeat in a cata-
strophic war and domination of Hungary by the Soviet Union. 
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The Wartime History of the 
National Bank of Hungary 
Through Hungarian-American Eyes 
Marguerite D. Allen 
Special Agent William I. DeHuszar of the United States Army Counter 
Intelligence Corps (CIC) arrested the Arrow Cross president of the 
Hungarian National Bank, Laszlo Temesvary, on May 10, 1945, in the 
village of Spital am Pyrhn, Austria.1 Just seven months earlier, Temes-
vary's personal friend, Hungary's new leader Ferenc Szalasi, had given 
him control over the entire treasury of the Bank including Hungary's gold 
reserves. Ten days after his appointment, the Bank's Board of Directors 
was dissolved. Temesvary replaced the pre-October 15 bank leadership 
with directors more to his liking, setting off a series of promotions and 
demotions based chiefly on political ideology.2 
Who was Laszlo Temesvary? He served the extreme far right as a 
journalist and knew nothing about banking.3 He owned and edited Nep 
(People), a "rabid and inciting" "anti-Semitic weekly" that advocated 
Arrow Cross political and ideological views and published Arrow Cross 
bulletins on its back page.4 A People's Court judge found Temesvary 
guilty of war crimes and crimes against people. These included spreading 
hatred against Jewish people, as in his book Mi lesz veliink? (What's 
Going to Happen to Us?) and A fasizmus penzugyi politikaja (The 
Financial Politics of Fascism). The judge found that his work as a journal-
ist encouraged young people to turn "against a segment of the population 
— even babies and old people — to rob them, treat them sadistically 
while deporting them, and to exterminate them." The People's Courts 
sentenced Temesvary to "death by bullet," later commuted by the Na-
tional Council of the People's Courts to "a life sentence of forced labour." 
His sentence was upheld as late as 1985.5 
Readers of post-1989 bank histories that deal specifically with the 
period of Szalasi's rule will find nothing about Temesvary's arrest or 
subsequent war crimes trial, even though the records of Temesvary's trial 
have been available at the Budapest City Archives since 1988-89. Nor 
will they find reference to the boxes of stolen Jewish valuables Temes-
vary stored in the Bank that are documented in the trial papers.6 
While researchers can find Special Agent DeHuszar's official 
reports in the U.S. Army files at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland, nowhere has it been 
documented that the American who arrested Laszlo Temesvary was a 
former Hungarian refugee. Special Agent William I. DeHuszar was my 
father. After his death I discovered a private diary recording his experi-
ences from March 30 through July 17, 1945, 7 while he served as a CIC 
Special Agent.8 This previously unknown document not only presents new 
information about this chapter of Bank history, but also offers a Hungar-
ian-American perspective on events and raises pertinent questions about 
larger issues of continuing importance. 
Although he was raised as a Lutheran in Budapest, on May 5, 
1939, fascist legislation defined my father as Jewish. He had graduated 
from the Verboczy Realgimnazium and served in the Hungarian army (the 
Honved). Unwilling to leave family, friends, and Budapest, the twenty -
-two-year-old stayed on in Hungary even after his younger brother's flight 
to the United States as a scholarship student at the University of Chicago. 
He waited until the last minute. On the day before the Second Racial Law 
took effect, he left Hungary.9 From Budapest he travelled with his mother 
to Vienna and then to Berlin. There he "negotiated" his departure with 
Adolf Eichmann, who was already functioning as the head of the Reich 
Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Berlin.10 Five years later, he 
returned to Europe as an American assigned to military intelligence in 
Patton's Third Army. As it turned out, he served his former country just 
as well as his new one." 
The Immediate Historical Background 
What circumstances led to American involvement with the National Bank 
of Hungary in May 1945? With the Soviet Red Army advancing rapidly 
from the East in the fall of 1944, the Hungarian National Bank began its 
final relocation westward out of Hungary in early November. Lengthy 
negotiations at the border with the Germans followed. Finally, in late 
January 1945, two trains carrying the nation's gold reserves and 600 bank 
employees including families made their way into Upper Austria.12 
Among the bank's holdings, in addition to the gold reserves, were the 
most valuable volumes of the National Szechenyi Library, gold treasures 
from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the gold reserves of the 
Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank (Hungarian Commercial Bank of Pest).13 
By the end of January 1945, the bank had settled into its new 
home in the ancient Benedictine monastery of Spital. There the bank re-
mained safe until the end of April when Russian, German, Hungarian, and 
American forces converged. The Russians had advanced to within seventy 
miles. The surrounding countryside was filled by German and Hungarian 
troops, with some 800 horses, who were in the process of surrendering to 
the Allies. In addition, top-level Nazis on the run sought refuge there in 
secluded, inaccessible mountain retreats — their so-called "Alpenfestung" 
or "National Redoubt."14 Finally, like the cavalry coming over the hill, 
Patton's Third Army crossed into Austria from the West. In the midst of 
this chaos, top Hungarian Arrow Crossers desperately tried to maintain 
control of the bank.15 
On May 2, bank leaders made their first attempt to contact 
American officials to request protection. On May 6, a bank representative 
managed to hand deliver the bank's urgent request for help to Lt. Col. 
Ball of the U.S. Army in Kirchdorf. The next day American tanks arrived 
and surrounded the monastery, forcing the Germans in the vicinity to 
flee.16 On May 8, Special Agent DeHuszar arrived in Spital with orders to 
investigate the bank situation, obtain an inventory of its holdings, and 
verify their existence.17 
DeHuszar's Diary and Official Reports 
My interest in the National Bank of Hungary began unexpectedly about 
three years ago when I discovered my father's wartime diary. He had 
locked it in a file cabinet that had gone into storage shortly after his death 
in 1990. In his entries from May 8 to May 14, 1945, he described his 
work as the lead investigator of the Hungarian National Bank case. It was 
an important assignment among many for the twenty-seven-year-old. He 
later tracked down, interrogated, and/or arrested such war criminals as 
Hungarian Cabinet Ministers Gabor Vajna and Laszlo Budinsky, Volks-
bund leader Franz Basch, and two of the instigators of the Ujvidek 
massacre, Marton Zoldi and General Ferenc Feketehalmi-Czeydner. All of 
these men were executed in 1946, either at the end of a rope or in front 
of a firing squad.18 
He also drove Gestapo chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Eichmann's 
boss, from his mountain retreat where Americans had captured him to 
CIC headquarters in Vocklabriick on May 12.19 "If I would be an oppor-
tunist," my father writes on June 23, 
I could run for office in Hungary. It would make a good story. 
I really cleaned Hungary. Arrested Temesvary, Fazekas of Nat'l 
Bank, Basily Goldschmidt of the Volksgruppe, Zoldi the War 
Criminal, Vajna the Min of Int & Budinsky the Min of Jus-
tice.... Had Feketehalmi-Czeydner too but left him there be-
cause of his old age.20 
To satisfy my curiosity, I visited the National Archives and 
Records Administration in College Park, Maryland to leam more. There I 
found my father's story confirmed in his and others' official reports. Still 
questions remained. 
As my interests and research broadened, I met Monika Pacziga 
while attending a Hungarian commemoration at the University of Kansas, 
where she was studying. Subsequently, she translated for me documents 
from Temesvary's trial that can be found at the Budapest City Archives. 
Ms. Pacziga, now a graduate student at the Central European University, 
also translated Hungarian accounts written more than forty-five years after 
the events took place.21 
Emil Fazekas and Stolen Jewish Valuables 
What new elements besides Temesvary's arrest do DeHuszar's new found 
diary and contemporary official records at archives in the United States 
and Hungary add to what we know from recent Hungarian accounts? 
First, the arrest of Emil Fazekas. Officially, DeHuszar reports on May 14, 
1945, that 
EMIL FAZEKAS is a member of the [Arrow Cross] Party 
since 1936. Assigned to recruit members. Collected dues and 
increased membership. In Oct '44, when the Hung Nazis took 
over, he suddenly became personnel manager, though he was 
not qualified. This promotion was the reward for his "Under-
ground" activities. EF believes in the Hung Nazi principles and 
defends the action of its leader, Ferenc Szalasi,22 
(To his private diary, DeHuszar confides, "Temesvary is a fanatic an t i -
Semite & a stoop & so is Fazekas") Temesvary also left Fazekas "in 
charge o f ' the bank during his absences.23 
About the arrest of Temesvary and Fazekas, DeHuszar writes: 
It was a strange feeling to go to both of them & tell them 
"Pack up, you have 20 minutes." Fazekas was white like the 
snow and deadly scared. Temesvary told me where Szalasi was 
(he believed in him). Later after I suggested that he take me to 
him he said that the radio announced that Sz. was captured 3 
days ago. I asked the others but they did not hear it. Talked to 
his two chauffeurs who drove him to Sz 10 days ago & one of 
them told me that he heard it at noon from T. which means that 
T. told him at noon what to say.24 
DeHuszar's diary also reveals that Temesvary and Fazekas escaped the 
POW camp a few days after their arrest. DeHuszar "went [back] to 
Spital," where he arrested them a second time on May 14: 
Temesvary and Fazekas got out of PW & went to Spital. A 
Hungarian General [had] secured them permission to go. Had to 
drive 100 miles to get them back. Arrange our own detention 
camp & we have now a Hfungarian] gendarme detail. Temes-
v[ary] complained that he was in a concentration camp for 3 
days, upon which I offered to show him one.25 
Unlike Temesvary, who was fifty years old at the time of his trial, 
Fazekas, in his early thirties, did not stand trial. There is no file on him in 
the People's Courts materials, nor among the prosecution materials in the 
Budapest City Archives. Instead, he apparently was sent to a POW camp, 
where he successfully completed a de-Nazification program and was given 
a job.26 
In contrast, Temesvary's arrest was openly discussed at bank 
meetings in October 1945 and recorded in bank minutes. Mrs Temesvary 
testified to bank directors and later at her husband's trial that he was 
arrested in Spital and taken away, that a few days later he returned to 
Spital and was arrested again.27 Among the charges brought against him 
by the People's Courts were using bank money to support the Arrow 
Cross and accepting two Arrow Cross boxes containing stolen Jewish 
valuables that he stored in the bank. At his trial in 1946, Temesvary 
admitted that he had stored the two boxes of stolen Jewish property in the 
bank and that they had been part of the valuables transported out of 
Hungary to Spital. He testified that they were not, however, included in 
the inventory later given to the Americans.28 
In his 2002 book The Gold Train, Ronald Zweig quotes from a 
document that shows how stolen Jewish valuables came to be stored in 
the bank. The document records a transaction that took place December 5, 
1944, in Budapest. It concerns valuables presumably stolen the previous 
day from Jewish apartments whose owners had been sent to the Budapest 
ghetto. It reads: 
The committee decided to give the $300 and the twenty pieces 
of jewellery with precious stones and one silver cigar box to 
the President of the National Bank, Brother (Testver or Com-
rade) Laszlo Temesvary, in order for him to deposit them in the 
National Bank, while the rest of the silver goods will be trans-
ported to the cellar of the National Bank in three boxes and one 
basket.29 
On April 28, 1945, Temesvary asked for and received the Arrow 
Cross boxes "n. 7" and "n. 9," saying that Szalasi had entrusted him with 
the handling of this "Jewish treasure."30 The third Arrow Cross box and 
one basket mentioned in the above document are not clearly identifiable 
in the bank's inventory. However, in the 1945 inventory given to the 
Americans and the 1947 inventory of remaining items to be returned to 
Hungary — the gold reserves had been returned in August 1946 — there 
appears a box containing all of the loose items mentioned above together 
with additional pieces of jewellery: "one silver cigar case [containing! 
$300, and 42 pieces jewellery."31 
Mrs. Temesvary told the bank directors, and later testified to the 
People's Court judge, that her husband made one easy-to-carry package 
out of the boxes and twice tried to bring these valuables to the "gold 
train" nearby or to "the Germans." Temesvary testified that he tried to 
give them to Szalasi. After her husband's arrest, Mrs. Temesvary said she 
tried to return the valuables to the bank.32 
American Documents and Istvan Cottely's Account 
There is one eye witness account, by Istvan Cottely of Buenos Aires, 
written originally in Spanish more than forty years after the events in 
Spital took place. It was published in 1992 in a Hungarian translation by 
Katalin Pa l f fy as A Magyar aranytartalelek a masodik vilaghdboru 
viharaban (The Hungarian Treasures During the Second World War). An 
unpublished German translation of the account by Dr. Lothar Schwarz 
also exists. Notably, the German account differs from the Hungarian in 
several, significant details. Cottely's account appears to be the first pub-
lished post-1989 account and all subsequent histories cite it, making the 
article an important historical source document.13 
In his autobiographical remarks Cottely writes that he was born in 
Pozsony (today's Bratislava) in 1905. When this city became part of 
Czechoslovakia in 1918, he was forced to learn Slovak in addition to 
Hungarian and German. Because Czech universities conducted classes in 
Slovak, Cottely chose to continue his education in Vienna. There he 
studied economics and in 1927 obtained the doctor of law degree. After 
fulfilling his Czechoslovakian military service in 1931-1932, he married 
an Italian. As a young lawyer working in his father's office, he became 
engaged in politics. Specifically, he founded a Christian-Social organiza-
tion for Hungarian youth. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested for irreden-
tist activities and jailed for a year. Upon his release, he moved to Hun-
gary, which he considered his true home. There he found a job with the 
National Bank of Hungary.34 
According to Cottely, in 1942, the bank sent him to work in the 
Bank of Italy's department of economic research "in order to become 
familiar with Italian "financial politics" (penzpolitikajaval) in the Hungar-
ian translation or "Italian politics" (um die von diesen Land adoptierte 
Politik kennenzulernen) in the German.35 After the war, he was unable to 
obtain a travel visa from the Allies, or from Italy, where his wife's family 
was living. As a result, he had to travel without one to Rome, where the 
Vatican had a relief agency for Hungarian refugees. Still unable to obtain 
a visa, a permanent job, or permanent residency, after several months in 
Rome, he applied to immigrate to Brazil, Canada, and Argentina. Shortly 
thereafter, Argentina responded favourably. He and his family arrived in 
Buenos Aires in May 1948.36 
DeHuszar's 1945 and Cottely's 1992 accounts provide an interest-
ing contrast. According to American documents, on May 8, Special Agent 
DeHuszar asked for and received from General Manager Cottely a copy 
of the bank's inventory, after which he verified the existence of the 
valuables.37 The twenty-seven-year-old CIC Special Agent interviewed the 
forty-year-old general manager again on the afternoon of May 9. DeHu-
szar records in his diary that during this second encounter he "caught him 
[Cottely] in a lie...." Afterwards, he interviewed former Business Manager 
Karoly Frank. On May 10, Special Agent DeHuszar spent his "forenoon 
[in Spital] talking to directors." That afternoon he arrested Temesvary and 
Fazekas, and, four days later, arrested them again. 
Finally, both DeHuszar and Cottely took part in the critical May 
13 negotiations between the Hungarian National Bank and the U.S. 
Military Government. Cottely represented the bank; four American 
officers, the U.S. Military Government; while DeHuszar translated inven-
tory and assisted in negotiations. DeHuszar writes: "13 May SPITAL: 
Negotiations between MG & H.N. Bank. Cottely behaved excellently and 
gained the respect of all four officers. They will definitely report favo-
rably on the bank & try to help them. I translate inventory and help at 
negotiations. 
Nevertheless, in his account Cottely does not mention Special 
Agent DeHuszar by name or function. In his account, DeHuszar never 
requested an inventory; instead Major Perera did (on May 13). Further, 
DeHuszar never interviewed Cottely, 
never talked to bank directors, never 
arrested Temesvary and Fazekas, and never took part in the negotiations. 
On May 12, according to Cottely, General George Patton arrived 
and personally shook hands with him.39 However, Patton did not mention 
the bank, or anything related to the bank, in his diary on, before, or after 
the supposed date of the purported encounter. Instead, "on May 12, 1945, 
General Patton met in Linz with the Commanding General of the 4th 
Russian Guards Army" for an Honours Guard ceremony followed by 
lunch at the officers' club, consisting mainly of whiskey.40 None of the 
published Hungarian accounts back up Cottely's assertion, nor do U.S. 
Army documents. It appears that forty years after DeHuszar first "caught 
him in a lie," he may have caught him in another. 
In fact, the most important event to occur on that day was the 
selection by bank leaders of Gyula Torzsay-Biber to replace Cottely as 
General Manager and the reinstallation of October 14, 1944, directors.41 
This change in leadership was a direct result of DeHuszar's arrest of 
Temesvary and Fazekas. 
Other Americans receive Cottely's praise. Chief Finance Officer 
Major Perara, the head of the negotiating committee, as well as Major F. 
M. Roesti, and Lieutenant J. S. Terry are singled out as "lower ranking 
officers" who behaved "much more politely to the Hungarians" than the 
unfriendly Americans who had arrived earlier. 
Yet, perhaps Cottely does refer to DeHuszar indirectly when he 
writes that the Americans who arrived on May 7 treated the Hungarians 
as "a former enemy" (conflating the arrival of American tanks and 
military personnel with DeHuszar's arrival the next day). They were "fair 
but unfriendly," Cottely writes. They would not shake hands with him.42 
In other words, perhaps Cottely found DeHuszar fair but un-
friendly. Perhaps DeHuszar would not shake hands with him. Considering 
that Hungary declared war on the United States and considering the 
genocide DeHuszar had seen first hand as the Third Army swept through 
Germany, knowing many of his own family members had been left at risk 
in Hungary for death or deportation, I think this quite likely. One month 
earlier, on April 10 in Gotha, Germany, DeHuszar wrote: 
Went out to Ohrdruf where there was a camp for foreign 
workers. Saw some twenty men machine-gunned & still laying 
[sic] in their blood. The Germans herded them into a pile just 
before we came. Some bodies arranged in a pile ready to be 
burned. Gruesome & terrible sight. Some were alive in the 
barracks but suffered from malnutrition. It should be compul-
sory to see it — so we all know what we are fighting for.43 
Earlier, in Neukirchen, on April 1, he notes: 
On [sic] the evening in the town we saw plenty of women. 
They were Hungarian Jewesses picked up from Budapest etc. & 
sent here to work. Summer 1944 they picked up all Jewish 
women (Nurnberg law Jews) and sent them on cattle trains to 
Alsweig [sic] where they had a gas-extermination camp. The 
old ones were killed the rest of them were undressed & were 
told to walk up before SS men.... The good looking ones were 
sent to bordells [sic] for the SS & Wehrmacht.... the others sent 
here to work in a gas factory that was dangerous to health. 
They were beaten & mistreated, had little to eat.... They make a 
horrible sight. 
He continues : 
What I saw & heard was sufficient to feel like slaping [sic] 
every German on the face, woman or man, alike and have no 
remorse for what I am doing. They have it too good — they 
should taste half of what they gone through. 
I don't have [to] believe or disbelieve the atrocity stories, I 
saw hundreds of the thousand women — and what about those 
I couldn't see anymore.44 
What does DeHuszar say about Cottely in his final May 14 
"Report on the Board of Directors..."?: "ISTVAN COTTELY joined the 
party Mar[ch] '45 under pressure. He is not a Nazi at all. He is the 
Director of the Statistical and Educational Department and the only one 
from the Board of Directors who speaks English."45 The "at all" in "He is 
not a Nazi at all" suggests that earlier DeHuszar suspected he was. 
Karoly Frank 
Another fact mentioned only in DeHuszar's diary illuminates his investi-
gation and gives us a glimpse of the inner workings of the bank. On his 
first day at Spital, DeHuszar asked Cottely for data missing from the 
inventory list. Cottely called "Dr. Frank" to get the information. When 
Frank brought it, DeHuszar recognized him: "Not until I look at him do I 
realize who he was... a little bit bent but very much the same polite [man] 
bringing me all the figures I demanded. He, however, did not recognize 
me. What a coincidence." 
A former neighbour and highly respected family acquaintance, 
Karoly Frank had been with the bank for thirty-five years and was at one 
time its general manager, but had been demoted after October 15 to 
assistant director. DeHuszar asked both men to appear at his office the 
next afternoon.45 
On May 9, DeHuszar spoke with Cottely first. After he caught 
Cottely "in a lie," he talked to Frank. DeHuszar reminded him of the ping 
pong games he and his brother used to play in Frank's basement with his 
son Zoli. Then Frank remembered that DeHuszar's father had been an 
editor (szerkesztd) and that DeHuszar left with his mother in 1939. Frank, 
who was very happy to see DeHuszar, told him that his family's home 
had been sold, and DeHuszar promised to see if he can locate Zoli and 
his brother. 
Frank revealed, among other things, that he, former General 
Manager Laszlo Jankovics, and bank attorney Gyula Torzsay-Biber were 
the only directors who refused to join the Arrow-Cross party.46 DeHuszar 
reports: 
FRANK, DR. KAROLY is with bank for past 35 years and is 
now assistant director. He was the business manager until 
October 1944, but lost his position because he refused to join 
the Party. Since he was a 'Liberal', FAZEKAS wanted to fire 
him. JANKOVICS, however, stood up beside him threatening 
[with] resignation if Frank was dismissed. This saved FRANK'S 
job, who is considered the 'Best Head' in the entire organiza-
tion.47 
As a result of this meeting, other bank employees (including Cottely) 
might well have learned that the Special Agent was a former Hungarian 
refugee. DeHuszar writes in his diary that Frank told him about a discus-
sion he'd had with his colleagues before the interview: 
He [Frank] didn't know why I wanted him too [along with 
Cottely] since he was not a leading man anymore. They talked 
about it & one of them remarked: 'You probably impressed 
him.' (Ha ok tudtak volna.).... He was one of the few who in 
spite of everything did not join the party. But they had to keep 
him because only he knew what the score was. Some directors 
only joined in March. He & two others refused. (Jankov[ics]... 
was pensioned [off] because of that.)4* 
It is even likely that upon his return to the bank, Frank's colleagues would 
have asked him why the American wanted to talk to him and that Frank 
replied that he'd known him before the war. Certainly, DeHuszar's conver-
sation (in Hungarian) with bank directors on the forenoon of May 10 
could have suggested his former refugee status. 
In his diary entry for May 10, DeHuszar writes that he arrested 
the two Arrow Cross men "with clear conscience and great pleasure. In 
addition to clear facts that would have been sufficient to arrest them my 
action was supported by the conviction that these men have no right to 
rule those who have still held out against the pressure." 
And he concludes: "There is justice! Frank was always decent and now he 
is the one whose word will count as far as I am concerned."49 
Torzsay-Biber, the most senior member of the leadership, became 
General manager on May 12, replacing Cottely.50 Torzsay-Biber had been 
with the bank for twenty years, was "known in international banking 
circles and... considered a man of great integrity."51 However, in Septem-
ber Torzsay-Biber left his leadership position and was arrested for refus-
ing to cooperate with the "red bank" in Budapest. Karoly Frank was then 
selected to head a committee of nine to run the bank in Spital.52 
On at least two other occasions Karoly Frank influenced events. 
Temesvary had forced Jankovics to "retire" on April 3 and appointed 
Cottely in his place. In a telephone conversation on April 10, Gabor 
Vajna (whom Cottely refers to as "the Interior Minister" rather than by 
name) gave Cottely the order to move the bank further west.5-1 On April 
25, Temesvary learned that Arrow Cross bank employees had petitioned 
Szalasi directly, and he rushed off to consult Szalasi himself. The next 
day Temesvary announced to the staff that, on Szalasi's orders, the bank 
would be moved south to Carinthia. According to Cottely, after Temes-
vary's announcement, bank employees met at the home of Karoly Frank 
and decided to sabotage any attempt to move the bank.54 
It could well be this meeting that led to the ruse — mentioned 
only in contemporary American newspapers — that helped to preserve the 
gold reserves for Hungary. The Chicago Daily News for May 21, 1945, 
reported these details at the end of its front page story, "Chicagoan Finds 
Hungary Gold in Alps Crag": 
Supreme Headquarters said Nazi Gestapo agents tried to hijack 
the treasure shortly before the arrival of 80th division dough-
boys. The Gestapo had the active co-operation of the Hungarian 
bank president . . . . But a patriot Hungarian stalled on the job 
and deliberately mislaid keys and key records and generally 
sabotaged the German attempt at plunder.55 
Second, the October bank minutes reveal that earlier Frank had 
wanted to tell the Americans about the two boxes with Jewish valuables 
(that were not on the inventory list), but that Cottely and Torzsay-Biber 
thought it "superfluous" to do so. After Torzsay-Biber's removal from 
power and Cottely's transfer to work on the bank's records with the 
Americans in Frankfurt am Main, Dr. Frank began an investigation into 
the boxes.56 
On October 11, 1945, Frank called a meeting of those bank 
employees still in Spital who had attended the April 28 meeting, at which 
Cottely gave Temesvary the two Arrow Cross boxes. They documented 
that the boxes had been given to Temesvary in the presence of "Chief 
Executive Officer (vezerigazgato)" Istvan Cottely. The attendees, with 
Mrs. Temesvary, also documented that the bank had been unable to take 
back the valuables and that bank officials had advised her to take them to 
an appropriate German bank (devizabank). 
Frank called another meeting for October 18 to discuss what 
became of the Arrow Cross boxes. At this meeting Mrs. Temesvary stated 
that at first Cottely agreed to take the jewellery; however, she would not 
sign an affidavit to this effect. Finally, on October 20, an inventory of the 
remaining valuables was made at the apartment of Tibor Meszarovits, a 
delegate (megbizott) from the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office. A 
sampling of the kinds of valuables remaining includes: 299 gold rings of 
various sizes, many watches, coins, necklaces, bracelets, earrings, dia-
mond pins, cigarette cases, medallions, etc.57 
Differences in the two Translations of Cottely's Account 
The German translation of Cottely's memoir differs significantly in several 
key places from the Hungarian. These need further examination. In the 
Hungarian version, the date on which Temesvary retired (i.e. fired) Laszlo 
Jankovics is May 3, 1945, rather than April 3, as in the German transla-
tion.58 The time difference matters. By March 30, the Russians had almost 
reached Sopron along Hungary's western border. By April 4, they had 
completed their occupation of Hungary; and by April 13, they had 
captured Vienna. In the meantime, the Americans, under Patton, were fast 
approaching from the West. Temesvary must have known at the begin-
ning of April that the time had come for Arrow Crossers (and Nazis) to 
grab the gold and escape. For this delicate task, Temesvary needed help 
from someone more cooperative than General Manager Laszlo Jankovics, 
who wouldn't even join the Arrow Cross. In fact, he replaced Jankovics 
with Cottely. 
Special Agent DeHuszar's diary also supports the earlier date as 
well as a desire to scapegoat Jankovics. On May 9, DeHuszar writes, 
"Some directors only joined in March. He [Karoly Frank] & two others 
refused. (Jankovics vezerigazgato was pensioned because of that.)" 
DeHuszar also records that during his discussion with bank directors on 
May 10, "Fazekas accuses Jankovics of being a drunk & a party member. 
Then when Jankovics [is] called he [Fazekas] begs him to admit that. The 
contrary is true."59 According to Catherine Ladanyi, wife of bank director 
Frigyes Ladanyi, it was General Manager Laszlo Jankovics who had refu-
sed to let the trains leave Hungary in January, 1945, before the agreement 
with the Germans stated that the bank employees would not be separated 
from the gold reserves. 
Changing the date of Jankovics's retirement to May 3 could 
mislead the reader into thinking unfairly that Jankovics was still in charge 
during the period when Cottely was telephoning with Gabor Vajna (April 
10), giving Temesvary the boxes of Jewish property (April 28), and 
receiving instructions from Gauleiter August Eigruber (April 30). In fact, 
under Cottely's leadership, bank employees felt compelled to send a 
petition to Szalasi themselves on April 24, protesting orders to move the 
bank. Temesvary then rushed off to Szalasi and returned with supposedly 
authentic affidavits, written on scraps of paper, indicating the renewed 
powers Szalasi had given him and the penalties should anyone dare 
disobey his commands.60 
The accurate date, April 3, clarifies Cottely's meteoric rise from 
bank employee to chief executive officer (vezerigazgato). In mid-October 
1944, Temesvary had promoted Cottely from his position as an employee 
to that of director of the Statistical and Economics Department. By 
January 1, 1945, Cottely had responsibility for organizing the trains and 
overseeing the move from the Hungarian border into the Reich. On April 
3, Temesvary made him the top bank officer (replacing Jankovics). Under 
the Arrow Cross regime, it took Cottely little more than five months to 
advance from bank employee to general manager, or to use his own 
words, "the man most responsible for the fate of the bank and its employ-
ees."61 
Of course, the date change in the Hungarian translation might 
simply be a typographical error. However, Cottely told Catherine Ladanyi 
he knew about "this mistake." He further stated that he had not tried to 
correct it because he thought it had been "too late" to change. Nonethe-
less, he sent the published article "to diplomats, politicians... to every-
one."62 
Moreover, there are other curious, but consistent alterations in the 
Hungarian translation. First, it omits the meeting Cottely says took place 
at Frank's house April 26, the meeting, at which bank employees decided 
to sabotage any attempt to separate them from the gold they were protect-
ing. Was this another sign that some bank employees had lost faith in 
Cottely's ability (or desire?) to save the gold for Hungary? This group of 
bank employees, Cottely writes, also demanded that Cottely include them 
in future management meetings.63 Two days later, Cottely handed over to 
Temesvary the Arrow Cross boxes filled with portable, fungible assets.64 
Another omission in the Hungarian translation occurs in the 6 
May 1945 letter Cottely reproduces from Herr Schiisselmann, who had 
demanded an immediate transfer of the bank's gold. This omission noted 
the presence in the bank of Reichbanksdirektor Dr. Leopold Scheffler, 
who had the responsibility of supporting the bank through trade with 
Hungary, as specified in the agreement signed at the border back in 
January.65 The sentence reminds the reader of the continuing cooperation 
between officials of the two governments, which in the matter of trade 
favoured Germany over Hungary.66 
Finally, the German translation records one reason Cottely wrote 
his recollections: "to portray the true story" (die wahre Geschichte 
darzulegen).67 
Questions 
In the end we are left with questions: 
1. Were the items turned over to Temesvary during the Arrow 
Cross meeting in Budapest on December 4, 1944, the only stolen Jewish 
valuables that were stored in the bank? Were the boxes containing silver 
(mentioned in the Arrow Cross memorandum) the same as the two 
Temesvary took on April 28? If the two boxes Cottely returned to 
Temesvary were two of the three given to him in Budapest, what hap-
pened to the third box and basket? 
2. Were there particular reasons why, after 47 years, Cottely 
omitted the Special Agent and his arrests of Temesvary and Fazekas from 
his "true story"? Whatever Cottely's reasons for eliminating DeHuszar 
from the narrative, there is sufficient documentary evidence to indicate 
that Cottely is, at times, an unreliable narrator. 
3. Perhaps Cottely's omits Temesvary's arrest because this event 
radically changed Cottely's position at the bank. After Temesvary's arrest, 
Torzsay-Biber became general manager, and the October 14 leadership 
was reinstalled. Cottely would have had no leadership responsibilities 
until he travelled to Frankfurt in July to work on the bank records. Here a 
new question arises: How did his previous working relationships affect his 
work on bank records? 
4. What is the explanation for the differences between the 
Hungarian and German translations? The fact that I stumbled upon these 
differences by chance is a reminder that the reader with access only to the 
Hungarian translation would never know that it had been edited. 
It is my hope that the new evidence presented here from Ameri-
can and Hungarian archival documents will spur further research into the 
events at Spital and that new studies will benefit from the light shed on 
Cottely's account and its Hungarian translation. Since, as Randolph 
Braham reminds us, "history is a formidable weapon,"68 and since few of 
the participants in the events in Spital are still among us, it is especially 
important to use all available documents in our efforts to leave an accu-
rate record for future generations. 
Conclusion 
It is ironic, to say the least, that the first American military intelligence 
agent to contact the National Bank of Hungary's executive board in 
response to the urgent plea for help was a former Hungarian who had 
been driven from his home, family, and friends. And it is absolutely 
fitting that the Special Agent who lost most of his extended family in the 
Holocaust arrested the Arrow Cross propagandist who had contributed to 
the hate campaign against Hungarian Jews and the theft of their property. 
My father's encounter with a family friend, former Business 
Manager Karoly Frank led to the arrests of Temesvary and Fazekas and 
enabled him to help the bank put its best foot forward with the Ameri-
cans. Later, Frank's investigation of the two Arrow Cross boxes restored 
bank accountability regarding this matter. In the end, of all Europeans, 
only the Hungarians had their gold reserves and national valuables 
returned to them intact after the war. 
"There is justice!" my father wrote on the day he made the 
arrests. On May 15, the day after he had arrested Temesvary and Fazekas 
for the second time and ensured that they could not escape again, Special 
Agent DeHuszar "went to Miihlbach via Gmunden and picked up Gabor 
Vajna."69 He would devote the rest of his military service to pursuing 
Nazi war criminals. 
In one of his last entries, my father writes: "Col Ball at supper 
with us & he told the Capt that the Hungarians told him that they ha te to 
see the 80th D i v i s i o n ] go because I was in it & would leave with 
them."7 0 
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Sport Policy in Canada and Hungary: 
Lessons of Inclusion and Exclusion 
Emese Ivan 
The level of academic and policy debate around issues of multi-
culturalism, integration and related concepts and approaches has grown 
enormously in recent years. In the European context it has been fostered 
1) by the need to deal with issues related to the post-colonial period when 
the end of empire signalled a new relationship with migrant populations 
from the former colonies, and 2) by the aftermath of the fall of commu-
nism in Central and Eastern Europe and wars in the Middle East that led 
to displacement of large number of people. Although transnational agree-
ments have reflected a need for a broader response to the recent large-
scale migration, considerable varieties in national policies still remain. 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, Canada represents to the world a 
culturally pluralistic society. Canadian political policies project the 
sentiment that racial and ethnic groups in Canadian society are useful and 
even desirable. The Canadian government has traditionally supported the 
policy of multiculturalism that originated in the early 1970s.1 
Throughout the modern era, society has romanticized the belief 
that sport is "the great equalizer." This notion implies that an ultimate 
common goal of competitive rivalry and victory exists within a sporting 
context and, as a result, concerns about race or ethnic differences suppo-
sedly diminish when weighed in comparison to the desire to win. On the 
contrary, sport can operate both as a component that may reinforce the 
separation between classes and ethic groups, and also as an element that 
may create and reinforce temporary links between participants from 
different social and cultural backgrounds. 
This study analyses the emergence of sport as a sector of public 
policy interest in two countries: Canada and Hungary. Central to the paper 
is the manifestation of "equal opportunity in sport" as a key policy 
concern in both countries. While the emergence of the concept "equality 
in sport - equality through sport" is the focus here, the increased sporting 
activities at regional and sub-regional level in Canada and Hungary 
require some attention. The paper draws from data gathered on two 
particular areas of sport policy representing equal opportunities in sport: 
sport for minority groups and sport for people with disabilities. The study 
relies on primary sources such as the published texts of various govern-
ment initiatives, directives and reports; secondary sources including 
books, conference papers and unpublished theses; as well as on interviews 
with academics who have been involved in empirical investigations of 
equal opportunity in Canadian or Hungarian sport. 
Canada 
Although Canada's culture and economy are greatly influenced by the 
United States, the country's historical roots are largely European. 
Canada's style of governance can best be described as a liberal democracy 
— within a federalist system of power sharing. Even though sport has 
been named as one of the important elements in Canadian history to build 
a nation divided geographically, religiously, and ethnically, for a long 
time Canadian governments have not had direct policy interests in sport. 
The shift towards increased federal government involvement in sport and 
away from what can be termed as a "voluntarist" approach became 
pronounced in September 1961 with the introduction of Bill 131 "An Act 
to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport." Since this initiative, Canadian 
sport policy must be contextualized in light of the broader political 
tensions surrounding the separatist tendencies in Quebec, ideological 
predominance of the Liberal Party in promoting cultural pluralism, and 
the growing influence of American capital in all aspects of Canadian life. 
In 1996, a Census Canada survey showed that 12.5 million Cana-
dians — 44% of the population — reported origins other than British, 
French or Canadian. Half a million people — around 2% of the total 
population — reported only Aboriginal origin.2 From another perspective, 
Canadian society can be also described as a complex network of relations 
among different ethnic groups that have unequal economic, political, and 
social positions or capacities. These relations can be characterized in the 
following ethnic polarities: 
- Natives vs. non-Natives 
- French vs. English 
- Colonizing (English, French) vs. other immigrant groups 
The Canadian Multicultural Act3 is a supplementary document to the 
Constitution. Multiculturalism as a government policy perspective has inf-
luenced sport policy as well. 
With respect to certain ethnic issues in sport, Christine M. 
O'Bonsawin, a sports historian at the University of Western Ontario, sug-
gests that 
The political, social, and cultural context, in which Native 
athletes participated in Canadian sport throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, assists in understanding their position in the Canadian 
mainstream sport system. The political context of Native 
participation relates specifically to federal policies addressing 
the government's role in both Native affairs and the develop-
ment and implementation of federal sport policies.4 
Significant policies of the federal government included the 1969 
Trudeau-Chretien "White Paper on Indians." This Paper was partly the 
result of ongoing Aboriginal disapproval of government policies during 
the 1960s regarding the appalling living conditions in Aboriginal com-
munities, and partly of the government's desire to place the Aboriginal 
question into a wider context of multicultural/bilingual Canadian policies. 
Concurrently the Canadian government's desire to promote sport specifi-
cally at the elite level, led to the formation of an Aboriginal sport policy 
and to increased participation of Aboriginal athletes in different sports. 
After the inception of the Canada Games in 1967, government officials 
realized that Native people of the North did not have opportunity to 
participate in the event. This was caused mainly by the fact that Aborigi-
nal people were not exposed to mainstream sports. 
The initiative to organize a competition similar to the Canada 
Games but primarily for the people of Canadian North came from native 
leaders and northern politicians. The initiative met the broader political 
interest of the federal government for establishing a prominent Canadian 
presence in the Arctic. The Arctic Winter Games featured not only some 
of the more popular mainstream sports but also Native games such as the 
high kick, the whip contest, and Eskimo dance. Even though the Games 
emerged within the context of Native sport policy and in reality served 
wider political goals of the federal government, they became eminent in 
Aboriginal sport policy for decades. As Donald Macintosh, Tom Bedecki, 
Tom Bedecki and C. E. S. Franks pointed out in this regard: "For 
whatever reason, the Arctic Winter Games became a reality in Yellow-
knife in [the] 1970s.... Eight hundred athletes, representing the Northwest 
Territories, the Yukon, and Alaska competed in this first Arctic Games."5 
Another initiative in sport policy definitely followed the pros-
pective of the White Paper, encouraging Aboriginal athletes' participation 
in mainstream sports. The most relevant program of Aboriginal sport 
policy was the TEST — Territorial Experimental Ski Training initiative. 
The government's concern was to motivate Indian and Eskimo youth to 
achieve academically and socially within the broader scope of competitive 
Canadian society. As O'Bonsawin concluded in her analysis of TEST, this 
project had been established explicitly to assimilate Aboriginals.6 Abori-
ginal sport leaders wished to assimilate, but in a way federal officials did 
not expect. Rather than assimilate into the mainstream sport system, they 
insisted on maintaining an all-Native sport system, where successful 
Aboriginal athletes would emerge and compete against the best Euro-
Canadians in provincial and national championships. 
Throughout the 1980s, Aboriginal leaders sought to have their 
sport activities acknowledged as legitimate national sport events. They 
tried to argue that this type of organization should have an equal access to 
government funding with other national sport organizations. In their 
understanding, this would achieve an equal opportunity for Aboriginal 
participants. These ideas led to the formation of the concept of the North 
American Indigenous Games, an all-Native multi-sport competition and 
cultural festival, as a branch to the World Indigenous Nations Games. As 
Janice Forsyth of the University of Manitoba pointed out, the 1980s "were 
a period of transition for Aboriginal Sport in Canada. The rise of the all-
Native sport system, and the initiative to develop a national sport 
coordinating body as part of the National Indian Brotherhood clearly 
demonstrated that Aboriginal people believed they had a right to self-
determination."7 Self-determination ran counter to the federal policies 
targeting Aboriginals for assimilation. 
The 1970s can be described as a decade for the incorporation of 
sport for disabled people into a broader concept of federal sport policy. In 
1976, as a result of the efforts of Dr. Robert F. Jackson, a Toronto Ortho-
pedic Surgeon, Toronto hosted the so-called "Torontolympiad," which 
later became known as the 5th Paralympic Games. Historically, in the 
domestic context, these Games can be referred to as the 3rd Canadian 
Games for Athletes with Disabilities. Although the timing of the Games 
was excellent and followed the Montreal Olympics, the Canadian govern-
ment withdrew its financial support after the organizers decided to allow 
an integrated South African team to compete. But using the initiative and 
the general idea to sustain the Games as an important tool of integration 
for people with disabilities into the wider Canadian society, the federal 
government targeted funds to a newly established coordinating committee 
after the successful accomplishment of the Torontolympiad.8 This 
coordinating committee was the founding organization of the recently 
formed Canadian Paralympic Committee. 
At the end of the 1970s, the federal government integrated 
athletes with disabilities into the Athlete Assistance Program. They were 
carded using the criteria similar to the other athletes. In 1984, nine wheel-
chair and five blind athletes received direct funding. During that decade, 
a growing number of member organizations required more sophisticated 
and increased coordination of activities.9 The Paralympic Committee 
focused on the matters of promotion, rules and coaching integration, 
participation in international competitions and administration involving 
more than one disability group. In the "Year of the Disabled" in 1981 the 
Canadian government provided $200,000 to assist with the programs of 
the organization. As a result of lobbying efforts, the International Para-
lympic Committee approved the creation of a Commission for Inclusion 
of Athletes with a Disability into major international competitions. This 
organization was chaired by Rick Hansen and located in the National 
Sport Centre in Ottawa. In 1996 the Canadian Paralympic Committee — 
after an unsuccessful participation at Atlanta Paralympic Games — 
reviewed its mandate. The report identified declining Canadian perfor-
mance and significant organizational challenges as the most serious 
concerns for the organization. The federal government adjusted the 
Athlete Assistance Program to include more athletes with disabilities. In 
the beginning of the 1990s there were 16 carded athletes with disabilities. 
Until 2001, the Canadian Paralympic Committee membership base 
consisted of 22 national sport organizations. The growing membership 
needed new vision and a new business plan to guide the limited resources, 
while ensuring the priorities and objectives of the organization were met. 
This new vision replaced the "event based" concept of the earlier strategy 
and it became a "movement" based organization on behalf of the 
community of athletes with disabilities. Whatever changes the organiza-
tion needed to secure the necessary funds, it sent its athletes to all of the 
Winter and Summer Olympic Games. The athletes even achieved higher 
ranking results at the Paralympic Games than the National Team of the 
regular Olympic competition. 
But the story of Canadian disabled sport and its inclusion in 
policy discourse speaks for itself. It follows the general tendency of the 
sport policy prospective focusing exclusively on elite development. The 
sport system supports the elite athletes even with disabilities to achieve 
the highest possible results in the mainstream policy terrain, specifically at 
the Olympic/Paralympic Games. 
Hungary 
The organization and development of sport in Hungary followed a 
different path. Historically, sport administration in Hungary had developed 
in tight connection with the educational system. Prussian-style military 
discipline used to be considered essential at all levels of the county's 
schools. Physical education played a very important role in this. 
Following the establishment of communist rule in Hungary in the 
late 1940s, both education and sport became organized on a strictly 
centralized, totalitarian pattern. After the demise of communism in 1989 
the Hungarian sport system began its democratic life in a highly turbulent 
atmosphere. Although the Government faced severe economic, political, 
and social problems, it managed to focus on the challenges faced by the 
sport community. On the 1st of January, 1999 it established the Ministry 
of Youth and Sport. The Ministry considered a priority the promotion of 
an active lifestyle for people all ages, both sexes, including citizens with 
disabilities. In 2002, a "White Paper on the Recent Situation on Sport in 
Hungary" was undertaken upon the request of the Ministry. The Paper's 
suggestions and recommendations served as the basis for Hungary's sub-
sequent sport strategy. 
"The National Sport Strategy" (NSS)10 is a political document, 
that surveys the current situation of the Hungarian sport system. It 
outlines the long-term goals of the sport community and conceptualizes 
the operational plans for achieving these goals. The sport policy as health, 
educational, youth, social and regional policies, became an integral part of 
the National Development Plan (NDP)." The National Development Plan 
emphasizes that without a mentally and physically healthy population it 
would be impossible to improve the competitiveness and the quality of 
life in the country. It acknowledges that the goals of the sport community 
have to be taken into consideration in the country's long-term socio-
economical planning process. The creation of the National Sport Strategy 
as part of the National Development Plan of Hungary is a moment of 
historical importance. 
Hungary has a highly homogenous population, where members of 
ethnic minorities comprise only about 3% of the citizenry. Officially, the 
Roma ethnic community represents 1.95% of the total population, while 
other minority groups represent nationalities from different East European 
countries, as well as Germans and Greeks.12 
Emphasizing the social importance of sport in promoting equal 
opportunities, the NSS pays particular attention to society's disadvantaged 
groups. Analyzing the structure of the document, chapters like "The Role 
of Sport in Social Cohesion" and "Sport for People with Disabilities" are 
placed at the very beginning of the document, far ahead of chapters such 
as "Elite Sport Development" or "Connection between Business and 
Sport."13 
Promoting equal opportunities for under-represented social groups, 
the Ministry of Sport launched the "Moonlight" program in 2001. It is a 
organized sport competition that takes place in the evenings, targeting the 
disadvantaged youth of urban communities who otherwise would be 
spending their time on the streets. In the table-tennis competition, for 
example, the participation amounted to 8000 individuals. Unfortunately 
there is no official data provided on the ethnic background of the partici-
pants. 
The Roma population has been targeted in the formal educational 
policies, policies that should have included the physical education curricu-
lum. In the period between 2001-2004, over $100 million was provided 
through the European Union's educational programs for Roma projects in 
Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, but sport currently is not 
included as a form of activity promoted in existing educational program-
mes. The so-called non-formal educational programming of sport has 
never targeted the Roma population on its own. 
In 1995, in order to seek some administrative help, the President 
of the Roma Soccer Federation, which had been established in 1992, 
contacted the Hungarian Soccer Federation expressing the Romas' desire 
and willingness to be included into the mainstream sport developments of 
Hungarian soccer. After long negotiations, in 1997 the Hungarian Soccer 
federation established a Roma Committee, incorporating the leaders of the 
Roma Soccer Federation into its own representatives.14 The Ministry of 
Sport, the Ministry of Interior, and the Hungarian Soccer Federation 
organized the Hungarian Anti-Racism Day first in 2003. The event 
included matches involving the national Roma and Slovene minorities' 
teams at the senior and junior levels. The insignificant percentage of other 
ethic groups in relation to the total Hungarian majority probably explains 
the non-existence of any specific policies that target other ethnic minori-
ties of the country. In both the formal and non-formal educational poli-
cies, the only existing measures are those showing the general level of 
integration for minority groups. 
Until the 1970s, the situation of people with disabilities in Hunga-
rian sport can be best characterized as "persona non grata." There were 
no opportunities for them to participate in organized sporting activities, 
there were no clubs, and facilities for them to use. The first sport clubs, 
or affiliations for people with disabilities came about in sports like table 
tennis, archery, sitting-volleyball and, later on, in swimming, bowling, and 
indoor soccer.15 Hungarian disabled athletes officially have been able to 
participate in international competitions only since 1984. Before that, the 
National Committee of Sport and Physical Education for People with 
Disabilities approached the National Office for Sport and Physical 
Education several times for their support to become a member of inter-
national organizations and that way secure the right of participation for 
their athletes, but the Office rejected these pleas without any explanation. 
The 1990s brought new opportunities for disabled athletes. Sport 
clubs organized activities and established national championships in a 
variety of sports for disabled people. In 1991, Budapest hosted the third 
Congress of the International Paralympic Committee. Although this was a 
promising start towards a new and existing sport policy for disabled 
people, the results quickly became frustrating. While sport organizations, 
clubs, and affiliations mushroomed, so did misunderstandings and discord 
among them. Perhaps the explanation for this can be found in the diffe-
rence of organizational structures between the disabled and mainstream 
sport organizations: the former formulated their associations on the basis 
of the type of disability while the latter were organized by disciplines. 
Unfortunately these problems resulted in a seven year delay in the estab-
lishment of the Hungarian Paralympic Committee and its sub-organiza-
tions in each sport discipline. 
In 1999 the newly established Ministry and the Paralympic sub-
committees together launched the first national sport program targeting 
people with disabilities. The program proudly announced that its primary 
focus would be on the recreational activities of disabled people — as an 
integral part of the general sport policy — while fostering and encourag-
ing the participation of disabled elite athletes in Paralympic Games and 
other international competitions. To achieve these two main goals, the 
Ministry divided funding for disabled sport into two sections: one to 
support elite athletes on the basis of a "carded system" similar to one in 
Canada; the other towards reconstruction of facilities that in most cases 
did not have any kind of wheelchair access for people with disabilities — 
either athletes or spectators. Taking into consideration the discourse of the 
National Sport Strategy, this initiative should have been emphasized in 
operational planning and consequently in funding, because this aspect of 
the program should have focussed on general recreation, in other words, 
on the inclusion of people with disabilities. In fact, an examination of the 
distribution of funds provided for the Ministry's two goals makes it evi-
dent that while the elite development received $11 million between 1999-
2005 from the state budget the amount allocated for the program's second 
section was just $2 million.16 
Conclusions 
Social exclusion as a concept entered political discourse in the 1980s. The 
term was adopted partly to deal with the reluctance of governments to use 
the word "poverty" and became central in the programming targeted at 
the most disadvantaged members of society in general. Within this 
context, a range of different actions have been identified that can promote 
intercultural understanding and mutual respect between different commu-
nities and groups, including legislation but also cultural and educational 
programs. Sport is one of such areas of policy activities. It has been 
recognized on the national and international levels as a "social phenome-
non." Sport in policy discourse offers a "common language and platform 
for social democracy," "it creates conditions for political democracy and 
is instrumental for development of democratic citizenship," "it contributes 
to the fight against prejudice," "it plays its part to limit social exclusion 
of minorities." However such claims about using sport are rarely made 
with the support of evidence or detailed analysis of how such goals can 
be accomplished.17 
Nevertheless, many aspects of social exclusion share one common 
feature: the lack of opportunities for some people to participate, that is a 
lack of social connectedness or social capital. Thus, offering opportunities 
to people to participate in sport can assist in this respect. As Coalter 
pointed out,18 it is necessary to consider the various features of sport, as 
individual, team, competitive, recreational; and the aims of provision to 
find a way of targeting outcomes so that they are appropriate to the 
different needs of various groups. 
This study examined the inconsistencies between sport policy 
discourses and sport practices regarding equality in sport in Canada and 
Hungary. The similarities between sport policies and practices of the two 
countries are the inclusiveness in discourse rather than in practice; the 
focus exclusively on high performance sport, the result of which is the 
fact that the only established measurement of a successful sport policy is 
the numbers of Olympic/Paralympic medals won. 
But there are some important differences between the two count-
ries' sport policies, and these are in line with their general orientation 
towards citizenship. Ian Henry outlined four different models of 
nationality and citizenship that are illustrative of the range of national 
approaches to sport and diversity. These are the Anglo-Saxon pluralist; 
the German ethno-nationalist; the French republican and the Polish post-
Communist models.19 Canada can be characterized as having a relatively 
heterogeneous population with evidence of multicultural or intercultural 
policy approaches, while Hungary is perceived as relatively homogenous 
population employing assimilationist approaches to policies. In spite of 
this seemingly heterogeneous approach, there is evidence to suggest that 
Canadian sport policies have been assimilationist as well, even though 
Canada claims to be a liberal pluralist state that promotes individual 
freedom of its members, intercultural exchange and separate but equal 
development for ethnic groups. In Hungary, the social organization and 
questions of citizenship were constructed under very different circum-
stances and under the communist regime: the importance of immigration, 
ethnicity, and national minorities were minimized. Even though Hungary 
still is in the process of working out its new approach to citizenship, the 
significance of national minorities has been recognized. Government and 
non-government agencies have been established to provide services to 
ethnic minorities and disadvantaged communities. But the policies are 
associated with an emphasis on cohesion rather than diversity, and with a 
unitary notion of national culture. The sport programming and practice 
still remains assimilationist, which seek to incorporate groups into existing 
national culture. 
Since 1989, Canada and Hungary have cooperated on more than 
150 projects worth over $30 million, funded by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA). Some of these projects were accomplished 
in strengthening civil society and education, but not one particularly in 
sport. The promot ion of sport exchange focusing on young people of 
under-represented groups and with the intention to measure the number of 
participants and their attitude towards cultural d i f ferences could grow into 
new connect ions and into an existing "good practice" benef i t ing both 
countries, and especially will g ive Hungarians the opportunity to learn — 
for good or bad — f rom the Canadian experience. 
N O T E S 
This papers was presented at the Annual Conference of the Hungarian 
Studies Associat ion of Canada on 29 May 2005, in London, Ontar io, in a 
workshop on "Cit izenship in Transitional Societies — C a n a d a ' s Lessons 
f rom Hungary and Central Europe ." The workshop was suppor ted by the 
C I D A - C F H S S Collaborat ive Program. 
' Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau was seeking ways in which he could 
counter two strong negative forces in the country: Quebec separatism and Ameri-
can economic and cultural domination. He mentioned sport in connection with 
culture first in 1968. As a result of his vision on the role of sport in promoting 
national unity, the first Canada Games was held in Quebec City in 1967 under 
the slogan "Unity of Sports." Following this new perspective the federal 
government did not renew the cost-sharing agreement with the provinces. 
Troubled by provincial-federal jurisdiction, it created arm-length organizations 
designed to improve Canada's international sport performances. In the period 
between 1970s and 1990s these organizations received $62 million from the 
federal budget. A Fitness and Amateur Sport Directorate with a deputy minister 
was established and Iona Campagnolo, the veteran Liberal politician, became the 
first Minister of State in sport. Canadian federal government involvement in sport 
is systematically analyzed in following books: Donald Macintosh and David 
Whitson, The Game Planners: Transforming Canada's Sport System (Kingston: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990); and Donald Macintosh, Tom Bedecki, 
and C. E. S. Franks, Sport and Politics in Canada (Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1987). 
2
 Multicultural Canada: Demographic Overview 1998 (Ottawa: Ministry 
of Canadian Heritage, 1998). 
3
 Canadian Multicultural Act 1985. 
4
 Christine O'Bonsawin, "Failed Test: Aboriginal Sport Policy and the 
Olympian Firth Sisters," unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Western 
Ontario, School of Kinesiology, London, Ontario, Canada, 2001. 
5
 Macintosh, Bedecki, and Franks, Sport and Politics in Canada, p. 67. 
6
 O'Bonsawin, Failed Test, p. 106. 
7
 Janice Forsyth, "From Assimilation to Self-Determination: The Emer-
gence of J. Wilton Littlechild's North American Indigenous Games, 1763-1997," 
unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Western Ontario, School of Kinesi-
ology, London, Ontario, Canada, 2001, p. 85. 
x
 For details see the homepage of the Canadian Paralympic Committee: 
http://paralympic.ca/english/aboutus/whoweare/history2.asp 
9
 Macintosh, Bedecki, and Franks, Sport and Politics in Canada, pp. 
135-37. 
10
 See the homepage of the Nemzeti Sporthivatal [hereafter NSP] 
(Hungarian Sports Office): http://nsh.hu/strategia 
11
 See the homepage of the Nemzeti Fejlesztesi Hivatal (Hungarian 
National Development Office): http://www.nft.hu 
12
 European Commission/Directorate General X, Studies on Education 
and Sport; Sport and Multiculturalism — Final Report (Report by PMP in 
partnership with Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy Loughborough University, 
August 2004). 
13
 Homepage of the NSP: http://nsh.hu/strategia 
14
 European Commission/Directorate General X, Studies on Education 
and Sport..., Section 2 "Approaches to sport policy and multiculturalism" (Report 
in partnership with the Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy, Loughborough 
University, August 2004), p. 29. 
15
 A fogyatekos sport tortenete Magyar orszagon [History of disabled 
sport in Hungary], unpublished report, prepared by the Hungarian National Sport 
Office (NSH), April 2005. 
16
 Data provided by Anna Molnar, Deputy Head of the Department for 
Strategic Developments of the NSH (Nemzeti Sporthivatal Strategiai Innovacios 
Foosztaly), during a personal interview on 22 April 2005. 
17
 European Commission/Directorate General X, Studies on Education 
and Sport..., Appendix E: Report on Project Conference "Sport and Multicultural 
Dialogue" (Paris, 26-27 April, 2004), pp. 7-8. 
IX
 Fred Coalter: "What is the evidence to support claims for the social 
inclusion effects of sport?" A paper delivered in April 2004, in Paris in a work-
shop entitled "Using sport for social inclusion." The workshop was organized and 
supported by the European Commission. 
19
 European Commission/Directorate General X, Studies on Education 
and Sport..., section 2: Approaches to sports policy and multiculturalism, pp. 24-
26. 
In Memoriam 
Thomas Spira 
(1923-2005) 
The readers of our journal will be saddened by the news of the passing of 
a trusted and experienced member of our editorial board, Thomas Spira, 
who died last September. An indefatigable worker and editor, Dr. Spira 
has been a role model and adviser to me on most matters of journal 
production and manuscript editing from the very first days of our journal. 
Thomas Spira was bom December 28, 1923, in Bratislava, 
Czechoslovakia, the capital city (Pozsony) of the Kingdom of Hungary 
from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. He and his family left East 
Central Europe during the late 1930s to escape the increasingly anti-
democratic and anti-Semitic political atmosphere there. He arrived in the 
United States just before the outbreak of World War II. Having 
experienced the mainly negative effects of nationalism in his childhood, 
he devoted a lifetime to its study. He received his B.A. from the City 
College of New York and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from McGill 
University in Montreal. He next joined the faculty of the Department of 
History at the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown, 
Prince Edward Island. There, in 1973, he launched the Canadian Review 
of Studies in Nationalism a journal he continued to edit for the rest of his 
life. The Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism published a great 
many articles of significance over the years and helped to give Thomas 
Spira's university a world-wide profile. 
Tom, as he was known to his friends and colleagues, also publi-
shed many articles and wrote or edited many volumes. The latter included 
The Rise of the Global Village; The German-Hungarian-Swabian 
Triangle, 1936-1939; The Road to Discord; Ideologies; and, most 
recently, Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic 
Dictionary and Research Guide. After his retirement from teaching, he re-
mained active as a scholar and editor and was in the process of 
completing the Political Science Handbook of Terminologies: An 
Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide* 
His contribution to our journal, beyond the giving of advice 
regarding editing and publishing, were two articles: "The Radicalization 
of Hungary's Swabian Minority after 1935," XI, 1 (Spring, 1984): 9-22; 
and "The Reaction of Hungary's German Minorities to Oscar Jaszi's Plan 
for an 'Eastern Switzerland,'" XVIII, 1-2 (1991): 27-42. 
Tom personally and thoroughly edited all the manuscripts slated 
for publication in his journal. His work-load must have been tremendous. 
Not surprisingly, no successor stepped forward to take over the task of 
editing the Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism. The journal 
ceased publication. 
Nandor Dreisziger 
* See the obituary of Thomas Spira by Henry Srebrnik, the most recent Associate 
Editor of CRSN, in the last volume of that journal (vol. 32, 2005), p. vii. 
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